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 Passed as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Law 
Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. 14141 (§ 14141) authorizes the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) to investigate, and enter into a court-enforceable structural reform agreement with 
a law enforcement agency engaged in patterns or practices of systemic misconduct, violations of 
federal law, and unconstitutional policing. 
  Under § 14141 authority, 33 investigations of municipal police have been conducted 
since 1994 where the DOJ determined that a police agency was engaged in, or at unreasonable 
risk of engaging in, a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. Publicizing this 
determination, a DOJ issued findings letter is the resultant output of a § 14141 investigation, 
detailing a variety of organizational deficiencies related to polices, practices, procedures, and 
systems contributing to systemic misconduct and unconstitutional policing. 
 Using a mixed-methodological approach, this study sought to identify, describe, explore, 
and analyze phenomena concomitant to DOJ findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional 
policing for municipal police agencies under § 14141 authority. Through an embedded design, 
the qualitative methodology consisted of analyzing DOJ’s findings letters for latent and manifest 
content describing policies, practices, procedures, and systems in need of reform. Supporting the 
v 
 
qualitative analysis, the quantitative portion consisted of analyzing variables integrating 
disjointed incrementalism, deterrence, and the multiple streams framework theories. The 
quantitative analysis was designed to better understand influences on patterns or practices of 
police behavior, organizational decision-making across investigative outcomes, and between 
generations of §14141 enforcement.   
 These analyses led to an explication of the meaning and contours of unconstitutional 
policing, the creation of a compendium of policies and practices to address systemic problems in 
municipal police agencies, and a four-step prescriptive model that can be used to forestall 
systemic misconduct and unconstitutional policing, obviating the potential for § 14141 
investigation, intervention, loss of autonomy, and federal oversight. In addition, an exploration 
of policy options for the continued enforcement of § 14141 is presented based on the analysis of 
past enforcement practices, and emerging conditions.  
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 Federal intervention of municipal police by the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ) in accordance with the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 United States Code § 
14141 (herein § 14141) signifies the failure of a law enforcement agency to meet its civic 
requirement of constitutional policing. At a most basic level, police departments exist to carry 
out the mission of protecting life and property, maintaining order, enforcing laws and 
regulations, arresting offenders, and protecting the rights of citizens within their jurisdiction 
while abiding by the Constitution and applicable law (Haberfeld, 2018). Police agencies1 that do 
not meet these standards are at risk of investigation, intervention, and regulatory oversight by the 
federal government, thereby stripping away jurisdictional control and operational autonomy. 
Considering the historical context, § 14141 empowers the DOJ to intervene in an area of 
government operations that until recently, has been the exclusive domain of local governance by 
tradition and intent. Indeed, the 1994 passage of § 14141 has been referred to by scholars of 
police as an “unprecedented event in the history of American policing” (Walker, 2017, p. 1).  
 Section 14141 authorizes the DOJ to investigate law enforcement agencies suspected of 
engaging in patterns or practices of systemic misconduct, unconstitutional policing, and 
violations of federal law (DOJ, 2017a). Investigations producing affirmative findings that a 
police agency is engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, empowers the DOJ 
to enter into a court-ordered structural reform agreement with the offending police agency to 
address and rectify underlying causes of that misconduct. To meet the sufficient standard of 
proof to initiate this process, the DOJ conducts an investigation and detailed review of a police 
                                                 
1 When referring to police as an organization throughout this dissertation, the terms “department” and “agency” are 
used interchangeably for linguistic purposes. Both of these terms have definitions that include; “an administrative 





agency’s policies, practices, procedures, and systems; attempting to discern the constitutionality 
of the agency’s operations, with particular interest in practices related to:  
Stops and searches; arrests without warrants or sufficient cause, or in retaliation for 
exercising free speech rights, and discrimination based on factors such as race, ethnicity, 
national origin, religion, disability, and sex-including sexual orientation, gender identity 
and LGBT status. (DOJ, 2017a, p. 5) 
 Although § 14141 has been viewed by many scholars as an appropriate mechanism to 
reform troubled and dysfunctional police departments (Armacost, 2003; Rushin, 2017; Stuntz 
2006), § 14141 has also been criticized as being antagonistic to the principle of federalism 
embedded in the U.S. Constitution and American tradition of governance (U.S. Const. amend. 
X). Scholars who make this argument suggest that § 14141 is at odds with the traditional 
relationship that the police should be accountable to local government and the people served by 
that government (Ross & Parke, 2009). This position is supported by other scholars who have 
studied implications of the federalist orientation of governance; arguing that in the U.S., “local 
prerogative is part and parcel of government structure and philosophy” (O’Hara, 2012, p. 65). 
Parallel to these scholarly criticisms, police practitioners whose law enforcement agencies have 
been the subject of a § 14141 action have noted not only does an investigation of a police agency 
undermine the historic tradition of local control and accountability, as well, federal intervention 
under § 14141 results in national stigma, negatively effecting a police agency’s reputation, and 
damaging agency credibility with the local community (Police Executive Research Forum, 
2013). 
 The philosophical perspective regarding a limited federal role in local matters, 




Indeed, as indicated by the former United States Attorney General (AG), who as head of the DOJ 
was responsible for setting agency agenda and priorities, has written: 
The federal government alone cannot successfully address rising crime rates, secure 
public safety, protect and respect the civil rights of all members of the public, or 
implement best practices in policing. These are, first and foremost, tasks for state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement. (Sessions, 2017, pp. 1-2)  
 This policy position creates a degree of uncertainty in the viability of ongoing and 
emerging § 14141 actions. The result of this uncertainty leaves police leaders, state and local 
governments, as well as the general public with a challenge: Since the agency responsible for the 
enforcement of § 14141 has taken a policy position that the investigation, intervention, and 
regulation of local police is not a federal priority (Sessions, 2018), by default, it becomes the 
responsibility of each law enforcement agency and their parent jurisdiction to monitor and self-
regulate, ensuring that their policies and practices are within applicable law, and constitutional 
guidelines.  
 The success of self-regulation presupposes that police leaders have the requisite 
knowledge, awareness, capabilities, and motivation to identify and address deficient policies, 
practices, procedures, systems, and conditions indicating that their police agency is engaged in, 
or at risk of engaging in unconstitutional policing. This is flawed assumption, as the knowledge 
required for self-regulation to become actionable requires that police leaders know where, when, 
and precisely what to look for, most of which has not been explored relative to § 14141. 
 The confluence of recent events involving police in the United States, including a number 
of high-profile controversial enforcement actions (e.g. Eric Garner, Philando Castile, Alton 




force incidents (Hafner, 2018), and the uncertainty involving the current and future enforcement 
of § 14141, presents an opportune moment to review not what has been done regarding § 14141 
actions – that knowledge already exists – but to glean new knowledge regarding the problematic 
policies, practices, procedures, and systems that existed in and about municipal police 
departments prior to the initiation of a DOJ action under § 14141 and thereafter. Examining § 
14141 interventions retrospectively affords the police profession, and public, the opportunity to 
understand how a municipal police department can avoid patterns or practices of unconstitutional 
policing through an analysis of problematic or deficient policies, practices, procedures, and 
systems concomitant to police agencies under federal investigation and intervention. This 
knowledge then can offer police leaders insights that will allow them to identify problematic 
areas within their own agencies, and address those deficiencies to protect against patterns or 
practices of unconstitutional policing, loss of reputation, credibility, autonomy, and potentially, 
organizational demise. 
  In the 25 years since the passage of § 14141, the DOJ has conducted 69 investigations of 
law enforcement agencies suspected of engaging in patterns or practices of systemic misconduct 
leading to unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). Of these 69 investigations, 55 involved what 
are defined as local police (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2015). These 55 § 14141 investigations 
were initiated against 51 discrete local police departments.2 Municipalities with dedicated police 
agencies, generally referred to as “city”, “village”, or “town” police, make up 98% of local 
police departments in the United States (BJS, 2008). Local municipalities that are referred to as 
“cities”, while having dedicated police departments subject to a § 14141 investigation, were the 
focus of this study. 
                                                 
2 Four local police departments were the subject of two distinct § 14141 investigations, these include: Cleveland, 




Overall Research Goal 
 The 51 local police departments investigated under § 14141 authority comprise 0.28% of 
the 18,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, and 0.42% of the 12,000 local police 
agencies nationwide (BJS, 2015). The mere fact that so few police agencies have been subject to 
§ 14141 enforcement leads to two fundamental questions: What contributes to such a rare event? 
And, how can this information assist other municipal police departments to practice 
constitutional policing?  
 To address the two-pronged research problem presented above, this dissertation seeks to 
identify, describe, explore, and analyze phenomenon concomitant to DOJ findings of a pattern or 
practice of systemic misconduct resulting in unconstitutional policing within a municipal police 
department, ex-ante. The purpose is to identify institutional, environmental, and systemic 
conditions, as well as deficiencies in policies and procedures, that existed in municipal police 
agencies prior to a § 14141 action by analyzing commonalities allowing for the proliferation of 
unconstitutional policing. The knowledge created from this analysis can then be used to facilitate 
the development of a compendium of policies and practices, and a prescriptive model to forestall 
municipal police behavior, that when applied to a police agency, can prevent patterns or practices 
of unconstitutional policing. Moreover, this research seeks to examine DOJ decision-making 
relative to § 14141, and explore how organizational decision-making influenced investigative 
findings and outcomes under § 14141 over time. In doing so, this research will explore policy 
implications for criminal justice at the federal, state, local, and organizational levels.  
 Scholarly activities involving § 14141 are few, until this study was conducted, an 
analysis of the conditions that preceded a § 14141 action was not undertaken. This dissertation 
adds then to the body of knowledge regarding § 14141, while making a significant contribution 




criminological theory, while revealing areas for future research, and new directions in the fields 
of criminal justice policy, and public administration.  
Problem Statement 
 In 2015, the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (President’s Task Force), 
reported: “Trust between law enforcement agencies and the people they protect and serve is 
essential in a democracy” (President’s Task Force, 2015, p. 5); reflecting priorities in 
participatory governance, rule of law, and the administration of justice as critical components of 
a just democratic society. This statement came after the President’s Task Force was initiated to 
review, research, and develop solutions to many of the problems that trouble local police 
departments in light of events that “have exposed rifts between local police and the communities 
they protect and serve” (President’s Task Force, 2015, p. 5).  
 The language of the President’s Task Force implies that problems related to the 
relationship between police and communities that are served by those agencies is either an 
emerging phenomenon, or one that has gathered enough public attention to become actionable. 
However, a closer examination of this relationship, particularly viewed through the prism of U.S. 
history, suggests that neither suggestion is accurate. Indeed, a variety of governmental 
commissions seeking to improve police operations, enhance constitutional policing and 
legitimacy, and identify best practices have had different iterations in the United States as far 
back as the early 1930s.  
 Scholars of police have identified the Wickersham Commission as one of the earliest 
governmentally sanctioned investigatory bodies initiated to address the myriad problems 
associated with policing in the United States (Walker, 1997). Since Wickersham, there have been 
a number of commissions seeking to expose and address systemic police failures related to 




Christopher Commission, 1991; Knapp Commission, 1973; Mollen Commission, 1994; Rampart, 
2000). These commissions were local in orientation and focus, addressing problems within a 
specific agency and jurisdiction, reflecting the traditional notion of policing as a local institution 
in America. Until the passage of § 14141, the federal government’s role in matters related to 
local police was restricted and infrequent.  
 More recently, scholars have categorized the relationship between the federal government 
and intervention of local police in the U.S. into three distinct periods beginning with what is 
referred to as the “hands-off era” (Rushin, 2017, p. 9). This first era of federal intervention 
encompassed the founding of the United States until the early 20th century, and was behaviorally 
characterized by the prevailing view that law enforcement, police regulation and oversight, were 
the responsibility of local governance. This perspective obviated the need for a federal role in 
matters related to local law enforcement.  
 A shift in orientation away from the hands-off era began in 1931 with the “Wickersham 
Commission”. Officially known as the National Commission on Law Observance and 
Enforcement, the Wickersham Commission investigated police practices and made details of 
widespread physical and constitutional abuses perpetrated by the police known to the public. 
Findings from the Wickersham Commission were memorialized in the Report on Lawlessness in 
Law Enforcement. This report detailed a variety of unconstitutional police practices and 
misconduct commonly referred to as the “third-degree”; practices that included “physical 
brutality, illegal detention, and refusal to allow access of counsel to suspects” (Walker, 1997, p. 
ix). It is not surprising then that Wickersham has been referred to as “one of the most important 




 The time period following the Wickersham Commission until 1994, referred to as the 
“build-up era” (Rushin, 2017, p. 45), was characterized by incremental changes in the 
relationship between the federal government and local law enforcement. Many of these changes 
were the result of judicial decisions that established regulations controlling police policies, 
procedures, and practices through the application of case law. One of the most prominent 
examples comes from the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Mapp v. Ohio (1961). The court’s 
decision in Mapp established the applicability of the exclusionary rule to local police, 
consequently, providing a mechanism for individuals who were the subject of a specific type of 
unconstitutional policing to seek relief through the suppression and exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence. Another remedy provided to victims of police misconduct during the build-up 
era occurred when the federal government authorized “civilians to file federal civil rights 
lawsuits against local police officers and police departments” (Rushin, 2017, p. 12) for under 
color of law civil rights violations through Title 42 United States Code § 1983.  
 The passage of the 1994 crime bill, and in particular § 14141, began in earnest what is 
now referred to as the “intervention era” (Rushin, 2017, p. 67). This time period, 1994 - present 
day, is characterized by the legal authority of the DOJ to investigate, and initiate regulatory 
intervention and oversight of law enforcement agencies across all jurisdictions of government 
under the purview of U.S. law. Although the authority granted by § 14141 replicates that 
practiced by the federal government to intervene in other public services including education and 
corrections, the passage of § 14141 still is viewed as “an unprecedented expansion of the federal 
government’s authority into a realm traditionally regulated by local and state governments” 




 The initiation of a § 14141 action against a municipal police department, as such, is an 
expression of federal authority that breaks from historical, and federalist norms. Considering that 
the mechanism of investigation, intervention, court-ordered oversight, and forced change 
authorized under § 14141 is so rarely used, it is perfectly valid to question the government 
bringing a federal solution to what many perceive to be a local problem on philosophical, 
effectiveness, or constitutional grounds. Indeed, these critiques do not appear to be unfounded.  
 Even the former head of the DOJ, who was responsible for overseeing the enforcement of 
§ 14141 – before departing his position – issued a policy memo regarding the enforcement of § 
14141 that greatly restricted and scaled-back current and future oversight actions, adding an even 
greater level of uncertainty regarding § 14141’s future. The former AG’s reasoning for these 
changes was grounded in the belief that § 14141 actions can cause more harm than good by 
undermining democratic control and accountability through burdening local jurisdictions with 
long-term financial liabilities that can greatly restrict operational autonomy (Sessions, 2018). 
Further noting, that any jurisdiction subject to a § 14141 inquiry must be afforded “the respect 
and comity deserving of a separate sovereignty” (Session, 2018, p. 2). In sum and substance, the 
AG’s argument was that the constitutional concept of federalism justified the numerous internal 
policy changes in the interpretation and application of § 14141 against local police.  
 Of the approximately 18,000 police agencies that are subject to U.S. law, very few have 
been subject to a § 14141 action. This has led some police practitioners whose law enforcement 
agencies have come under § 14141 investigation to resist what has been viewed as overweening 
and meddlesome federal authority. Two such examples involve the Maricopa County Sheriff, 
and Alamance County (N.C.) Sheriff, both of whom refused to share their records with the DOJ 




want to come in and take over your law-enforcement agency. They march in the door and say 
you are guilty of all these things” (Albright, 2015 as cited in Weichselbaum, 2015, final 
paragraph). The issue articulated by the Sheriff’s, per se, raises important questions of equity, 
fairness, and the ability of the federal government to implement § 14141 in a manner consistent 
with a constitutional framework. Considering these critiques, it is worth noting that DOJ’s 
current policy on § 14141 enforcement appears to acquiesce to both practitioner concerns and 
scholarly criticisms (Sessions, 2017; Sessions, 2018). 
 Nevertheless, § 14141 has existed since 1994 and continues to do so. With approximately 
63% of the U.S. population living in cities (U.S. Census, 2015), federal intervention of municipal 
police has impacted millions of U.S. residents, yet, has the potential to impact millions more 
through organizational modeling, and implementation of policing best practices. When viewed 
from this macro perspective, the scale and scope of the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 
becomes much larger than the 69 § 14141 investigations and numerous reform agreements with 
local police agencies. Concerning this scale then, and how little is known of the circumstances 
that support the government’s findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, it is 
fitting and appropriate that this dissertation identified, described, explored, and analyzed the ex-
ante conditions that contributed to a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, thereby 
subjecting a municipal police agency to public scrutiny, legal and financial liability, and loss of 
autonomy for federal intervention and external control. 
 The above review leads to some fundamental questions for exploration, including:  
• Out of what is essentially innumerable choice, how does the DOJ identify a specific 
municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional policing?  




• What organizational characteristics and environmental conditions existed in municipal 
police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation?  
• What themes emerge as patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing from DOJ’s § 
14141 findings? 
• Have DOJ’s pattern and practice investigations changed over time?  
• As well: How can these findings support other police departments to practice 
constitutional policing, while avoiding organizational failure that may lead to federal 
oversight?  



















Title 42 U.S.C. § 14141 
 Often referred to as the 1994 crime act or crime bill (DOJ, 2010), after the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act (VCCLEA) was passed into law, the federal government 
announced:  
[The VCCLEA] represents the bipartisan product of six years of hard work. It is the 
largest crime bill in the history of the country and will provide for 100,000 new police 
officers, $9.7 billion in funding for prisons and $6.1 billion in funding for prevention 
programs….$2.6 billion in additional funding for the FBI, DEA, INS, United States 
Attorneys, and other Justice Department components. (DOJ, 1994, para. 1) 
 Included in the VCCLEA, but not as a “significant provision of the bill” (DOJ, 1994, 
para. 1), the police reform subsection known as the Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 
U.S.C. 14141, was the result of years-long effort to pass police accountability measures at the 
federal level (Rushin, 2017). Although some scholars who have studied § 14141 directly relate 
its passage to the events involving Rodney King and the LAPD in 1991 (Alpert, McLean, & 
Wolfe, 2017; Douglass, 2017), the law’s genesis can be traced to findings made by the Kerner 
Commission in 1968, and subsequent recommendations made by the United States Commission 
on Civil Rights in the 1981 publication Who is guarding the guardians? A report on police 
practices (DOJ, 2010). The momentum created by these commissions and their 
recommendations helped to initiate necessary action on police accountability that coalesced after 
the 1991 Rodney King incident, subsequent acquittal of four indicted LAPD officers, and the 
rioting in Los Angeles that was followed by numerous hearings on police misconduct and 




 Following these events, § 14141 was passed by Congress in August 1994 as part of the 
VCCLEA, and signed by President Bill Clinton on September 13, 1994 (Miller Center, 2018). 
The law reads:  
(a) Unlawful conduct[.] It shall be unlawful for any government authority, or any agent 
thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a government authority, to engage in a pattern 
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any 
governmental agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the 
incarceration of juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. (b) Civil action by 
Attorney General[.] Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that 
a violation of paragraph (1)1 has occurred, the Attorney General, for or in the name of the 
United States, may in a civil action obtain appropriate equitable and declaratory relief to 
eliminate the pattern or practice. (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2006) 
 The DOJ may initiate a § 14141 investigation when there is sufficient cause that a police 
agency is engaging in a pattern or practice of systemic misconduct resulting in unconstitutional 
policing or violations of federal law (DOJ, 2017a). Affirmative findings of unconstitutional 
policing require a “reasonable cause to believe” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 15) standard that violations of 
the Constitution or federal laws are not isolated events, but rather represent a pattern or practice 
(DOJ, 2017a). Legal precedent is used to define and categorize a “pattern or practice” insofar as 
the DOJ “does not need to find a set number of incidents” (Perez, 2013, p. 4), wherein a “pattern 
or practice may be found by examples representing typical conduct, as opposed to isolated 




sanctioned by policy or otherwise” (DOJ, 2014, p. 3). Pattern or practice findings, therefore, do 
not need to meet specific objective criteria for affirmation, and can be challenged in court.  
 The first § 14141 investigation commenced in May 1995 against the Torrance (CA) 
Police Department (Childress, 2015; Rushin, 2017), and the most recent in December 2016 
against the Orange County (CA) Sheriff’s Department (DOJ, 2017b). Between 1994 and 2017 
there have been 69 § 14141 investigations, most of which supported findings of a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional policing, resulting in a specific legal settlement or agency agreement 
between the law enforcement agency under investigation and the federal government (DOJ, 
2017a). However, as indicated, 26 § 14141 investigations have been closed without formal 
findings (DOJ, 2017a). Although accurate on its face, this statistic is misleading; 11 of those 26 
investigations yielded technical assistance reports where the DOJ (2017b) memorialized and 
made public, findings of systemic misconduct and organizational problems that did not, but had 
the potential to rise to the level of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing if left 
unaddressed. As well, one § 14141 investigation was dropped after initial findings of 
unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017b). 
 Considering the federal government’s interpretation of § 14141 formal findings, it is 
instructive to recognize that over the life of § 14141, 55 of the 69 § 14141 investigations have 
resulted in some type of publicly available, verifiable, and memorialized agreement to reform 
police practices that have led to, or were believed to have the potential to lead to patterns or 
practices of unconstitutional policing.  
 The § 14141 process. 
 Prior to initiating an official investigation of a municipal police department, the DOJ 




involve the monitoring and tracking of a specific police agency (PERF, 2013). At this stage, it is 
not disclosed to the police agency in question that a § 14141 inquiry has been initiated (PERF, 
2013). Consequently, complete and accurate data related to the number of preliminary inquiries 
over the life of § 14141 are not publicly available. If at any time during the course of this 
preliminary inquiry, the DOJ finds sufficient cause that a police agency is engaged in a pattern or 
practice of systemic misconduct, unconstitutional policing, or violations of federal law, the 
police agency is notified, concurrent with initiation of an official investigation.    
 A DOJ issued findings letter is the output of a § 14141 investigation wherein a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional policing has been revealed. The DOJ makes these findings letters 
available to the police agency and the general public, detailing the results of their investigation 
and describing policies, practices, procedures, systems, and operations in need of reform. Section 
14141 investigations in which findings do not support that a police department is engaged in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, but significant operational deficiencies have been 
noted, a non-binding technical assistance letter, or referrals to other federal assistance programs 
may be offered to that police agency (DOJ, 2017a). Investigations that have led to technical 
assistance have embedded findings in DOJ issued letters, whereas referrals to other federal 
assistance programs do not elicit any publicly issued findings or comments.  
 A resultant § 14141 investigation, then, will generally follow one of three outcomes:  
 (1) An investigation that did not reveal any systemic misconduct or unconstitutional 
policing; the DOJ will terminate the § 14141 action without the public issuance of findings or 
enforcement action being taken against that police agency.3  
                                                 
3 DOJ (2017a) has indicated that in some § 14141 investigations, “other forms of federal intervention are better 
suited to address a particular law enforcement agency’s needs” (p. 7). These actions can include individual officer 
prosecution, referral to the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) or Office of Justice Programs 




 (2) Investigative findings not supporting that a police department is engaged in a pattern 
or practice of unconstitutional policing, but the DOJ has noted significant operational and 
systemic deficiencies that have the potential for unconstitutional policing outcomes; non-binding 
technical assistance may be offered. 
 (3) Investigative findings supporting that a police department is engaged in a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional policing, resulting in a specific type of negotiated settlement between 
the DOJ and the offending police agency.  
  These three options do not necessarily suggest mutually exclusivity in § 14141 
investigative outcomes. The DOJ retains the authority to initiate a new investigation, issue 
multiple findings, pursue various outcomes over-time, or discontinue § 14141 actions after 
adverse findings, and has done so with police agencies when deemed necessary and appropriate 
(Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 2017).   
 After the DOJ has made known their investigative findings to both the police agency and 
public, they then initiate a process towards reform, this process is described by the Civil Rights 
Division as follows: 
Where the Division has found evidence of a pattern or practice of police misconduct, 
resolution generally will take the form of an order enforced by a federal court. These 
orders are usually called ‘consent decrees,’ reflecting that the terms of the order were 
negotiated and agreed to by the United States and the law enforcement agency that was 
investigated. (DOJ, 2017a, p. 22)  
 Police departments that have been found to be engaged in a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing will have specific legal remedies taken against them initiating the 




consent decree, or a memorandum of agreement (MOA). Police agencies can then choose to 
litigate the findings or decide to settle the matter (Douglass, 2017). Six police agencies under § 
14141 investigation have chosen the former option (DOJ, 2017a; Douglass, 2017), one of which 
won at trial, however, that police agency along with the five other litigants ended up resolving 
the § 14141 action against their agency in a negotiated settlement with the government at a later 
time (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2017a; Douglass, 2017).  
 Court enforceable actions, including consent decrees, and negotiated settlements are the 
preferred remedy in § 14141 actions when an investigation reveals a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). Alternatively, a MOA may be offered to a police agency 
“when the issues to be addressed are relatively narrow and there is significant evidence that the 
jurisdiction has the capacity to accomplish and sustain reform in a timely manner and without 
ongoing court oversight” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 23).  
 Consent decrees, MOAs and court settlements are all considered “negotiated settlements” 
(Harmon, 2009, p. 16), meaning a jurisdiction and the DOJ have agreed to adopt specific 
remedial measures to address systemic failures. Specific types of negotiated settlements have 
different force of law; for example, consent decrees and settlement agreements are contained 
within, and enforceable by court order (Harmon, 2009), whereas MOAs are drafted as private 
contracts between two parties, as such, the enforcement mechanism for a MOA is to sue for 
breach of contract. However, the functionality of legal settlements and MOAs are the same; both 
are the result of negotiation between parties that require institutional changes and reforms to 
deficient policies, practices, procedures, systems, and organizational structures.  
 Considering their commonalities, and to standardize meaning for analysis, clarity, and 




resulting in a MOA, legal settlement, court-enforceable agreement, settlement-agreement, or 
consent decree. In a number of § 14141 actions involving municipal police, the DOJ sought to 
terminate the negotiated settlement after a finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional 
policing in favor of a transition agreement to more efficiently address remaining systemic 
deficiencies and threats to constitutional policing within that law enforcement agency (DOJ, 
2017a; DOJ, 2018). As such, transition agreements are in sum and substance the result of a § 
14141 investigation where the government first established reasonable cause to believe that a 
police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing.  
 Differentiated from the standard meaning of a negotiated settlement, these transition 
agreements may result from scenarios in which the police agency under investigation was found 
to have made “significant reforms” (DOJ, 2018, p. 17) throughout the course of a § 14141 action. 
When these reforms occur after a negotiated settlement has been reached, and the DOJ believes it 
preferable to work with the police agency to continue reforms, they will seek permission of the 
court to terminate the negotiated settlement (DOJ, 2018). This process helps facilitate a police 
agency’s implementation of agreed-upon reforms while the government acknowledges “the 
progress the agency has made toward effective constitutional policing” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 37). 
Although the final agreement between the DOJ and the police agency in these transition 
agreements was not a negotiated settlement or technical assistance, since the transition 
agreement came after an investigative finding of unconstitutional policing, they too were 
classified as negotiated settlements for the purpose of this study. 
 To assist with implementing the legal terms of a negotiated settlement, a monitoring team 
is appointed to report, offer technical assistance, and lend their expertise to the offending police 




settlement will be terminated upon satisfactory implementation of institutional reforms after an 
agreed-upon duration. At that point and moving forward, it becomes the responsibility of the 
police agency to maintain and institutionalize those reforms without federal assistance.   
 As an alternative to entering into a negotiated settlement with a police agency, the DOJ 
has on numerous occasions offered technical assistance when a § 14141 investigative finding 
reveals operational or policy deficiencies contributing to systemic problems that do not rise to 
the level of a pattern or practice unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2010; DOJ 2017a). This type of 
assistance has been described as “non-adversarial” (DOJ, 2018, p. 19), and seeks to address a 
myriad of substantive-related organizational and operational issues through training, peer-to-peer 
consultation, data analysis, strategic planning, and curriculum development (Bureau of Justice 
Assistance, National Training and Technical Assistance Center, n.d.). 
Academic Literature  
 Although federal authority to investigate and enter into a reform agreement with 
municipal law enforcement agencies has been in force since 1994, a dearth of quantitative or 
qualitative studies exist on its empirical effectiveness (Chappell, 2017). These deficiencies were 
recognized as recently as 2017 in which calls were made for greater research on a practice that 
has been “shrouded in secrecy” (Alpert, McLean, & Wolfe, 2017, p. 240). As a result, 
criminologists have paid very little attention to § 14141 and its impact on police (Alpert, et al., 
2017). In addition to academics, legal scholars have noted the lack of research on this topic, 
acknowledging that “very little scholarship in any discipline has empirically analyzed structural 
police reform. And virtually no legal scholarship has done an empirical examination of the topic” 
(Rushin, 2014, p. 3215). This is all the more troubling considering § 14141 has been referred to 




years in the sphere of police regulation” (Stuntz, 2006, p. 781), and “perhaps the most promising 
mechanism” (Armacost, 2003 p. 457) to reduce systemic police misconduct.  
  The first academic study of § 14141 was conducted five years after the City of Pittsburgh 
and the DOJ entered into a consent decree. As part of the settlement’s evaluative process, Vera 
Institute of Justice (Vera) and the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services sought 
lessons to be learned by performing “in-depth interviews with police officials, the monitor, 
police officers, union members, OMI staff, human rights activists and community leaders” 
(Davis, Ortiz, Henderson, Miller, & Massie, 2002, p. 8). Additionally, Vera surveyed hundreds 
of Pittsburgh residents and solicited opinions from the general public to gain a better sense of 
community awareness and perceptions of change in policing during the period of reform 
implementation (Davis, et al., 2002).  
 Vera found that the Pittsburgh negotiated settlement was “generally viewed as a success 
in terms of increasing police accountability and improving officer training” (Davis, et al., 2002, 
p. 3). However, the researchers noted that there were complaints from officers regarding a 
“decline in morale, an increase in paperwork, and a reluctance to engage in enforcement actions” 
(Davis, et al., 2002, p. 3). With this first report, thus began the scholarship orientation of § 14141 
that has since followed; implementation analyses and post-hoc assessments.   
 In 2005, Vera conducted a follow up to their original report on the Pittsburgh decree; 
building off earlier findings, Vera sought to answer the central question: “Can local officials 
maintain these reforms after the federal government and its monitor withdraw?” (Davis, 
Henderson, & Ortiz, 2005, p. 2). To assess the lasting impact of this § 14141 settlement, Vera 
used a variety of methodologies including qualitative focus groups with community members, 




led them to conclude that a negotiated settlement “could engender substantial accountability 
reforms in a short time and that the reforms would survive the life of the decree intact” (Davis, et 
al., 2005, p. 41). 
 As of 2005, there were indications that federal intervention could work to bring about 
short and long-term change in American police agencies. As promising as these findings first 
appeared, a longer view of federal intervention has not produced such optimism. Indeed, 
regarding sustainability, Alpert, McLean, and Wolfe (2017) have concluded that “there is some 
anecdotal information about positive, short-term impacts of CDs [consent decrees], but there is 
no convincing evidence that there are long-term improvements in the agency” (p. 243). Similar 
concerns over post-termination sustained viability and agency backsliding have been raised by 
numerous scholars who have studied § 14141 (Chanin, 2015; Keenan & Walker, 2005; 
Simmons, 2008; Walker, 2012). Such backsliding served to justify the DOJ’s initiation of a 
second § 14141 investigation against the Miami Police Department (Perez, 2013), and the 
Cleveland Police Bureau, both specifically for failing to institutionalize and sustain agreed-upon 
reforms (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014).  
 A core problem identified by scholars of § 14141 agreements who have studied post-
reform implementation is that institutional changes in police organizations are not self-sustaining 
(Chanin, 2015). This issue was manifestly acknowledged and made known to the general public, 
not by police scholars, but when The New York Times reported of the follow-up to § 14141 
Pittsburgh decree, announcing: “It Did Not Stick: The First Federal Effort to Curb Police Abuse” 
(Stolberg, 2017).  
 More recent than Vera’s second report on the Pittsburgh consent decree, an assessment of 




undertaken by Stone, Foglesong, and Cole (2009). Using participant observation, analysis of 
police data, surveys of police officers, and focus group interviews, the researchers concluded that 
there was a “staggering scale of change” (p. 75), and after eight years since the initiation of the 
consent decree: 
The LAPD of today is a changed organization. Within Los Angeles, community 
engagement and partnership is part of the mainstream culture of the Department. Not 
everyone embraces it, and not everyone practices it, but the commanders we observed 
take relationships with communities seriously as an essential part of their work. The 
precise forms that accountability takes remain subjects of intense debate, but the fact of 
accountability has entered the lifeblood of the organization. (p. 76)  
 As positive as these findings appeared at that time, the researchers advise caution in light 
of fundamental questions regarding sustained improvements after decree termination. 
Specifically, their criticisms were directed at the strength and durability of management systems 
and oversight initiated under the decree. These concerns over sustainability echo those that 
became realized in the Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and Miami § 14141 agreements (Gupta & 
Dettelbach, 2014, Perez, 2013, Stolberg, 2017).  
 More recent than the report on the LAPD, and both studies of the Pittsburgh negotiated 
settlement conducted by Vera, Chanin (2014a) conducted an analysis of the lasting effects and 
continued compliance of § 14141 negotiated settlements for five police agencies (Pittsburgh, 
Washington, D.C., Prince George’s County, Los Angeles, Cincinnati). Using a mixed-
methodological design, the researcher found that the success of creating institutional change 
within police departments was varied, concluding that “these findings highlight the challenge 




been noted by other scholars as well, such as Skogan, (2008) who suggests that reforming a 
police department, and holding police agencies responsible for institutionalizing changes are 
more complex and nuanced tasks than academics, politicians and the informed public imagine. 
 Scholars have recently moved beyond measuring implementation outcomes and 
institutionalized sustainability of § 14141. One recent example involves a study conducted by 
Powell, Meitl, and Worrall (2017) in which the researchers sought to explore the relationship 
between the number of lawsuits filed for civil rights violations against police officials before and 
after a § 14141 action. For this study, § 1983 lawsuits were used as a proxy to measure the 
success of a consent decree in reducing patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. These 
results suggest that a consent decree may reduce the likelihood of federal civil rights lawsuits 
against a police agency, but by how much, and under what conditions remained unclear. As well, 
there were two significant methodological limitations in the study design, one of which involved 
their choice of a control, the other concern was related to the internal validity of the measure. 
These criticisms notwithstanding, their technique offered scholars new insights into how a 
consent decree can change police behavior, while adding to methodologies used to measure the 
impact of § 14141 to initiate and sustain structural police reform.   
 Other examples of scholars moving beyond implementation studies of § 14141 involve 
assessing the relationship between § 14141 and changes in police behavior related to levels of 
enforcement activity (Chanin & Sheats, 2017; Rushin & Edwards, 2017). Concerning § 14141 
intervention on officer behavior, for example, Rushin and Edwards (2017) found that “the 
introduction of external regulation to a police department via a § 14141 action was associated 
with a statistically significant increase in the frequency of several crime categories” (p. 758) 




study found support for the idea that police officers in agencies under a consent decree and 
federal control, are more likely to engage in “‘de-policing’-retreating from active police work in 
reaction to the negative publicity that has been placed on police agencies across the country” 
(Shjarback, Pyrooz, Wolfe, & Decker, 2017, p. 42). These empirical findings support the 
qualitative assessments that were made by researchers in both the Pittsburgh and LAPD 
implementation studies regarding the perspective of rank-and-file officers, and their suggestion 
that § 14141 will lead to less effective policing. Yet, other scholars disagree with the de-policing 
phenomenon, for example, Chanin and Sheats (2017) using a more limited study sample than 
Rushin and Edwards (2017), found no evidence supporting that de-policing is an unintended 
consequence on police behavior in agencies subject to a § 14141 action.  
 Emerging literature on DOJ’s process. 
 Recently some scholars have begun to offer insights that describe DOJ’s § 14141 
investigative process (Chanin, 2017; Chanin, 2014a; Rushin, 2017). Yet, how and why the DOJ 
chose a specific police agency to investigate and proceed into a negotiated settlement remains an 
open question. Noting this gap, Chappell (2017) asserts that “there is no systematic approach for 
identifying problematic police departments” (p. 572). Indeed, in discussing methods to improve 
outcomes for § 14141 negotiated settlements by identifying the most troubled police 
departments, Harmon (2017) suggests that decision-making seems to have been mostly based on 
a combination of informed judgments and intuition, commenting; “the Department of Justice is 
more likely to notice and sue a department that seems to have a serious pattern of misconduct if 
it is especially large or its problem is especially salient” (p. 620). Yet there are no studies that 
seek to explore the ex-ante conditions that gave rise to a § 14141 investigation and subsequent 




 It wasn’t until 2017 that the process in which § 14141 actions proceed was publicly 
detailed. In the report; The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and Practice Police Reform Work: 
1994-Present, the DOJ described much of what had been unknown to scholars and practitioners 
regarding § 14141 enforcement. Although moving towards transparency, the DOJ did not specify 
a rationale for their choices beyond qualitative descriptions, or explain how their decisions and 
choices regarding enforcement were made. As described in their technical reports, § 14141 
investigative processes follow the contours of structured reform described by Bertelli (2004), and 
as such, merely comports with what is already known about traditional structural reform models. 
Nor did the DOJ offer any explanation of how or why they chose a particular police agency for a 
preliminary inquiry, preferring to keep the specifics of this process confidential.  
 Enforcement of § 14141 appears to have been beset by challenges related to the scope 
and scale of law enforcement in the United States. Choosing among the multitude of agencies 
that have the potential to be the next § 14141 investigation appears to be overwhelming to the 
federal government; in their own words: “[The] Division’s police reform strategy is not, and 
cannot be, premised on an effort to investigate every police department in need of reform” (DOJ, 
2017a, p. 4). However, the DOJ must somehow identify among thousands of potential police 
agencies to investigate for systemic violations, the agency has stated of this process: 
[The] staff in the Civil Rights Division regularly examine information available to the 
Division, including publicly available information and confidential information provided 
to the Division by witnesses and complainants, to conduct preliminary inquiries into 
whether law enforcement agencies may be engaging in a pattern or practice of police 
misconduct…it regularly receives complaints from affected community members and 




police officers with knowledge of misconduct…the Division also conducts its own 
research to identify potential subjects for investigation…reviewing investigative reports 
by academics, review panels, and journalists; monitoring existing lawsuits involving law 
enforcement agencies; tracking complaints received over time by the Division; and 
consulting with persons and organizations likely to have relevant information about 
policing issues around the country. (DOJ, 2017a, pp. 5-6) 
 While all of this is useful, it does not better inform researchers, the public, or police 
practitioners how “hundreds of preliminary inquiries” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 5) lead to a negotiated 
settlement with so few police departments while other police agencies remain uninvestigated, 
dropped after a preliminary inquiry, or never rise to the level of requiring a preliminary inquiry.  
 Given the need to select among 18,000 agencies to investigate, the DOJ (2017a) has to 
“prioritize, the national context” (p. 6), and determine “whether the allegations represent an 
emerging or developing issue, such that reforms could have an impact beyond the primary 
objective of eliminating constitutional violations in the specific law enforcement agency” (DOJ, 
2017a, p. 6). From this policy statement, it can be inferred that decisions made regarding § 14141 
pattern or practice investigations, are in part based off a general deterrence (Beccaria, 1764) and 
incrementalist decision-making approach (Lindblom, 1979). That is, the DOJ seeks out police 
agencies to serve as examples of unconstitutional policing, with an awareness that special 
attention be paid to the complexity of the problems and proposed reforms both for a specific 
police agency, and as a model for other police departments. This overall strategy is consistent 
with what Harmon (2009) refers to as a “worst-first” policy (p. 4). 
 This has led some scholars to suggest that § 14141 “enforcement is driven by a 




consistent technique exists for identifying problematic police departments” (Powell, et al., 2017, 
p. 579). Although the specifics of their decision-making remain opaque to the general public, the 
DOJ has described the basic investigative process they follow, and has shed light on their 
motivations for doing so. These insights allow researchers to further explore § 14141 decision-
making, and better understand the conditions that may lead a municipal police agency into a 
negotiated settlement from an ex-ante perspective – which has yet to be done.  
 Negotiated settlements. 
 Court orders that are used to initiate structural reform can come in a variety of legal 
frameworks. These legal frameworks can broadly be described as negotiated settlements; two of 
which – consent decrees and memoranda of agreement – are variations of the type of negotiated 
settlement that are regularly used after a § 14141 investigation. These two particular types of 
negotiated settlements have been found to have specific advantages over other types of legal 
actions since “a city does not admit liability, but nevertheless agrees to adopt specific remedial 
measures to end the matter and avoid litigation” (Harmon, 2009, p. 16). Court orders, including 
legal settlements, consent decrees, and MOAs have been referred to as influential government 
output that helps drive social change in the public sphere (Schlanger, 2006). These binding 
agreements allow the federal government to initiate structural changes in a government agency 
by force of law when necessary, whereas using alternative mechanisms, reforms may not have 
been possible because of organizational resistance. 
 Using negotiated settlements and courts to initiate organizational change in public 
agencies did not begin with § 14141. In a review of negotiated settlements related to employment 
discrimination, Schwarzschild (1984) informs that “the federal courts have increasingly become 




that the use of injunctive relief by the federal government “first became prominent in antitrust 
cases” (p. 888). Since then, structural reform litigation has been widely used to initiate 
institutional and organizational reform in “education, voting, housing, and prisons” (Harmon, 
2009, p. 11).  
 Scholars have cited the landmark desegregation case Brown v. Board of Education (1954) 
as an example of the impact that structural reform litigation can have on government practices, 
institutions, and society (Schlanger, 2006; Schwarzschild, 1984). Soon after the Brown case, 
structural reform litigation was viewed with great potential because it “authorized district judges 
to assess the need for, order, and oversee sweeping changes not only to schools but the full range 
of important governmental institutions” (Schlanger, 2006, p. 552). Viewed from this perspective, 
constitutional violations perpetrated by local government institutions that are unable, or 
unwilling to abide by constitutionally permissible practices, provide the government sufficient 
and necessary justification for federal intervention.  
 Consent decrees in the criminal justice system. 
 Since the onset of civil litigation against jails and prisons in the 1960s, court orders and 
consent decrees have been widely used in correctional contexts to address “nearly all aspects of 
prison and jail life” (Schlanger, 2006, p. 564). These orders have been found to have had an 
enormous impact “by direct regulation, their indirect effects, and the shadow they cast” (p. 563). 
The potential for reform outside of a correctional context has been particularly appealing as a 
mechanism for reforming municipal police departments because:  
A remedy designed to reform the workings of a large organization is most effective when 




up an institution are more apt to cooperate in carrying out a negotiated scheme than in 
complying with an order imposed from above by a court (Schwarzschild, 1984, p. 899). 
 Scholars who study the impact of consent decrees on public organizations suggest that 
“over time, structural reform litigation has created significant and recognizable change” (Bertelli, 
2004, p. 29). As well, it is assumed these types of reform agreements will do so for police 
organizations because “consent decrees remedy unconstitutional policing by providing specific, 
detailed guidance to the subject police department on how to remedy its past unlawful practices 
and provide for accountability” (Douglass, 2017, p. 329).   
Practitioner Perspectives 
 Concerning federal intervention in local police matters, no consensus opinion has 
emerged from police leaders whether those opinions were from leaders whose agency was 
subject to § 14141 or otherwise. Some police leaders whose agencies have been through the § 
14141 process viewed it opportunistically, from a perspective that a § 14141 action can be useful 
for the police profession in identifying best practices that can then be applied to their specific 
agency (PERF, 2013). Additionally, § 14141 has been viewed by some police leaders as the 
necessary ingredient to secure the support of the public to initiate much needed organizational 
reform (Kohler, 2014). Such was the case that occurred in Pittsburgh, wherein the Police Chief 
used federal oversight and intervention as a strategy to force “reforms that he supported and that 
otherwise could be stymied by police labor unions” (PERF, 2013, p. 2). Similarly, police leaders 
have suggested that using the § 14141 process as leverage can be useful to “get resources your 
department needs” (PERF, 2013, p. 34), which then may lead to a better police organization 




 Other police leaders who view § 14141 positively have used the provision for the purpose 
of external review. Police Chief Charles Ramsey, who on two occasions with different municipal 
police departments, requested that the DOJ conduct an investigation and consider federal 
intervention, believing that the § 14141 process will benefit organizational performance (PERF, 
2013). Similar to actions taken by Chief Ramsey, Chief Raul Martinez of the Miami Police 
Department requested a § 14141 investigation after a series of controversial police shootings 
(Perez, 2013), and Chief Michael Chitwood of the Portland, Maine Police Department requested 
an investigation of his department’s policies and procedures to help remedy ongoing operational 
dysfunction (Brown Cutlar, 2003). 
  Opinions regarding the utility of § 14141 have not stopped at police leadership; political 
leaders such as the Mayor of New Orleans, Mitch Landrieu, and the Mayor of Portland, Sam 
Adams, have reached out to the DOJ for assistance with their police agencies for guidance in 
constitutional policing under § 14141. Mayor Landrieu later pushed-back against the DOJ’s 
findings because of expected costs (Robertson, 2013), while Portland’s political and police 
leadership demonstrated a willingness to collaborate and remedy organizational deficiencies 
(Perez & Marshall, 2012). As well, the City of Austin, Texas, represented by the City Manager, 
and Chief of Police requested a § 14141 review after a local newspaper reported an unflattering 
analysis of the Austin Police Department’s use of force (Futrell & Knee, 2005).  
 Arguments against federal intervention both by police and political leaders have revolved 
around three particular issues found problematic to the police agency and parent jurisdiction; loss 
of autonomy, costs, and stigma. An example of this occurred at the completion of the New 
Orleans investigation wherein the City of New Orleans claimed that DOJ’s required changes 




the only city that raised what was perceived to be excessive financial costs as a justification for 
pushback against § 14141 intervention, for example: 
In cities like Detroit and New Orleans, officials have railed at the high cost of the Justice 
Department’s reform plans, including the multi-million-dollar fees paid to the monitors 
who make sure local officials comply with federal mandates. Elsewhere, some local 
officials have simply refused to accept what they view as meddlesome dictates, preferring 
to fight the demands for change in federal court. (Weichselbaum, 2015, p. 2)  
 Another criticism that police leaders have articulated regarding § 14141 enforcement 
involves the stigma associated with federal oversight, which “takes a long time to overcome in 
the community” (PERF, 2010, p. 3). Even with § 14141 associated stigma, some police leaders 
have suggested that while it is important to accept the inevitability of federal intervention under 
§ 14141, their critique was that as a matter of fairness, police leaders should be “appraised of an 
investigation and become involved earlier rather than later in the process” (PERF, 2010, p. 3), 
suggesting that a loss of autonomy, and exclusion from the § 14141 process is more problematic 
to the police agency than the associated stigma. These critiques notwithstanding, for some police 
leaders, federal intervention has simply been described as “cumbersome, expensive, overly 
adversarial, and time-consuming” (PERF, 2013, p. 37).  
 Rank-and-file police officers supported by their union representatives have frequently 
opposed federal intervention and police reform efforts for a myriad of reasons. Keenan and 
Walker (2005) point to the use of statutory law by police unions to create legal barriers to 
proposed organizational and work changes. Skogan (2008) points to a number of reasons why 
reform efforts involving the police fail, including generalized internal resistance and 




acknowledge that excluding those closest, and most responsible for implementing proposed 
reforms is contrary to democratic inclusion. This last critique, ipso facto, justified rank-and-file 
and union resistance to reform in many of the early § 14141 investigations of municipal police. 
   Police scholars have noted that union resistance to federal oversight and blocking 
important reform efforts have had a noteworthy history in the U.S. (Emmanuel, 2016; Walker 
2008; Walker, 2016), pointing out that resistance by unions typically involves filing motions in 
federal court to block federally-initiated reforms (Bernstein, 2012). In contrast, other police 
unions have “voiced their displeasure with their exclusion from DOJ’s reform process” 
(Simmons, 2008, p. 523). Some other police unions, including the Fraternal Order of Police, 
have sought to play a more active role in the negotiation process (Khan, 2016). The importance 
of this active role has been noted by Simmons (2008) who argues that excluding those closest to 
the reforms is “contrary to the general principal of democratic theory that those affected by 
government policies should be able to participate in the decision-making process” (p. 520). 
 In the review of the LAPD agreement conducted by Stone, Foglesong, and Cole (2009), 
researchers found that “ubiquitous among police officers of every rank, that the consent decree 
has burdened the police with increased paperwork and recordkeeping” (p. 13). Often the basis for 
union resistance is the belief that reform agreements and oversight will make officers “less active 
and aggressive in fighting crime” (Davis, et al., 2005, executive summary). These perspectives 
were noted by the president of the Albuquerque Police Officers Association who claimed that 
“many beat cops – some already skeptical of the push for more transparency and accountability – 
see an inefficient system of red tape that keeps them off the streets while they fill out paperwork 




 Finally, there have been many police leaders who have expressed frustration at the lack 
of assistance from the current DOJ in matters related to local law enforcement and the 
collaborative reform of local police (Eder, Protess, & Dewan, 2017). Although not requesting 
investigation and oversight under § 14141, police leaders in Spokane, Washington; Fort Pierce, 
Florida; Tucson, Arizona; Tulsa, Oklahoma; and St. Louis County, Missouri have gone on record 
to suggest that collaborative policing efforts between the federal government and local police, 
with guidance in matters related to constitutional policing, are out of step with a growing 
consensus that rebuilding community trust is essential to crime reduction (Elder, et al., 2017), 
supporting the idea that federal assistance in local police matters can benefit police 
organizations, police leadership, rank-and-file, and the public being served.  
Criticisms 
 Despite the historical use of negotiated settlements to initiate change in the area of civil 
rights, not all scholars have viewed this tool without criticism (Douglass, 2017; Ross & Parke, 
2009). In a review of consent decrees and federal involvement in local government 
organizations, Scott (2017) points out that “the history of direct federal involvement in reforming 
state and local institutions, across a variety of occupational realms, is not one of unqualified 
success” (p. 611). Indeed, there are many issues that scholars of consent decrees, and federal 
regulation of the police have raised, some of which are fundamental to the meaning of ordered 
liberty rather than disagreements over how well a law is being implemented. A critique of § 
14141 in this spirit is offered by Ross and Parke (2009) who warn that there are “several reasons 
for caution and skepticism” (p. 202). Their warning is not based on the effectiveness of 
implementation, rather it is directed at the role the federal government plays in local matters, 




 Scholars have also raised concerns over § 14141 negotiation transparency as exemplified 
by a shifting of power away from the people and their elected representatives to the courts and 
the federal government, in addition to the information asymmetry that exists between the police 
as a profession and the general public (Douglass, 2017). Observing that the process of federal 
intervention and negotiation by its very nature happens in secret behind closed doors, Ross and 
Parke (2009) suggest; “[results in] the government failing to represent the public as a whole” (p. 
203). Further supporting this argument, Chanin (2017) points out that the process of negotiating 
in the early stages of a consent decree are particularly problematic, characterized by 
disproportionate power structures, exacerbating unequal negotiations between the DOJ and local 
jurisdiction, suggesting; “the DOJ’s early reputation for heavy-handedness and an unnecessarily 
adversarial approach to the investigation process” (p. 260) was not unjustified.  
 These inequalities in negotiations and perceived power shifts have frequently engendered 
animosity between the local jurisdiction and the federal government as local police departments 
are forced into federal compliance (Powell, Meitl, & Worrall, 2017). Indeed, the power structure 
that exists between the federal government’s resources and that of a local police agency make the 
negotiation process between the two parties “uneven from the start” (Ross & Parke, 2009, p. 
206). Embedded within this resource asymmetry argument is a cost-effectiveness criticism, 
similar to that offered by Scott (2017), who argues that enforcing compliance with a local agency 
is costly for both the federal government, and agency being sued. As such, “the taxpaying public 







Gaps in the Literature 
 A review of the extant literature reveals that until recently, scholars have taken a post-hoc 
approach to studying § 14141 actions. Conducting an implementation study of § 14141 implicitly 
acknowledges that a police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional 
policing, yet the very meaning of this term has not been fully operationalized. Understanding, 
defining, and practicing constitutional policing is an acute problem in the United States where 
policing is decentralized (Douglass, 2017). As asserted by PERF (2015), constitutional policing 
is at its most fundamental, “legal policing” (p. 1), however, this term is too “often used in a 
limited context” (p. 3), as “discussions about constitutional policing occur only ‘after the fact’” 
(p. 3). The lack of clarity in the meaning of constitutional policing, and questions regarding what 
type of credible measures should be used to assess this construct, have plagued the study and 
utilization of § 14141 since its passage (Harmon, 2017).  
 Implicit in PERF’s (2015) argument over the meaning of “legal policing” and “after the 
fact” analysis is that greater internal scrutiny may help preclude organizational and operational 
deficiencies before they cascade into unconstitutional practices. As evidence of this point of 
view, PERF (2015) comments that “forward-thinking police leaders are reviewing their policies 
and practices to ensure that they not only promote community policing and crime reduction, but 
also advance the broad constitutional goal of protecting everyone’s civil liberties and providing 
equal protection under the law” (p. 3). This statement and perspective can be interpreted as a call 
by PERF to help provide police leadership with the requisite knowledge to assist in ensuring 
constitutional policing.  
 All of this supports the notion that there is both a significant knowledge gap regarding § 




explore, examine, or analyze conditions that existed in a municipal police department prior to a § 
14141 investigation. As such, the tools and knowledge that forward-thinking police leaders, and 
scholars could use to promote constitutional policing, remain unstudied and elusive. 
Final Thoughts on the Literature 
 What stands out most in the literature is the lack of research that attempts to describe, 
explore, or explain the conditions surrounding a police department that may have led to a § 
14141 action, and what can be done with that information. Consider § 14141 actions as a process 
for a moment; that process consists of a predecision (preliminary inquiry-investigation), decision 
(investigative findings), agreement (negotiated settlement), implementation (monitoring and 
reporting), compliance (agreement termination), and results (sustainability). This process has 
been studied and reported in the literature with one exception, the earliest part, that is, the 
predecision to decision. This lacuna made for an apt, compelling, and necessary study; as has 
been noted by scholars of § 14141: “[T]here remains a descriptive gap in the literature on the 
process by which the DOJ currently identifies cities engaged in a pattern or practice of police 
















 Exploring and understanding the enforcement of § 14141 by the federal government 
against municipal police presents a unique problem in criminal justice, public policy, and public 
administration. It is an enforcement action taken against a government agency at one level, by a 
government agency within another level of government for the purpose of constitutional and 
legal compliance, while also involving complex agency decision-making and purposeful 
selection of a specified municipal police agency. 
 Since an established criticism of § 14141 enforcement against municipal police is that 
federal intervention of local police contravenes constitutional directive, ipso facto, it was 
imperative that the examination of § 14141 against municipal police encompassed a range of 
methodology and theory to address this problem. In doing so, three theories were applied to 
assist in answering this study’s research questions. As such, multiple streams formed the 
overarching theoretical framework, and thereby supported by disjointed incrementalism and 
deterrence. 
 These three theories have been selected to support core components of this dissertation. 
These components involve the identification of variables within a framework contributing to § 
14141 selection, a description of how the agency responsible for identifying and investigating 
police agencies applies its legal mandate over-time, and a description of how § 14141 findings 
can be used as prescriptive measures in the law enforcement community to prevent 
unconstitutional policing, and potential federal intervention.   
Multiple Streams 
 Public policy theory provides a lens in which the world of governmental decision-making 




public policy framework that allows scholars to understand the phenomenon of organizational 
decision-making, and the variety of factors that influence policy and agenda decisions, ex ante. 
 Rationale. 
 At its core, the MS framework is a policy process model that explores governmental 
decision-making among infinite choices in “organized anarchies” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 84). In its 
original construction, MS describes how specific policy options, which may have lain dormant, 
rise to agenda status when its three streams converge, whereby some action is taken to promote a 
specific policy choice over an alternative. As applied to government decision-making at the 
organizational level, this same construct applies. The DOJ, as part and parcel of the federal 
government, does not make decisions in a vacuum. Actionable, decision-making in public 
organizations is suffused with both rationality and values. Using terminology from public policy 
theory, organizational decision-making regarding which items, or in the case of this study, 
municipal police departments, become actionable under § 14141 is not wholly rational-
comprehensive or post-positivistic (Smith & Larimer, 2013). Rather, decision-making at the 
organizational level is a combination of the two.  
 Implicit in Kingdon’s framework is that policy choices are imbued with values, and those 
values support decisions based on objective conditions. To illustrate; a focusing event can 
illuminate problems within a public organization. A close examination of that focusing event 
may lead to the discovery of a faulty policy. Problems and faulty policies are quantifiable in MS 
through a rational-comprehensive lens by measuring size, scope, impact, and cost-benefit. 
Values support which problems or faulty policies are worth paying attention to over others. 
 When applying MS to § 14141 actions using the above reasoning, this study will show 




are technically feasible, have value acceptability, conform to the political environment and 
national mood. All of these; problems, policies and politics, are accounted for in the MS 
framework. As such, this framework was used to explore and explain how the convergence of 
the three streams in the context of municipal police agency practices, and environmental 
conditions, facilitates the initiation of a § 14141 action. This knowledge, then, can be used by 
police leadership to initiate necessary policy change within their agencies.    
 The MS framework “theorizes at the systemic level” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 66) and uses 
“predecisions” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 1), meaning the entire system (Zahariadis, 2007), as the unit 
of analysis. In doing so, MS provides a lens to examine government decision-making policy 
retrospectively, which made it particularly applicable for this dissertation. The strength of the 
MS framework has been noted by scholars such as Larkin (1996), who has asserted: 
There is no shortage of examples in numerous federal policy fields to illustrate the 
operation of Kingdon’s theory…the criminal justice field, however, is a particularly 
inviting subject. The reason is that, short of sending the nation to war, the most intrusive 
action that the federal government can take against any person is to imprison or execute a 
convicted defendant for a crime. Judicious implementation of sound criminal justice 
policy also is a cornerstone to any successful political society, since there is no more 
elementary duty that government has than to protect public safety. And there is no 
shortage of controversial criminal justice issues potentially subject to illumination by 
Kingdon’s theory. (p. 9) 
 Although Kindgon’s framework is most well known as a theory of the policy process in 
terms of agenda setting, MS has been widely used to explore decision-making within national, 




a “flagship framework for explaining agenda setting, policy making, and policy implementation” 
(Rawat & Morris, 2016, p. 627). As an example of its prominence, the MS framework has been 
applied in a variety of policy fields including transportation, the environment, energy, law 
enforcement, arms-control, health and transportation (Rawat & Morris, 2016). In the field of 
criminal justice, researchers have applied the MS framework to explore the rise and fall of prison 
privatization (Culp, 2005), drug policy process in Australia (Lancaster, Ritter, & Colebatch, 
2014), “three strikes” legislation (Saint-Germain & Calamia, 1996), antiterrorism policy and the 
death penalty (Larkin, 2012), police privatization in the United Kingdom (White, 2014), and the 
adoption of emergency management policies in Canada (Henstra, 2010). As this dissertation 
focuses its analysis on decision-making by the DOJ in matters related to unconstitutional 
policing at the municipal level, MS provided a particularly suitable fit for guiding the project 
forward.  
 Structural Elements and Processes.  
 Described as theorizing “from the macro to the micro” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 68) by 
subsuming three independent streams flowing through a system, to which, when there is 
convergence, presents an opportunity for a policy decision, or policy output. The three streams 
are the problem, policy, and political streams (Kingdon, 1995), each with their own 
operationalization. The policy output resulting from the convergence of the three streams is 
described by Kingdon (1995) in a temporal order; a “problem is recognized, a solution is 
developed and available in the policy community, a political change makes it the right time for 
policy change, and political constraints are not severe” (p. 165).  
 Convergence of the three streams brings together two additional structural elements 




elements describe processes of the MS framework. As informed by Kingdon (1995), policy 
windows are limited-time opportunities that allow for the initiation of policy action at critical 
moments. These windows are opened by “compelling problems or by events in the political 
stream” (Zahariadis, 2007, p. 74), and are coupled by the appropriate policy makers and 
stakeholders (Kingdon, 1995). The successful union of these elements results in specific type of 
output. The policy output for this research is DOJ’s § 14141 investigative outcome, presented in 
a publicly issued findings letter that identifies and describes the extent to which a police agency 
is engaged in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. The conceptualization of the MS 
framework, as applied to this dissertation is presented as an iterative process in Figure 1.   
 As such, Kingdon’s multiple streams formed the overarching framework that allows for 
both an exploratory and explanatory analysis of § 14141 enforcement against municipal police 
agencies engaged in unconstitutional policing, assisting to answer research questions 5 and 6: 
How does the DOJ identify a specific municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional 








 Operationalization: problem stream. 
 Three core elements make up the problem stream, these include; focusing events, 
indicators, and feedback. In the MS framework, focusing events are crises that can bring an issue 
to the forefront for policymakers and governmental agencies; examples include “a crisis or 
disaster that comes along to call attention to the problem, a powerful symbol that catches on” 
(Kingdon, 1995, pp. 94-95). As well, a focusing event is known as a “Triggering Event”, 
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It is not uncommon for a seemingly random occurrence-for example, a critical op-ed 
newspaper article written…an inmate taken to a local hospital with severe injuries 
inflicted by police officers-to bring attention to government policies or behaviors that 
potentially violate constitutional law. (p. 281) 
 Considering these descriptions, the operationalization of a focusing event for this study 
was the identification of a high-profile event(s) involving a specific municipal police agency in 
the three years prior to a § 14141 investigation. This event must have been: either explicitly 
recognized by the DOJ, alluded to by the DOJ in their § 14141 documents, or publicly reported 
in such a way that in the aggregate, represents a singular problem to that municipal police 
agency. This operationalization is supported by DOJ’s policy and decision-making language 
regarding high-profile events insofar as “individual incidents may suggest a systemic problem, 
and often, therefore, comprise part of the information the Division relies upon to justify opening 
an investigation” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 10). 
 The second core element in the problem stream is referred to as indicators. Indicators 
consist of activities and events used to “assess the magnitude of a problem and to become aware 
of changes in the problem” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 91). Indicators can take the form of any number 
of activities; using Kingdon’s (1995) studies, some examples of indicators include “highway 
deaths, disease rates, immunization rates, consumer prices, commuter and intercity 
ridership...infant mortality rates, and many others” (p. 90). As noted by Zahariadis (2007) 
“indicators can be monitored either routinely or through special studies” (p. 79), and as Kingdon 
(1995) describes, there is a “need for indicators, particularly quantitative measures” (p. 93).  
 One way that municipal police departments monitor indicators for both individual and 




intervention systems (EIS) (Walker, Milligan, & Berke, 2005). These systems have been 
described as a “data-based police management tool designated to identify problematic behavior 
and allow early intervention…to promote best professional police practices, accountability and 
proactive management” (Cutlar, 2008, p. 42).  
 As a type of performance management system, scholars have recognized the importance 
of intervention systems in measuring and promoting organizational effectiveness, greater 
efficiency, and transparency for agencies at various levels of government, including the police 
(Hatry, 1978; Wholey & Hatry, 1992). Indeed, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights endorsed 
the adoption of performance management systems, including early intervention systems, for 
police departments nationwide in 1981, and by the year 2000, approximately 40% of municipal 
police departments with a population greater than 50,000 were estimated to have implemented, 
or planned to implement such a system (Alpert & Walker, 2000). 
 As described by the DOJ, early intervention systems should be designed to track and 
monitor a variety of indicators and particularly those involving misconduct, and specific 
behaviors that may necessitate intervention, including; complaints against officers, internal 
disciplinary actions, uses of force, civil lawsuits, sick leave, vehicle accidents, and other data 
relevant to “evaluate and audit the performance of all levels” (Cutlar, 2008, p. 44) of a police 
department. Since EISs subsume a variety of regularly measurable misconduct indicators, DOJ 
findings of a deficient EIS was operationalized as the presence of indicators in the problem 
stream.  
 The third element in the problem stream is feedback since government officials receive 
information about policies and operations through feedback from the external environment 




and other times informal. One such example of the use of systematic feedback “comes in the 
form of media portrayals [because]….the press thrives on the public interest and consistently 
portrays events and issues of great social importance” (Worrell, 1999, p. 325). As 
operationalized in this study, feedback involved the presence or absence of news media reports 
of misconduct by a municipal police department in the national news media during the three 
years prior to the commencement of a § 14141 investigation against that specific municipal 
police agency.  
 Operationalization: policy stream. 
 The policy stream is described by Zahariadis (2007) as containing various elements, 
including “a ‘soup’ of ideas that compete to win acceptance” (p. 72). Within this soup exist 
policy communities that “are composed of specialists in a given policy area” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 
117). A variety of policy proposals “are considered in various forums and forms, such as 
hearings, papers and conversations” (Zahariadias, 2007, p. 72). Moreover, these policy proposals 
are brought before a variety of groups and forums for the purpose of “educating the general 
public” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 128), and informing a “more specialized public, peculiar to a 
particular issue” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 128). 
 The success of policy proposals within this stream involve the consideration of a variety 
of policy options, however, few survive because of what is referred to as “selection criteria” 
(Zahariadis, 2007, p. 72). Two core constructs of selection criteria include “technical feasibility 
and value acceptability” (Kingdon, 1995, p. 131). Value acceptability refers “not only notions of 
the proper role and size of government, but also concepts of equity and efficiency” (Kingdon, 




 In detailing the process of identifying policies and practices for remedy, the DOJ (2017a) 
has stated that they seek “community input regarding remedies” (p. 17), and that this “input has 
informed the provisions of the Division’s reform agreement” (p. 17). Furthermore, the DOJ 
(2017a) 
also seeks the input of rank-and-file officers and police unions and affinity groups 
[because]…all stakeholders must feel invested in the remedies presented….Communities 
must be invested for the long-term sustainability of the reform. Individual officers who, 
day-to-day, will carry out the reforms must be invested.…And police and local leadership 
must be invested to provide leadership and support. (p. 18)  
The DOJ’s position involving policy communities in their § 14141 actions reflects Kingdon’s 
(1995) comments regarding the importance of value acceptability within the policy stream.  
 In addition to value acceptability, the DOJ takes into consideration whether it is believed 
that a policy proposal can be successfully implemented because “without that belief in its 
technical feasibility, the proposal is not likely to survive to the point of serious consideration” 
(Kingdon, 1995, p. 132). Technical feasibility, as expressed by the DOJ (2017a), is part their § 
14141 policy consideration process insofar as “consensus opinions in the law enforcement 
profession regarding best practices for preventing police misconduct” (p. 20) are critical to a 
policy’s successful acceptance and implementation. By actively engaging with national police 
experts, as well, considering how to best “assist the agency in developing a plan to implement 
reforms and address any barriers to implementation, including by providing technical assistance” 
(p. 21), the DOJ is better able understand the limits of a municipal police agency to implement 




 In consideration of these processes within the policy stream, and the reliance on technical 
feasibility and value acceptability as core criteria for implementing organizational change in a 
municipal police department, the policy stream was operationalized as specific policies grouped 
into clusters identified in § 14141 investigative findings letters that are in need of reform. The 
aggregation of these policies into clusters are thus the reflection of selection criteria’s highly 
restrictive two core elements; technical feasibility and value acceptability. 
 Operationalization: political stream. 
 The political stream contains three elements that contribute to understanding changes in 
policy, these include; the national mood, pressure group campaigns, and administrative turnover 
(Kingdon, 1995). Zahariadias (2007) points out that among these three elements, “the 
combination of the national mood and turnover in government exerts the most powerful effect on 
agendas” (p. 73). In Kingdon’s (1995) words; “swings of national mood and the shifts of 
administration…brought about by election results can be sufficient to overcome organized 
opposition, and to define the political stream as leaning towards changes” (p. 152).  
 In consideration of Kindgon’s national mood and administrative turnover as the two most 
important aspects of the political stream, polling data – specifically three questions related to 
confidence in the police, confidence in the criminal justice system, and perceptions of police 
honesty by Gallop Inc. over the life-course of § 14141 were used to conceptualize and measure 
the national mood as it relates to attitudes towards the police. Presidential office-holder and their 
associated political party were used to operationalize and measure influences of administrative 
turnover in the political stream. 
 As opposed to the political party of municipal leadership at the local level, political party 




three reasons. First, in keeping within the established conceptualization of the MS framework as 
articulated by Kingdon (1995), presidential officeholder is theorized to exert the strongest 
influence on agendas, and therefore, a policy output. Second, although having been applied at 
different levels of government in previous studies, the MS framework, as conceptualized and 
applied in this study, focuses its exploratory decision-making from the federal level onto the 
local level of government, not vice versa. The implication of which is that the political 
environment at the federal level has direct influence on policy decisions, which is the specific 
area requiring exploration in this study. Finally, the analysis of decision-making in this study is 
from the perspective of the DOJ – a federal agency whose leadership is directly appointed by the 
president, and as such, the most powerful actor in Kingdon’s framework, consequently, the 
political party of the leadership of a municipality under § 14141 lacks appropriate relevancy at 
the federal level of analysis, and thus, is unsupported by MS as applied in this study.   
 Operationalization: policy entrepreneurs.  
 In the MS framework, policy entrepreneurs are represented by a variety of interested 
parties and actors who assist in the movement of the two core elements in the policy stream, 
value acceptability and technical feasibility, with the convergence of an issue or decision during 
a policy window. Elements within this process are unspecified and unmeasured variables within 
this study as the policy output subsumes the two values that allow for a policy output. Moreover, 
qualitatively, DOJ (2017a) acknowledges the influence of interested parties in their § 14141 
investigative processes, yet, these parties’ role in § 14141 investigations remain unspecified 
since the DOJ does not make known through their findings letters the extent to which policy 




entrepreneurs is not specifically operationalized, but rather treated as a process since its 
specificity is unknown.  
 Operationalization: policy windows. 
 Similar to policy entrepreneurs, policy windows are an unmeasured descriptive process in 
Kingdon’s framework resulting from the convergence of the problem stream, political stream, 
and timely movement of core elements in the policy stream by policy entrepreneurs. Policy 
windows consist of time-limited opportunities for an agenda to move through the framework 
allowing for a policy output. As indicated by Kingdon (1995) windows open and close for a 
variety of reasons including general elections, focusing events, and most consequentially, the 
president. The influence of policy windows then, beyond mere description, is best represented by 
the confluence of elements in the problem and political streams that must come together apropos 
for an output. For this study, all policy outputs are affirmative, that is, a DOJ § 14141 decision 
has successfully made it through the streams framework, and implicit in that output is that the 
streams successfully navigated the policy window. As such, policy windows are not specifically 
measured but are a subsumed process as indicated by a successful policy output.  
 Operationalization: policy output.  
 As conceptualized, the MS process finalizes with a policy output. In Kingdon’s 
framework a policy output is the adoption of a specific policy resulting from the successful 
confluence of the three streams by entrepreneurs during times of opportunity (windows). The 
application of the MS framework to DOJ’s decision-making in this context is an affirmative one. 
That is, decisions by the DOJ not to pursue a § 14141 action post-investigation are not 
considered, consequently, each policy output represents the successful union of the different 




consists of two categories, the differentiation of the output was used to explore the different 
variables within the various streams and processes on MS’ final policy output for each municipal 
police agency.   
Disjointed Incrementalism 
 Disjointed incrementalism by Lindblom (1979) is a theory of the policy process that 
focuses on decision-making within an organizational context. Having been referred to as “a 
theory of organizational behavior” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 14), disjointed incrementalism is an 
expansion of Lindblom’s (1959) earlier work on incrementalism rooted in Simon’s (1947) 
“bounded rationality”. Initially described as “muddling through”, incrementalism by Lindblom 
(1959) “viewed policy making as a fragmented process of small steps that individuals engender 
only slight changes in existing policies” (Culp, 2005, p. 416), because decision-makers “must 
respond to problems in the absence of certainty regarding outcomes or agreement over core 
values” (Atkinson, 2011, p. 10). This requires decision-making “premised on what is practical 
and possible” (p. 10).   
 As opposed to small changes over the status quo, disjointed incrementalism offers a 
“realistic model of policy making that comport with the diffuse authority and responsibility 
structures of bureaucracy” (Culp, 2005, p. 417). Disjointed incrementalism is characterized by 
the following: 
• Limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives. 
• An intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of 
the problem. 
• A greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be 
sought. 




• Analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a 
considered alternative. 
• Fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in the policy process.  
 Although well-known and popular since its initial formulation, disjointed incrementalism 
has been criticized as being a “spent intellectual force” (Bendor, 2015, p. 194) in large part 
because of its inability to account for rapid, large, or unforeseen changes from the status quo 
(Dror, 1964; Etzioni, 1989; Lustick, 1980; Rajagopalan & Rasheed, 1995). Etzioni (1989) 
suggests that incremental decision-making is “not so much toward a goal as away from trouble” 
(p. 123), claiming that disjointed incrementalism “amounts to drifting to action without 
direction” (p. 124). Dror (1964) has referred to Lindblom’s (1959) original formulation of 
incrementalism as “pro-inertia and anti-innovation” (p. 155). Rajagopalan and Rasheed (1995) 
point out that continual change in the environment, and incremental policy change, when 
unequal, can create a ‘strategic drift’ requiring non-incremental change, because “under 
conditions of high-rate change, ignorance can produce agreement upon a catastrophic policy” 
(Dror, 1964, p. 155).   
 Overall, criticisms of disjointed incrementalism revolve around the framework being 
insufficiently proactive, insufficiently goal oriented and ambitions, excessively conservative, 
useful in too limited a range of decision contexts, and too hostile to analysis (Weiss & 
Woodhouse, 1992). Yet these same researchers claim that criticisms of disjointed incrementalism 
are “by and large invalid” (Weiss & Woodhouse, 1993, p. 255), and have gone to lengths to 
argue that its descriptive power endures as Lindblom’s (1959) original formulation was as an 




 Despite these criticisms, disjointed incrementalism has been used in the field of criminal 
justice to explain prison privatization (Culp, 2005), decarceration in Massachusetts (Stolz, 1984), 
criminal justice policy-making at the federal level (Stolz, 1985), and offered as an efficient 
means of criminal justice planning to deal with the “field’s most troublesome characteristics” 
(Smith & Klosterman, 1980, p. 403). As such, disjointed incrementalism was used to analyze 
DOJ decision-making while supplementing analysis from Kingdon’s multiple streams. 
 Operationalization of disjointed incrementalism. 
 Decision-making by DOJ regarding policy alternatives is embedded in their language, as 
an example, in § 14141 cases the DOJ (2017a) “considers whether the allegations represent an 
emerging or developing issue” (p. 6). Tellingly, DOJ (2017a) emphasizes that: 
The model of reform reflected…has changed over time as the Division has learned from 
its own experiences enforcing Section 14141, responding to feedback from law 
enforcement and community stakeholders, and incorporated developments in the social 
science of police reform. (p. 20) 
 This statement is indicative of disjointed incrementalism, that is; limited policy 
alternatives, analysis and values intertwined, remedy of ills, learning from trial and error, 
exploration of some alternatives, and diffusion of policy work to partisans. Moreover, § 14141 
actions during the first decade after the law’s enactment are referred to as “the first-generation 
model of police reform” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 40), and more recent § 14141 actions as the “current 
generation” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 40), clearly demarcating a philosophical and practical approach 
between two eras. Disjointed incrementalism then is well-suited to explore DOJ’s decision-
making regarding a § 14141 action. As such, disjointed incrementalism was operationalized as 




efficiency, investigative outcome, and output over the life-course of § 14141, and assisted in 
answering research questions 3, 4, and 6: Have DOJ’s pattern and practice investigations 
changed over-time? What organizational characteristics and environmental conditions existed in 
municipal police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation? How can § 14141 support police 
departments to practice constitutional policing?  
Deterrence 
 Deterrence theory traces its roots to utilitarian notions of crime and punishment as 
formulated by Beccaria (1764) and espoused by Bentham (1789). The underpinning of 
deterrence theory is the rational actor model which “assumes that offenders exercise rational 
judgment and are reasonably aware of the potential costs and benefits with criminal acts” (Pratt 
& Cullen, 2005, p. 415).  
 Deterrence theory posits that when present, three key elements of punishment – certainty, 
severity, and celerity, will discourage criminal behavior. These three elements manifest in a 
utilitarian calculus that dictates general, specific, and marginal effects on behavior (Harmon, 
2009; Nagin, 2013). Despite evidence suggesting its empirical weakness relative to other modern 
criminological theories (Pratt & Cullen, 2005), some scholars argue that deterrence theory’s 
nuances and complexity have been misapplied and understudied, and therefore not sufficiently 
understood (Nagin, 2013). Even with these scholarly disagreements, deterrence theory remains 
popular among scholars and practitioners for its unambiguous conceptualization, and 
applicability to social science, criminal justice, and public policy (Braga & Weisburd, 2012; 
Kelling & Wilson, 1982; National Academy of Sciences, 2017; Wilson, 1975).  
  Deterrence theory has also been used as a framework by economists to explore questions 
related to optimal levels of enforcement and crime, as was initially done by Becker (1968). Since 




of rational actors related to crime, enforcement, and punishment. One such model has been 
offered by Polinsky and Shavell (2000), known as the public enforcement of law. These scholars 
apply their economic model to a variety of aspects of the enforcement process, one such is 
referred to as “The enforcement authority’s problem” (p. 49). As described in this context, the 
goal of enforcement “is to maximize social welfare by choosing enforcement expenditures e (or, 
equivalently, the probability of detection p), the level of the fine, f, the length of the 
imprisonment term, and the standard for imposing liability” (Polinsky & Shavell, 2000, p. 49).  
 Related to police organizations, and to serve as a deterrent against unconstitutional 
policing practices, Harmon (2009) interprets this model as; “expected cost of § 14141, E, to any 
municipality is at least p, the probability perceived by the municipality that its police department 
will be subject to a full investigation…multiplied by c, the cost a municipality expects to incur as 
a result of that investigation” (p. 24). As applied, raising the costs or probability of a § 14141 
action against a specific police agency will increase that agency’s expected costs above 
efficiency, thereby serve as a deterrent to an offending police agency. Using this model of 
deterrence, sufficiently raising the probability of intervention related to systemic misconduct 
relative to the costs borne by a police department under a § 14141 action, a rational police 
agency would be deterred from engaging in unconstitutional policing through punitive 
expenditures, loss of autonomy, and potential organizational demise. This operationalization of 
deterrence was used as a framework, along with MS and disjointed incrementalism, to explore 







 Operationalization of deterrence.  
 It can be inferred from public comments that enforcement of § 14141 as it relates to 
choosing a specific police agency to investigate is influenced by the principles of deterrence, as 
expressed by the DOJ (2017a): 
The Division considers whether the allegations represent an issue common to many law 
enforcement agencies as well as whether the allegations represent an emerging or 
developing issue, such that reform could have an impact beyond the primary objective of 
eliminating constitutional violations in the specific law enforcement agency. (p. 6) 
 Financial costs associated with a § 14141 action vary depending on the size of the 
organization and complexity of DOJ’s findings, however, little of this aspect of § 14141 is 
known. What is known, however, is that the “local jurisdiction generally bears the costs of 
supporting the monitoring team” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 23), approximating $1 million per year (PERF, 
2013). This figure does not include the costs associated with actual organizational reform, which 
appear to be substantial. As an example, Kelly, Childress, and Rich (2015) reported that the total 
cost of § 14141 reform in the LAPD – which lasted over 12 years – was estimated by the Los 
Angeles Chief Legislative Analyst to approximate $300 million. 
 Since costs associated with § 14141 action appear to be substantial, and quite possibly 
onerous to the police agency and their parent jurisdiction, the application of § 14141 within a 
deterrence framework suggests that enforcement may be directed towards municipal police 
agencies with specific attributes including larger size, greater resources, and more financially 
supportive jurisdictions. Municipalities with these characteristics may be better suited to 
withstand the costs associated with a § 14141 investigation than smaller or resource deprived 




the reform of patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing practices, and often those patterns 
or practices involve civil rights, the demographic make-up of jurisdictions is an important 
variable to consider as the DOJ may be employing their authority as a specific deterrent against 
certain types of unconstitutional policing, and specific constitutional violations.  
 As such, the deterrence framework above was operationalized as resources, measured as 
a police-to-civilian-served ratio, contextualized within an external control and resource 
dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2016) perspective to explore the inducement of organizational 
change in the deterrence model. The variable resources was selected to represent a dimension of 
deterrence in this study rather than municipal expenditures because as conceptualized and 
applied to municipal police, resources and expenditures are differentiated variables through the 
concepts of effectiveness and efficiency. That is, in the context of municipal police and 
application of §14141, the DOJ is interested in the “overall goal of achieving effective, [emphasis 
added] constitutional policing” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 22). Organizational effectiveness in policing 
directly relates to the police meeting their operational goals, whereas, efficiency refers to police 
organizations that get more for their money (Skogan, 1976).  
 In their pursuit of ensuring effective and constitutional policing for the municipal police 
agencies under their purview, the DOJ makes no mention of improving municipal police 
efficiency, but rather routinely targets police effectiveness (DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a). 
Consequently, the effective application of a municipal police department’s resources is more 
important to constitutional policing than the efficient application of those resources. By 
extension, how much a municipality spends on a police department per officer is less relevant to 
how well a police department meets the mission of the agency with the resources they have been 




 In addition to ratio of police-to-civilian-served ratio, size of the police department was 
operationalized in terms of sworn employees because larger police departments can serve as an 
example of reform in a general deterrence framework, while better absorbing the costs associated 
with a § 14141 investigation than small police agencies. Included with the size of a police 
agency and ratio of sworn employees, overall population statistics, and demographics measured 
as a municipality’s percent of the non-White population were both operationalized within the 
deterrence framework to assist in answering research questions 4 and 6: What organizational 
characteristics and environmental conditions existed in municipal police departments prior to a 
§ 14141 investigation? How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional 
policing?   
Theory Integration Representation 
 Using multiple streams as the driving theoretical framework and integrating it with other 
theories is consistent with much prior research (Rawat & Morris, 2016), and for this study, it was 
essential. Without multiple streams, understanding decision-making lacks model and form; 
without disjointed incrementalism, an evaluation of changes in decision-making over-time lacks 
direction; without deterrence, a suggestion that municipal police should be called to action to 
implement necessary change lacks incentive. As well, by applying these three theories, all 
aspects of the main research problem are couched in well-established, and venerable theories that 
integrate the social sciences through the fields of public policy and criminal justice. As 
conceptualized, influences of disjointed incrementalism, and deterrence on the MS process are 
presented in Figure 2, visually representing the influence of disjointed incrementalism from one 
investigation to the next, the theory’s influence on investigative outcomes over-time, as well as 





Figure 2.  Influences on the MS Process: Disjointed Incrementalism and Deterrence 
Research Questions 
 In attempt to both fill the knowledge gap posed by the literature review, and address the 
problem statement, the following research questions guided this study:  
1. What pattern or practice themes emerge from DOJ investigative findings?  
 Prior to a municipal police agency entering into a negotiated settlement or technical 
assistance subsequent a § 14141 investigation, the DOJ publicly issues a findings letter 
specifying the results of their investigation, and describing remedies to be undertaken to rectify 
organizational and systemic police dysfunctionality. Two affirmative outcomes – negotiated 
settlement or technical assistance – result from DOJ’s conclusion that a municipal police agency 
suffers from systemic problems so great that they are actively engaged in, or at risk of engaging 
in, patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. This differentiation is crucial, as it is the 
demarcation of unconstitutional, and constitutional but problematic police behavior.  
 Since § 14141 investigative findings letters vary in length, detail, and analysis, it was 
suspected that these differences were related to a number of variables including whether a § 




statute, over-time changes in the interpretation and emphasis on behaviors that constitute patterns 
or practices of unconstitutional policing, as well as both the unique variations associated with a 
discrete police agency, and their parent municipality. 
 DOJ’s § 14141 investigative findings letters contain two types of content – manifest and 
latent. The manifest content is characterized by overt policy, practice, and procedural 
deficiencies that were specifically attributed to systemic problems, and for many investigations, 
unconstitutional policing practices. In contrast, latent content is subtler, nuanced, and intricate – 
only to be discerned through a careful analysis and interpretation of the data contained therein. 
Determining the themes embedded in these investigative findings letters through thematic 
analysis allowed for a clear attribution of patterns or practices of organizational police 
dysfunctionality, and the contours of unconstitutional policing.  
2. What patterns or practices did DOJ find contribute to unconstitutional policing?  
 Identifying and specifying DOJ’s patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, 
through a differentiation of the two categories of investigative outcome, allowed for an analysis 
and interpretation of the relationship that exists in how the DOJ identifies a specific municipal 
police agency for investigation, commonalities in what the DOJ seeks to reveal through their 
investigations, what they find, and how these findings change over-time. The analysis contained 
herein assisted in addressing both parts of the research problem, that is, identifying what 
contributes to patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, and how municipal police 
leaders can use that knowledge to prevent systemic problems, misconduct, investigation, and 






3. Have DOJ’s pattern or practice investigations changed over-time?  
 Understanding how organizational decision-making, and the influence of rationality 
apply to the identification, investigation, and enforcement of patterns or practices of 
unconstitutional policing, its interpretation, and how that may change over-time was necessary to 
address the second part of the research problem. Exploring the phenomena of over-time change 
regarding § 14141 investigations offers municipal police departments knowledge comporting not 
only to their current needs, but the knowledge necessary to forecast needs as a reaction to 
emerging DOJ enforcement practices, and the mutable interpretation of unconstitutional policing. 
Determining how the DOJ exercised their § 14141 authority in the past, and examining the 
changes that occurred in the enforcement of § 14141 over the life-course of the law, facilitated 
the development of a model to forestall unconstitutional policing.   
4. What organizational characteristics and environmental conditions existed in municipal 
police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation?   
 Employment characteristics, and environmental conditions were necessary to 
contextualize § 14141 investigations at the municipal level, and to help understand the 
interactions or effects that organizational resources, organizational size, jurisdictional 
demographics, and population size have on patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, and 
why the DOJ may have identified a specific municipal police agency for reform with respect to 
these variables. As well, these data facilitated the operationalization of a municipal police agency 
to meet the minimum jurisdictional population for this study – information that was used to assist 
in an understanding of the implications of resource deprivations, and targeted enforcement 




5. How does the DOJ identify a specific municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional 
policing? 
 A theoretical framework of the policy process was applied to identify, describe, explore, 
and analyze concomitant variables within all § 14141 municipal police agencies investigated for 
patterns or practices of systemic misconduct. Through an application of the theoretical 
framework, and by differentiating § 14141 actions by investigative outcome, it was hoped that a 
clearer picture would emerge of the specific variables that led to a finding of patterns or practices 
of unconstitutional policing. This analysis then assisted in answering the first prong of this study 
apart from the research question: What contributes to such a rare event?  
6. How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional policing? 
 This question was formulated to address the second prong of the research problem; 
accordingly; how can the information produced from the first prong of the research problem 
assist other police departments to practice constitutional policing? This knowledge then can be 
used to improve municipal police performance through the creation of a compendium of police 
practices, serving as a remedy to systemic police dysfunctionality and unconstitutional policing 
prescriptively. Moreover, the application of the knowledge created in this study can then be used 
to explore policy options regarding future enforcement of § 14141, serving as a guide for 
municipal police leaders, while incentivizing those leaders to study, learn about, and initiate 
necessary change in their agencies proactively, rather than by legal decree, obviating a loss of 







Variables Examined in Hypotheses 
 Dependent variables. 
 The dependent variable of interest in this dissertation was DOJ’s § 14141 investigative 
outcome, that is, the binary categorization of police agencies under negotiated settlement 
differentiated from police agencies under technical assistance. By definition and design, this 
dichotomy distinguishes municipal police agencies found to have engaged in a pattern or practice 
of unconstitutional policing (i.e. negotiated settlements, n = 24), from those municipal police 
agencies found to have systemic problems that did not rise to the level of a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing (i.e. technical assistance, n = 9). Moreover, to assist in explaining 
rational decision-making through the process of disjointed incrementalism, DOJ’s investigative 
output, that is, the length of their § 14141 findings letters, measured as the number of pages for 
each findings letter, served as a dependent variable for related analyses. This was selected as a 
secondary dependent variable to assist in assessing changes in the complexity, nuance, and depth 
of DOJ’s findings over-time. 
 Descriptors from findings letters.  
• Thematic findings – derived from a thematic analysis of DOJ’s findings letters, measured 
according to presence or absence in each findings letter, not by frequency or intensity. 
Thematic findings that were comprised of subthemes were categorized as present if at 
least one subtheme was derived from the analysis. Accordingly, at this level, the presence 
of multiple subthemes within a single theme was counted as the presence of one theme.  
• Subthematic findings – derived from a thematic analysis of DOJ’s findings letters, 
measured according to presence or absence in each findings letter, not by frequency or 




measured by their presence or absence in each findings letter. Any theme that did not 
have subthemes was measured as a scaled theme. 
Independent variables.  
 Independent variables for this dissertation were grouped according to their supporting 
theory and analytical strategy. The following categories of variables are presented in the same 
order as their associated hypotheses: 
 Disjointed Incrementalism. 
• Generation – measured dichotomously as first or second-generation § 14141 investigation 
based on pre or post 2005 initiation.  
• Investigation length – time period from the reported initiation of a § 14141 investigation 
to the issuance of a final findings letter, measured in months.  
 Deterrence.   
• Resources – measured as a ratio of the number of sworn officers to population. Then 
categorized dichotomously as greater than or less than the national average. 
• Size – number of sworn officers for each municipal police department. Classified into 
one of seven of BJS’ (2015) sworn employee categories, and further categorized 
dichotomously as greater than, or less than 500. 
• Population group – total population of a municipality classified into one of seven of BJS’ 
(2015) population groups. Further reduced and categorized dichotomously as greater 
than, or less than 250,000 persons.  
• Percent non-White – percentage of municipal population identified as any other race, or 





 Multiple streams – problems.  
• Focusing events – measured as the presence or absence of an operationalized focusing 
event in the three years prior to the initiation of a § 14141 investigation. Gleaned from 
the manifest analysis of DOJ issued findings letters, related archives, and publicly issued 
technical reports.   
• Indicators – measured as the presence or absence of DOJ recognized insufficiencies, 
deficiencies, and non-existent police early intervention systems. Gleaned from an 
analysis of DOJ issued findings letters. These systems are designed to monitor, track, and 
alert police supervision and leadership to a variety of problematic police officer behavior 
indicating individual, and organizational misconduct.   
• Feedback – measured as the presence or absence of national news reports of police 
corruption or misconduct related to each municipal police agency in three years prior to 
the initiation of a § 14141 investigation.  
• Accompaniment – measured as the interdependence of focusing events and feedback in 
the three years prior to the initiation of a § 14141 investigation.   
  Multiple streams – policies.  
• Policy clusters – the categorization of five clusters of policies including; use of force, 
stop, search and arrest, response to special populations, civilian complaint systems, and 
internal discipline system policies. Measured as the presence or absence of insufficiencies 
and deficiencies gleaned from a manifest analysis of findings letters. 
 Multiple streams – politics.  
• Political party of the president – § 14141 investigation categorized by political party, 




• National mood – an aggregated over-time measure of three polling data questions related 
to attitude towards the police. Measured each year over the life-course of § 14141 as 
more positive, or less positive than historic positive drawn from Gallop Inc. data between 
1994-2017 specific to confidence in the police, confidence in American institutions, and 
honesty of police officers. 
Covariate. 
• In state – measured dichotomously as the presence or absence of more than one § 14141 
investigation of municipal police within a state.  
Hypotheses 
 Section 14141 investigations of municipal police resulting in publicly issued findings 
letters have been categorized into one of two outcomes – negotiated settlement or technical 
assistance. Implicit in this categorization are organizational, and aggregated individual behaviors 
that differentiate a finding of unconstitutional from constitutional but problematic policing – 
allowing for identification, analysis, and interpretation. As such, the first hypothesis is offered:  
H1: Thematic findings will differ between municipal police agencies under negotiated 
settlement, and those under technical assistance.  
 Moving beyond a differentiation of findings between the two types of investigative 
outcomes, police agencies found to engage in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing 
were expected to have a greater number of findings than those police agencies under technical 
assistance. The basis for this expectation was supported by DOJ’s conceptual and legal reasoning 
behind the identification of unconstitutional policing. Police agencies found to engage in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing engage in specific unconstitutional behaviors, and 




of unconstitutional policing. At a more granular level, comparing subthemes across investigative 
outcomes, then, should allow for greater nuance, detail, and analysis. To quantify these 
differences, and to better identify these differences behaviorally, the second hypothesis is 
offered:  
 H2: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have more scaled 
 subtheme findings than those under technical assistance. 
 As applied to organizational decision-making, disjointed incrementalism (Lindblom, 
1979) posits that small adjustments over the status-quo are preferable to decision-making that 
attempts rational-comprehensiveness, or other methods that do not allow for small adjustments 
and corrections. Throughout the course of § 14141 investigations of municipal police, DOJ’s 
output appeared to change in length, complexity, nuance, and analysis. One scholar has referred 
to this phenomenon as exemplifying the government’s “learning curve” (Walker, 2017, p. 10) in 
the implementation of the provision. Explicitly, the DOJ has recognized the incrementalism of 
their § 14141 decision-making through the differentiation of investigations into two distinct 
generations – those commenced through 2005, and after (DOJ, 2017a). One manner to assess the 
effects of disjointed incrementalism relative to § 14141 should then be evident through DOJ’s 
output, that is, their findings letters. As such, the third hypothesis is offered:  
H3: Second-generation output will be significantly longer than first-generation output.  
 
 Furthermore, when applying disjointed incrementalism to § 14141 investigations, the 
expectation is that over-time change would produce greater efficiency; a product of shorter 
investigation lengths through trial and error, organizational learning, institutional memory, and 




between the two generations of § 14141 enforcement. As such, the following hypothesis is 
offered: 
H4: First-generation § 14141 investigations will have lasted longer than second-
generation investigations. 
 The product of efficiency in their investigative process, and ability to conduct 
investigations of larger, more complex organizations would be expected from over-time changes 
in the application of § 14141 by the DOJ against municipal police. Disjointed incrementalism 
then would be revealed through shorter investigation times with a greater number of findings, 
therefore, marked by a greater ability to assess unconstitutional policing in larger police 
agencies. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:   
 H5: The length of an investigation will be negatively associated with the number of DOJ 
 scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police department. 
 Moreover, the application of disjointed incrementalism to § 14141 investigations 
suggests there would be a change in orientation in the types of police practices that the DOJ 
sought to investigate because of ills to be remedied, and intertwining of policy goals and values 
(Lindblom, 1979) are mutable. Indeed, considering the effects that administrative turnover is 
posited to have within the political stream (Kingdon, 1995), and therefore, on the enforcement of 
§ 14141 (DOJ, 2017a), the following hypothesis is offered:  
 H6: DOJ’s investigative findings will differ over time.  
 
 The application of a deterrence orientation to the enforcement of § 14141 by the DOJ 
suggests that certain municipalities, and their police agencies are targeted for enforcement action 
under this authority as a means of both addressing the most highly offensive municipal police 




municipal police agencies from engaging in unconstitutional policing. Applying an economic 
framework of deterrence; organizational resources and size, as well as environmental conditions 
would be expected to differ between police agencies engaged in constitutional and 
unconstitutional policing. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:  
H7: Environmental and organizational characteristics will differ between police agencies 
found to engage in unconstitutional policing, and police agencies without such findings.  
 Under a deterrence framework, municipal police agencies that suffer from resource 
deprivations would be expected to have more organizational problems as indicated by the 
number of findings. As well, § 14141 as applied through a resource dependence perspective, the 
size of a police agency is less relevant than a police agency’s resources. As such, the following 
hypothesis is offered:  
H8: Municipal police agency resources will be negatively associated with the number of 
scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police department. 
 The MS framework as applied to § 14141 decision-making was used to support an 
exploration of the variables that may lead to the identification of a police agency engaged in 
unconstitutional policing, ex-ante. Each of the three streams have their own variables, some of 
which are theorized to act independently, while others, dependently. Within the problem stream, 
Kingdon (1995) suggests that focusing events require accompaniment of a previous agenda to 
rise to actionable status, however, other scholars have found that accompaniment is not required 
to change the agenda status of a decision in the problem stream when focusing events are 
particularly unique or large (Worrall, 1999). To test whether a focusing event, that is, a large and 




was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, as suggested by the MS 
literature, the following hypothesis is offered:  
H9: Municipal police agencies experiencing a focusing event are more likely to have been 
found to engage in unconstitutional policing than those that have not experienced a 
focusing event. 
 Similar to focusing events in the problem stream that may require accompaniment, 
indicators within the problem stream can assist in bringing problems to the attention of decision-
makers, helping to allow the problem rise to actionable status (Kingdon, 1995). To test whether 
indicators within the problem stream, operationalized and measured as a deficient intervention 
system, serve as a precondition to a finding that a municipal police agency was engaged in a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, the following hypothesis is offered: 
H10: Municipal police agencies found to have deficient intervention systems will be more 
likely to engage in unconstitutional policing than municipal police departments without 
such deficiencies.  
 As an alternative to the independence of focusing events in the problem stream, Kingdon 
(1995) suggests that focusing events require accompaniment to become actionable. In the context 
of § 14141, feedback, in the form of national media reporting is such example of accompaniment 
that along with a focusing event, facilitates a problem becoming actionable by the DOJ. To test 
whether feedback has independent influence on raising an issue to agenda status, the following 
hypothesis is offered:  
 H11: Municipal police agencies with focusing events are more likely to have 




 Within the policy stream, policy proposals reflect the two core criteria of value 
acceptability and technical feasibility, that is, what should be done, and what is doable. As 
applied to § 14141 investigations, it stands to reason that police agencies found to engage in 
unconstitutional policing would have a greater number of policy problems (i.e. insufficiencies, 
deficiencies, and necessary, but non-existent policies) than police agencies that were not found to 
engage in unconstitutional policing, implying that policies, and investigative outcomes are 
directly related. As such, the following hypothesis is offered: 
 H12: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have a greater 
 number of policy deficiencies than those under technical assistance. 
 In the MS framework, policies within the policy stream are described to move through 
the framework directly to policy entrepreneurs where they are then coupled through a policy 
window. As described by Kingdon, this stream does not act in unison with the others. 
Consequently, to better establish a connection between problematic policies and DOJ’s 
descriptive findings of a municipal police agency, which would suggest a relationship between 
deficient policies and overall organizational dysfunctionality, it is expected that deficient policies 
would be related to the level of organizational problems since policies are the most independent 
of the three streams in relation to the policy output. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:  
H13: The number of deficient policies will be positively associated with the number of 
thematic findings. 
 Within the political stream it is argued by Kingdon (1995) that administrative turnover is 
the most important element that effects an agenda and decision-making. Applied to the 
enforcement of § 14141, administrative turnover is operationalized as changes in presidential 




exert the strongest influence on a DOJ § 14141 agenda, and therefore on enforcement action 
against municipal police. As such, the following hypothesis is offered:  
 H14: The number of observed § 14141 investigations occurring during the tenure of each 
 president will differ from expected observations.  
 In the MS framework, administrative turnover is accounted for by changes in presidential 
administration, however, an alternative interpretation considers administrative turnover between 
political parties of the president, rather than the officeholder of president since a president must 
pay special attention to their political party and base of support when making political 
appointment decisions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2009). It is expected then that administrative 
turnover, as operationalized by political party of the president, would have the greatest influence 
on a §14141 investigation. Therefore, the following hypothesis is offered:  
 H15: Investigative outcomes will differ between political parties.  
 In addition to the above stated hypotheses, during the course of research and analysis of 
variables, information was revealed warranting special consideration relating to possible 
differences in this study’s organizational and environmental variables when disaggregated by 
investigative generation. Since differences in these variables between the two generations was 
not initially considered, yet important for deeper analysis of over-time changes in § 14141 
targeted enforcement, the following exploratory hypothesis was offered:   
He: Organizational and environmental characteristics for municipal police will differ 
between first and second-generation investigations. 
N.B.: The above exploratory hypothesis is listed as the last hypotheses as is customary, however, 
due to its analytical relevance it was tested between H6 and H7 as it bridges disjointed 






 This dissertation used a mixed-methodological embedded design to address the research 
problem. An embedded research design is useful “when the primary method is qualitative or 
quantitative but the researcher adds the other component to gain additional insight” (Bachman & 
Schutt, 2014, p. 353). Researchers recognize that using a mixed-methodological approach can 
provide a more robust understanding of the research problem than could be accomplished with 
only one approach (Caruth, 2013; Creswell, 2008). Although both types of data are used in an 
embedded design, one type of data serves as a supplement for the other type because both “are 
useful for gaining a broader perspective on the topic at hand and for studying different groups, or 
levels, within a single study” (Hanson, Creswell, Plano Clark, Petska, & Creswell, 2005), and 
when a “single data set is not sufficient, that different questions need to be answered, and that 
each type of question requires different types of data” (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, p. 91). In 
the field of criminal justice, scholars such as Brent and Kraska (2010) have argued the benefits 
of using a mixed design as a viable third methodological choice, particularly for its compatibility 
with various types of data.  
 Designing this mixed-methodological study involved similar procedures used in 
traditional research methods, however, due to the nature of the problem, three additional steps 
were necessary (Hanson, et al., 2005, pp. 226-227), these included: 
1. Deciding whether to use a specific theoretical lens that underlines a researcher’s study 
and subsequent methodological choices (Crotty, 1998). 
2. Deciding how data collection will be implemented and prioritized. 




 Rationale for a mixed-methodological approach. 
 The rationale for applying this methodology was the result of three distinct but 
interrelated factors; (a) the research problem, (b) the theoretical framework, and supporting 
theories used to examine the research problem, and (c) the pragmatist philosophical perspective 
driving the research questions.  
  Kingdon’s MS framework, accompanied by Lindblom’s disjointed incrementalism, and 
deterrence are particularly well-suited to a qualitatively-driven embedded design. In considering 
that the three streams have a variety of qualitative and quantitative variables that come together 
to produce an outcome, MS embraces both the rationalist and post-positivistic traditions of 
science, while both incrementalism and deterrence are well-aligned with the philosophical 
perspective of pragmatism. This flexibility allows the theoretical framework to comport 
seamlessly to the collection and interpretation of both types of data, and is in keeping with 
positivist-quantitative, and hermeneutist-qualitative traditions of scientific inquiry (Caruth, 
2013). 
 Use of a comparison group in the research design. 
 To enrich the findings, and better understand the nuanced differentiation of constitutional 
and unconstitutional patterns or practices at the organizational level, municipal police 
departments subject to a § 14141 investigation resulting in technical assistance rather than a 
negotiated settlement were used as a comparison group. Municipal police departments 
investigated under § 14141 authority resulting in an agreement for technical assistance were all 
found to suffer from systemic, policy, and structural issues detrimental to the municipal police 
agency and public. Yet, for these investigations, the DOJ noted that the specific police agency 




findings regarding the constitutionality of a police agency’s patterns or practices. The DOJ’s 
justification for technical assistance in lieu of a negotiated settlement in these cases suggests that 
a police agency’s patterns or practices, aggregated and at the organizational level, may lead to 
unconstitutional policing if left unaddressed. Findings for these unconstitutional policing “near-
misses” were embedded in the letters/technical assistance reports issued near, or at, the 
completion of a § 14141 investigation. An example of a technical assistance determination from 
the DOJ in a letter issued to the Harvey Police Department: 
We have completed our investigation. We do not make findings that there is a pattern or 
practice of constitutional law violations and are closing our investigation. However, we 
do conclude that there are serious deficiencies in the operation of the Harvey Police 
Department that create an unreasonable risk that constitutional violations will occur. 
(Smith, 2012, p. 1)   
 Analyzing these unconstitutional near-misses, aggregated with the negotiated settlements 
into a study population, and disaggregated by investigative outcome (i.e. negotiated settlement or 
technical assistance), allowed for a clear, documentable, and officially sanctioned distinction 
between municipal police agencies found to have engaged in patterns or practices of 
unconstitutional policing, from municipal police agencies that have not. Moreover, including § 
14141 investigations with two distinct outcomes captures all of DOJ’s investigative outcomes in 
which a findings letter was produced under § 14141 authority against municipal police. This 
design supported a robust analysis, facilitating the creation of knowledge while supplementing 
the understanding of the differentiation between police behavior at the systemic and 
organizational level that constituted unconstitutional policing, thereby, offering a means to 





 Reflecting the choice of research design, data collection occurred in steps wherein 
qualitative data collection and interpretation were the emphasis for the first part of the study, and 
thereafter supported by quantitative data analysis of variables attributable to disjointed 
incrementalism, deterrence, and the multiple streams framework. All analyses within this 
dissertation were conceptualized and conducted as a single-coder study. Consequently, the 
qualitative portion of the mixed-methods design relies exclusively on single researcher 
interpretation and analysis. Subsequent quantitative analyses subsume aspects of the qualitative 
data interpretation. As such, protocols were developed from the methodological literature to 
ensure the highest levels of trustworthiness. These protocols, and insufficiencies related to solo-
coder interpretation are addressed in subsequent sections. 
 Study population – municipal police subject to § 14141. 
 All municipal police agencies subject to a § 14141 action resulting in a negotiated 
settlement or technical assistance were identified. These data were open source, available 
through documents that live on DOJ’s website and in their technical reports (DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 
2017a; DOJ, 2017b). DOJ issued technical reports and their website archive contained 
information related to the opening and closing of a § 14141 investigation, allegations of 
misconduct, investigative outcome, and disposition when applicable. This information was 
available for all negotiated settlements which was then collected and recorded, however, 
information for § 14141 investigations resulting in technical assistance have only been published 
by the DOJ through June 2010. To identify all § 14141 actions involving a negotiated settlement 
or technical assistance, two secondary sources (Childress, 2015; Rushin, 2017) were cross-




Division, Special Litigation Section’s website archive to verify inclusion for analysis (DOJ, 
2017b). This technique resulted in the identification of 55 § 14141 investigations resulting in a 
negotiated settlement or technical assistance between 1994 and 2017. The remaining 14 
investigations that did not lead to a negotiated settlement or technical assistance were excluded 
from analysis; reflecting a decision by the DOJ not to further pursue § 14141 reform post-
investigation is indicative of insufficient support that the subject police agency was engaged in, 
or at risk of engaging in, a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). For 
these 14 investigations, the DOJ did not publicly memorialize, nor has made publicly available 
any documents, findings, or justifications for their decision not to pursue further § 14141 
enforcement against the investigated police agency. In these non-finding § 14141 investigations, 
the DOJ will simply notify the agency and close the investigation (DOJ, 2017a). 
 After identifying the 55 § 14141 investigations that led to a negotiated settlement or 
technical assistance, police agencies that did not meet the operationalization of a municipal 
police department were excluded from analysis. Using the BJS (2015) definition of local police, 
a differentiation between specific types of local police agencies including municipal police, was 
critical for the purposes of specificity, measurement, and analysis. Accordingly, the term 
“municipal”, which refers to “those governments designated as cities, villages, boroughs (except 
in Alaska), and towns (except in the six New England states, Minnesota, New York, and 
Washington” (U.S. Census: Federal, State, & Local Governments, n.d.), was narrowed to refer 
only to place-names of cities. The rationale for the operationalization of the term “city” was 
rooted in the U.S. federalist structure insofar as each state has the legal authority to dictate the 
terms of municipal incorporation. As such, there is discontinuity between place-names and 




 Analyzing jurisdictions that adhere to place-names of “city” standardized the term for 
consistent analysis. Of the 55 § 14141 investigations leading to a negotiated settlement or 
technical assistance, 39 involved place-names of cities. Moreover, laws regarding differentiation 
of the terms “city,” “town,” and “village” vary by state, however, these definitions typically 
involve; (a) minimum populations, and (b) legal incorporation (U.S. Census, 2013). The current 
distinction between these terms is one of population size (National League of Cities, 2017), and 
the specification of principal cities by the U.S. Census Bureau (2012) does just that by defining a 
principal city as the largest incorporated place with a population of at least 10,000 persons. 
Principal cities with a population at least 10,000 persons but fewer than 50,000 are referred to as 
micropolitan statistical areas, and those with a population at least 50,000 persons are referred to 
as metropolitan statistical areas (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). In addition to operationalizing the 
meaning of the term “city”, the U.S. Census (2012) definition of a principal city was used as the 
population floor for inclusivity of a municipal police department, which therefore included 
populations comprised only of micropolitan and metropolitan statistical areas.  
 Applying the U.S. Census Bureau’s (2012) population standards of a principal city to the 
39 § 14141 investigations led to the exclusion of two municipal police agencies due to 
insufficient population – Villa Rica, Georgia, population 4,134 (U.S. Census, 2000) and Ville 
Platte, Louisiana, population 7,430 (U.S. Census, 2010b). One dual-jurisdiction police agency 
serving both a town and city was excluded due to that agency bearing responsibility for police 
services in two different jurisdictional structures across two adjacent states with different place-
names, although classified under one investigation by the DOJ (2017b). Colorado City Marshal’s 
Office provides police service for Colorado City, AZ – which is designated as a town (U.S. 




population floor at 2,726 persons (U.S. Census, 2010b). This law enforcement agency was not 
included in the initial tabulation of municipal police agencies subject to 14141 due to its unique 
organizational structure and jurisdictional responsibilities.  
 Two municipal police agencies were included although they did not meet the strict 
criteria of a § 14141 investigation leading to a negotiated settlement or technical assistance. First, 
the Columbus Division of Police was the subject of a § 14141 investigation beginning March 
1998, with DOJ findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing made public in 
October 1999 (DOJ, 2017b). The DOJ then brought a lawsuit against the City of Columbus 
where it was revealed that both parties agreed to enter into a consent decree (U.S. v. City of 
Columbus, OH, 1999). This lawsuit was resolved in 2002 at the request of the DOJ without 
formally entering into a negotiated settlement. This resolution reflects more broadly a negotiated 
settlement than technical assistance or no finding, as such, it was classified as a negotiated 
settlement. Similarly, the Chicago Police Department was the subject of a § 14141 investigation 
beginning December 2015. In January 2017, the DOJ released findings of a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing, and along with the City of Chicago announced an agreement to enter 
into a consent decree (DOJ, 2017c). With the changeover in presidential administration in 
January 2017, both the DOJ and the City of Chicago agreed to discontinue that agreement 
(Hinkel, Sweeney, & Ruthhart, 2017). The interim agreement of this investigation best reflects a 
negotiated settlement rather than technical assistance or no findings, and was therefore classified 
as such. These exclusions, and special inclusions resulted in 37 § 14141 investigations involving 
34 discrete municipal police agencies at this stage of the methodology.4 
                                                 
4 Three municipal police agencies were the subject of a § 14141 negotiated settlement or technical assistance on two 
separate occasions, these agencies include: New Orleans, LA; Cleveland, OH; & Miami, FL. Hence, 34 police 




 Investigative outcome. 
 To reflect the binary outcome of a § 14141 investigation, each municipal police agency 
was categorized according to their final investigative outcome. Consequently, municipal police 
agencies under technical assistance were coded as “0”, and negotiated settlement as “1”, thus 
reflecting municipal police agencies having not been found to engage in patterns or practices of 
unconstitutional policing to those that have.  
 Collection of findings letters and decision rules. 
 Upon completion of a § 14141 investigation wherein a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing has been found, a DOJ issued findings letter is sent to the offending 
police agency and made publicly available for review. All municipal police agencies subject to a 
negotiated settlement under § 14141, including the two special cases of Columbus and Chicago, 
had available findings letters with two exceptions, the Buffalo Police Department, in which a 
MOA from 2002 and amended MOA from 2007 were available, and Highland Park Police 
Department, in which a consent decree and MOA were available. Because the findings letters for 
these two municipal police departments were not available, and were critical data for consistent 
analysis across all cases, both were excluded from the study. 
 The DOJ issued multiple findings letters to two different municipal police agencies at 
different times during the course of a § 14141 investigation. The Detroit Police Department had 
three findings/technical assistance letters issued by the DOJ over the course of four months 
before entering into two separate but concurrent consent decrees. In this case I chose to use the 
third and final findings letter for date of investigation completion but aggregated the findings 




 The Easton Police Department had four separate findings/technical assistance letters 
issued by DOJ before entering into a MOA, in this case I decided to use the fourth and final 
findings letter for analysis, and as the end of investigation date. The rationale for this decision 
was based on the manifest language used in the findings letter, suggesting that the § 14141 
investigation was ongoing; for example, “As you know, the Civil Rights Division of the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has been conducting an investigation [emphasis added] of the 
Easton Police Department pursuant to the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994, 42 U.S.C. § 14141” (Cutlar, 2010, p. 1). Additionally, in this case, the fourth and final 
findings letter best represented the aggregated findings of DOJ’s investigation.  
 The DOJ’s first investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police began in 2000 leading 
to two separate findings, one related to the initial investigation with interim findings issued in 
July 2002, resulting in a negotiated settlement. That investigation was subsequently closed in 
February 2004, however, during the course of the first Cleveland investigation, The DOJ issued 
additional findings against Cleveland in June 2003 on a separate matter unrelated to the initial 
investigation. This second, but concurrent investigation led to a distinct negotiated settlement 
between the DOJ and Cleveland in May 2004. In this case, since both findings were from the 
same agency, and the second investigation was concurrent with the initial investigation, both 
findings letters were included in the analysis, however, in this special case, similar to Detroit, 
both § 14141 actions against Cleveland were classified as one investigation and analyzed 
accordingly.  
 The DOJ initiated a new § 14141 investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police in 
March 2013 resulting in a negotiated settlement. Since this investigation occurred after DOJ’s 




analyzed accordingly. Similar to DOJ’s two § 14141 investigations against Cleveland (2000 & 
2013), both resulting in distinct negotiated settlements, the DOJ conducted two discrete § 14141 
investigations against Miami (2002 & 2011), the earlier resulting in technical assistance, and 
more recent, a negotiated settlement. These four § 14141 investigations against two police 
departments were classified as four distinct municipal police agencies for subsequent 
measurement and analysis for two reasons. First, the DOJ treated both investigations against 
Cleveland and Miami as distinct investigations with unique findings. Second, because the two § 
14141 investigations against Cleveland and Miami occurred in different decades, the variables 
related to these investigations reflected changed environments, organizational attributes, and 
conditions. As such, these two police departments were treated as four distinct agencies for 
analysis, resulting in 35 investigations of municipal police at this stage of the methodology.  
 With these above-mentioned exclusions, special cases, and inclusions, the final yield was 
n = 24 investigations leading to a negotiated settlement against municipal police agencies having 
DOJ issued findings letters available for analysis. 
 Section 14141 investigations that produced less than reasonable cause to believe that a 
police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, but where the 
DOJ as part of their investigation noted operational deficiencies, systemic problems, or 
insufficiencies with policies or procedures, a technical assistance letter with embedded findings 
was issued to that police agency and made publicly available. There were 11 police agencies 
whose § 14141 investigation ended with a mutual agreement for technical assistance without a 
resultant negotiated settlement pursuant to that particular investigation.  
 Of the initial 11 § 14141 investigations of municipal police resulting in technical 




For both the New Orleans Police Department and Miami Police Department, this second § 14141 
investigation resulted in a negotiated settlement. Since both of these second investigations were 
treated as discrete from their initial investigation by the DOJ, and resulted in a different outcome 
from their first § 14141 investigation, New Orleans and Miami were treated as investigations 
unique to technical assistance outcomes. This resulted in a pool of 11 investigations of 11 police 
agencies.  
 Findings/technical assistance letters for these 11 municipal police agencies were publicly 
available and able to be collected with two exceptions – New Orleans Police Department and 
Eastpointe Police Department. Concerning New Orleans, a § 14141 action resulting in technical 
assistance from 1996 was verified through a DOJ issued technical report (DOJ, 2010), however, 
as reported by Childress (2015), the DOJ has indicated that they are unable to locate any specific 
documents related to this investigation. As well, my search of DOJ archives revealed no 
documents or memorialized history of this investigation other than verification of its occurrence 
in a DOJ document (DOJ, 2010). Concerning the Eastpointe Police Department, a DOJ technical 
report (DOJ, 2010) indicated that the Eastpointe investigation resulted in a technical assistance 
letter, however, DOJ archives, and secondary sources (Childress, 2015; Rushin, 2017) used to 
triangulate the data did not reveal the existence of a technical assistance letter or memorialization 
of the investigation. Since the existence of these letters was critical to consistency and not 
available, both of these investigations were excluded from analysis.  
 These exclusions yielded n = 9 municipal police agencies investigated by the DOJ under 
§ 14141 resulting in technical assistance with findings letters suitable for analysis. Including 
investigations leading to a negotiated settlement, and special consideration given to the two 




& Miami), 33 municipal police agencies made up the study population of N = 33 § 14141 
investigations involving municipal police with findings letters suitable for inclusion and analysis. 
The complete list of all municipal police agencies included in this study can be found in 
Appendix A. 
 Investigative output. 
 After collection of all N = 33 investigative findings letters of municipal police, the second 
dependent variable was collected. DOJ’s investigative output, that is, the number of pages in 
DOJ’s publicly issued findings letters was recorded as a continuous variable for each 
investigation. Due to the issuance of multiple findings letters in some of the N = 33 § 14141 
investigations of municipal police, three cases required special consideration. First, the Detroit 
Police Department was the subject of multiple findings letters during DOJ’s investigation, and 
since these letters covered different qualitative aspects of Detroit’s operations, they were 
classified together as one investigation for the purposes of analysis. 
 To maintain analytical consistency, the investigative output (number of pages) from the § 
14141 action against Detroit was aggregated and recorded as one investigative output. Similarly, 
the first investigation against the Cleveland Division of Police (2003) yielded two separate 
findings and consent decrees, and since these two investigations ran concurrently, both findings 
letters were analyzed in the aggregate. Consequently, the output from the DOJ investigation of 
Cleveland from 2003 is the aggregation of both letters. Conversely, the Easton Police 
Department was the subject of multiple findings letters from the DOJ over a five-year period. 
Differentiated from the output against Detroit and Cleveland, each investigative output from 




output recorded since this final § 14141 investigative findings letters best represented the 
aggregation of DOJ’s findings from previous investigations and letters.  
Qualitative Data Integration 
 In the embedded research design, one type of data supports the other type of data. This 
study is qualitatively driven, with the quantitative data providing descriptive and analytical 
support. As such, the initial step in analysis involved a qualitative review of DOJ’s findings 
letters.  
 Content analysis is an analytical technique that uses a set of procedures to make valid 
inferences from text (Weber, 1990). This technique can produce qualitative, quantitative, or both 
types of data. The most common approach to content analysis is thematic analysis (Franzosi, 
2004). Thematic analysis has been described as “a method for identifying, analyzing and 
reporting patterns (themes) within text” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79) by coding data into 
segmented and categorized themes (Ayres, 2008).  
 Thematic analysis was performed on all findings letters involving a municipal police 
agency subject to a § 14141 negotiated settlement or technical assistance. Each findings letter 
was analyzed for latent themes related to unconstitutional policing; the search for which “goes 
beyond the semantic content of the data…to identify or examine the underlying ideas, 
assumptions, and conceptualizations – and ideologies – that are theorized as shaping the 
semantic content of the data” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 84). As well, findings of deficient 
policies, focusing events, and the presence or absence of an insufficient EIS were recorded and 
categorized. These types of data are referred to as manifest content, described by Potter and 
Levine-Donnerstein (1999) as “that which is on the surface and easily observable, such as the 




 Thematic analysis was the qualitative methodological choice in this study for three 
specific reasons: (a) DOJ’s findings are based on the failure of a police agency to practice 
“constitutional policing” – the interpretation of which lacks specificity and clarity. Latent 
thematic analysis allows for the identification, and exploration of organizational behaviors that 
give meaning to that term and the underlying ideas behind it; (b) thematic analysis allows the 
researcher to identify with specificity, unacceptable patterns or practices within municipal police 
departments, and to quantify, classify, and analyze those patterns and practices, and (c) to 
compare DOJ’s § 14141 actions between police agencies found to engage in patterns or practices 
of unconstitutional policing as a counterpoint to agencies with problematic practices or policies 
that have not risen to the level of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. 
 The thematic analysis and related coding were conducted as solo research. Although 
uncommon, there is precedent for solo thematic coding in dissertation research and published 
reports (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006). Essential to all interpretive research, but specifically 
to solo research is establishing a “process to demonstrate credibility and trustworthiness” 
(Fereday & Muir-Cochrane, 2006, p. 81). Such a process of establishing trustworthiness in 
thematic analysis has been put forth by Nowell, Norris, White, and Moules, (2017), this involves 
establishing: (1) credibility; (2) transferability; (3) dependability; (4) confirmability; and (5) 
audit trails. Although these scholars indicate that “there is not clear agreement about how 
researchers can rigorously apply the method [of thematic analysis]” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 2), 
this five-step process provided a template for establishing trustworthiness and credibility. As 
such, their five-step process was used throughout the thematic analysis.   
 Procedurally, in conducting the thematic analysis, I adhered to the step-by-step outline 




yourself with the data; (2) generate initial codes; (3) search for themes; (4) review themes; (5) 
define and name themes; and (6) produce the report. The initial review was conducted manually 
on paper copies; beginning with step two, I digitized all documents, and used Excel Office 
Professional Plus 2016 for code and extract organization, as well as thematic review.   
 Familiarize yourself with the data. 
 As recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006), after collection of the complete data set, I 
read through all 1,356 pages of text contained therein, making notations on the data items, and 
searching for patterns and meanings across the entire data set. As suggested by Nowell, et al., 
(2017), I engaged with the data in a prolonged manner, as demonstrated, initial review of the 
data began in early March and continued through late June. To memorialize this process, work 
towards code and theme development, and help establish an audit trail, a reflective journal was 
kept throughout the preliminary coding process with thoughts, reflections, and ideas for 
triangulation. Preliminary codes with examples were recorded on the data and in the reflective 
journal heuristically. All raw data with initial notes were kept secure and well-organized in 
archives.  
 Generate initial codes. 
 The approach for coding the latent data was inductive; that is, “without trying to fit it into 
a preexisting coding frame” (Nowell et al., 2017, p. 8). During this second phase, preliminary 
codes were developed from within-and across-case comparisons as suggested by Ayers (2008), 
and memorialized agency by agency through the creation of a preliminary scheme with ideas 
gleaned from the first phase of analysis. This was done by reviewing all 1,356 pages of the data 




conclusions from the data that could serve as appropriate codes for subsequent analysis and 
theme development.  
 At this stage, the development and identification of codes was still preliminary but 
oriented towards specificity for each extract. This preliminary process produced 159 unique 
codes applied to 1,034 coded extracts for the n = 24 investigative findings letters. The reason for 
the high number of codes during this phase was in keeping with Braun and Clarke’s (2006) 
suggestion that the researcher should “code for as many potential themes/patterns as 
possible…code individual extracts of data in as many different ‘themes’ as they fit into – so an 
extract may be uncoded, coded once, or coded many times” (p. 89). As well, the duplicative 
nature of many of the codes (e.g. Investigations-internal-partiality; Investigations-internal-failure 
to conduct; Investigations-internal-bias, etc.) facilitated the production of the high number of 
preliminary codes arranged around similar findings. The same process of preliminary coding was 
conducted for the n = 9 investigations leading to technical assistance yielding 69 unique codes 
applied to 359 data extracts.  
 The next step was to review, refine, and consolidate the preliminary codes, and continue 
the process of establishing trustworthiness (Nowell, et al., 2017), which for this step included; 
development of a coding framework, ongoing documentation, reflexive journaling, triangulation, 
and the use of “professional experience” (Ayers, 2008, p. 868). Each unique code was placed 
within a broader code through the creation of coding framework with exemplar extracts, 
descriptions, and references. This process yielded 39 unique codes for the entire dataset: See 
Table 1 for an example of the coding framework. The complete coding framework that resulted 







Preliminary Coding Framework Exemplar Extract – Complaint Deficiencies. 
 
Code Description of code Exemplar extract Triangulation 
Complaint 
deficiencies 
Describes deficiencies in 
policies, procedures, 
practices, and systems 
specific to the civilian 
complaint making 
process; not the internal 
investigation of those 
complaints. 
 
CDP’s civilian complaint system, as a whole, is 
disorganized and ineffective. CDP was only able 
to produce a fraction of the case files we 
requested, and the files produced were often 
incomplete and lacked basic information about 
dispositions and outcomes. CDP does not have 
systems in place to track its performance or 
decision-making regarding civilian complaints 





 Similar to development of the preliminary codes, code development at this stage was 
inductive, however, I regularly referred to prior-research to triangulate and serve as a consistency 
check a posteriori. Exclusive of DOJ documents and technical reports, four publications exist 
that address specific and summary findings of § 14141 actions that proved useful in further code 
development, and were used to cross-reference and triangulate my analysis (Childress, 2015; 
Rushin, 2017; Walker, 2017; Douglass, 2017). Additionally, as described by Boyatzis, (1998) 
reliability of codes can be demonstrated as “consistency of judgement over time, events, and 
settings…when a person makes the same observation at two different times or in two different 
settings” (p. 147).  This research required consistency of judgment over different time periods, 
and across investigative findings. Considering the N = 33 investigations involved 33 municipal 
police agencies from 1994 to 2017, there was substantial cross-over in themes across 
investigations, and between investigative outcomes. The development of a preliminary codebook 







 Searching for themes. 
 Step three analysis began after all preliminary codes were reviewed and collated into 
broader codes. The goal of this phase was to identify “candidate themes” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 
p. 89) by “sorting the different codes into potential themes and collating all the relevant coded 
extracts with the identified themes” (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 89). Since this process was 
inductive, I did not attempt to fit the codes into any type of preexisting thematic frame or theory, 
and ensured that the candidate themes were closely linked with the data as recommended by 
Nowell, et al., (2017). Detailed notes were kept throughout this process in the reflective journal 
to maintain trustworthiness (Nowell, et al., 2017).  
 This process produced 18 candidate themes, which included a “miscellaneous” theme for 
coded extracts that did not yet fall within a theme. Continuing to follow the methodology 
described by Braun and Clarke (2006), I organized the candidate themes into theme-piles and 
creating a visual representation of the themes within the reflective journal. This was an iterative 
and reflective process in which the codes from each candidate theme were reviewed and finely 
analyzed to ensure appropriate theme association: See Table 2 for an example of the output of 
this process.  
Table 2 
Thematic Analysis Candidate Theme and Code Association. 
 
Code Candidate Theme 
Deficient accountability systems 
Lack of accountability 
Complaint deficiencies 
Deficient internal investigations 










 Reviewing themes. 
 
 During this step, analysis and refinement of the 18 candidate themes began with a review 
of the candidate themes with necessary revisions. This process was in keeping with established 
practices of data reduction for thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 1998; Braun & Clarke, 2006; Nowell, 
et al., 2017) wherein codes that formed a coherent pattern were grouped as themes or sub-
themes, and those that did not were reviewed to ensure adequate support within the dataset. As 
recommended by Braun and Clarke (2006), review and analysis took place at two levels, the first 
involved rereading all the coded data within each associated theme to ensure consistency, 
coherence, “and clear and identifiable distinctions between themes” (p. 91). This first level of 
review resulted in some recoding, modification, and refinement as was necessary and expected 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
 The second level of analysis during this phase involved a review of all codes within 
associated themes across the dataset to ensure consistency of interpretation and robustness for 
final theme consideration. The process of returning to the data was in keeping with 
trustworthiness criteria (Nowell, et al., 2017). During the analysis it became clear that some 
candidate themes were more suitable to subthemes, while others lacked support across the entire 
dataset for theme or subtheme consideration. In addition, two new codes were developed (King, 
2004) from the “miscellaneous” theme, one of which became its own theme, the other a 
subtheme. 
 This iterative and reflective process yielded a total of 8 themes with 18 associated 
subthemes from the 1,356 pages of data, and 159 preliminary codes. The reduction of data 
cohered to Attride-Stirling’s (2001) suggestion that during thematic analysis, the data should 




 Defining and naming themes.  
 Following Braun and Clarke’s (2006) methodology, this step began by conducting a 
detailed analysis of each theme, which was done both qualitatively and quantitatively. For the 
qualitative portion, each theme, subtheme, and associated coded extract were reviewed for 
internal consistency by referring to DOJ’s (2017a) The Civil Rights Division’s Pattern and 
Practice Reform Work: 1994-Present report a posteriori by comparing summary reports to 
thematic findings. Similar to the procedure during preliminary code development, a qualitative 
analysis write-up for each theme and subtheme was memorialized with examples from the 
dataset: See Table 3 for an example of the output of this process. This same process, with 
relevant interpretation and memorialization, was completed for all eight themes, and 18 
subthemes. A full and finalized theme and subtheme codebook can be found in Appendix C. 
Table 3 
Theme and Subtheme Codebook – Example 
 






Organizational outlook and enduring 
legacy. Widespread and endorsed 
strategies and practices geared 
towards a specific end. Can be 
characterized by legitimate means 










FPD supervisors are more concerned 
with the number of citations and 
arrests officers produce than 
whether those citations and arrests 
are lawful or promote public safety. 
(DOJ, 2015, p. 22) 
 
 
 The quantitative analysis of each theme involved frequency scoring by counting the 
presence or absence of each theme and subtheme for the dataset (Boyatzis, 1998). To facilitate 




letters with thematic findings were then reviewed and analyzed according to, (1) temporal order 
by year at first presence to analyze over-time changes in § 14141 findings, (2) highest to lowest 
frequency observations to understand any hierarchy of meaning within the data (Braun & Clarke, 
2006), and by (3) simple scaling of the subthemes and themes by frequency counts (Boyatzis, 
1998).  
 After quantitative analysis of each theme was completed, each theme, subtheme and 
coded extract were reviewed twice, and scrutinized as recommended by King (2004) to aid in 
ensuring trustworthiness. The final phase, producing the report (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was the 
final output of this process, and is included in the thematic analysis section of this dissertation.  
Quantitative Data Integration  
 The quantitative data were collected from a variety of sources contingent to the type of 
data sought and supporting theory. The following sections identify the sources of those data, 
methodology in collection, and coding of applicable variables.  
 Disjointed incrementalism variables. 
 Disjointed incrementalism variables were collected from the following open sources: 
DOJ issued findings letters, DOJ’s website archive, and DOJ technical reports (DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 
2017a; DOJ, 2017b; DOJ, 2018), news reports (Childress, 2015), and scholarly publications 
(Rushin, 2017). The collection of variables from the preceding sources is described below.  
 Investigative generation.  
 DOJ § 14141 investigations of municipal police were categorized according to the 
generation in which the investigation commenced. As indicated by the DOJ (2017a), 
investigations through 2005 are categorized as first-generation, and thereafter, have been 
categorized as second-generation. The commencement date of each § 14141 investigation was 




2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 2017). This generational dichotomy resulted in n = 16 first-
generation, and n = 17 second-generation § 14141 investigations of municipal police. To reflect 
the binary distinction between first and second-generation investigations, first-generation 
investigations were coded as a “0”, and second-generation as “1”. 
 Investigation length. 
 The length of a § 14141 investigation was determined by the reported and documented 
month and year that an official § 14141 action was commenced using multiple, and triangulated 
sources to verify initiation date (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 
2017). The variable investigation length was calculated from this date to the identified month 
and year when a final findings letter was issued by the DOJ. Investigation length was measured 
as the number of total months between these two dates. All N = 33 § 14141 investigative 
findings letters had the date of issuance identified on their first page with three exceptions; 
Pittsburgh, Columbus, and Washington D.C. For these cases, I was able to obtain the findings 
letter issuance date through other primary (DOJ, 2010) and secondary sources (Childress, 2015; 
Rushin, 2017), and used that date accordingly. Both the investigation commencement date, and 
findings letter issuance date for all N = 33 investigations can be found in Appendix A. 
 Deterrence variables. 
 Deterrence variables were collected from a variety of open source documents and public 
archives including municipal police employment data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
Uniform Crime Reporting – Crime in the United States Law Enforcement Personnel report for 
each year that the DOJ initiated an investigation against a police agency. Population statistics 
were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau website. Both sources served to assist in the 
creation of other deterrence variables including size and percent non-white. The methodology for 





 The nearest decennial census year for each of the 33 § 14141 investigations was used to 
create a ratio of total sworn personnel per 1,000 population as a measure of police resources. 
This process led to the creation of the variable resources, and is the same ratio reported in the 
UCR cities and counties group by size reports (FBI-UCR, 1994-2015). The variable resources 
was measured at the ratio level, and further as a binary variable. Since 2.8 sworn police officers 
per 1,000-person population was the mean of the study population, the variable resources was 
coded as “0” for municipal police agencies with fewer than 2.8 sworn employees per 1,000-
person population, and “1” for those with 2.8 or greater. 
 Size. 
 Accounting for the variable size of a municipal police agency involved reducing the 
number of sworn employees by dividing the total number of sworn employees by 10 to make the 
data more manageable, facilitate interpretation, categorization, and analysis. Size of a municipal 
police agency was treated as both a continuous, and categorical variable, depending on the type 
of analysis conducted. To assign police agencies into categories with validity, I used seven of 
BJS’ (2015) Local Police Departments, 2013: Personnel, Policies, and Practices categories 
accordingly; (category) size of police agency by full-time sworn employees: (1) 10-24; (2) 25-
49; (3) 50-99; (4) 100-249; (5) 250-499; (6) 500-999; (7) 1,000 or more. BJS (2015) accounts for 
police agencies with 0-1, 2-4, and 5-9 sworn employees, however, these categories were not 
included since these sized agencies had no representation in the study population.  
 For analysis as a binary predictor variable, the seven categories of the variable size, were 
collapsed into two: Categories 1-5 which include municipal police departments with up to and 
including 499 sworn employees were coded as “0”. The remaining two categories, 6-7, which 




binary categorization was chosen because municipal police agencies with 500 or more sworn 
employees represent 1% of all local police agencies in the United States (BJS, 2015). As such, 
the binary distribution of the variable size by code was “0” for the bottom 99% of local police 
agencies, and “1” for the top 1% of local police agencies based on the number of sworn 
employees.  
 Population group.  
 BJS’ (2015) Local Police Departments, 2013 report served as a reference for 
categorization of the variable population group. Since the inclusion of a municipality for this 
dissertation had to meet the 10,000-person threshold, two of BJS’ population categories were 
excluded since their populations fell below the minimum threshold for operationalization as a 
municipality. The remaining seven population categories were assigned accordingly; (category) 
population served at time of nearest census year: (1) 10,000-24,999; (2) 25,000-49,999; (3) 
50,000-99,999; (4) 100,000-249,999; (5) 250,000-499,999; (6) 500,000-999,999; (7) 1,000,000 
or more.  
 For analysis as a binary predictor variable, the seven categories of the variable population 
group were collapsed into two: Categories 1-4 which include municipalities with up to 249,999 
persons were coded as “0”. The remaining three categories, 5-7, which included municipalities 
with 250,000 or more persons was coded as “1”.  
 When coded as a binary variable, both size and population group reflect their aggregated 
categories that are less than 1% of all local police. That is, BJS (2015) indicates that 0.9% of all 
local police agencies in the U.S. have 500 sworn employees or more (categories 6 & 7), and 
0.8% of all local police agencies in the U.S. serve populations of 250,000 or more persons 
(categories 5, 6, & 7). Adding an additional category to either variable makes the percentage of 




“1” reflect a dichotomy that differentiates the aggregation of categories representing 99% of 
local police, from 1% of local police for both variables.  
 Percent non-white. 
 Population statistics were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau’s website. Specifically, 
population data from each municipality reflected the nearest decennial census year to the date 
that a § 14141 investigation was initiated against a particular police agency. These data were 
collected in the form of total population, and percent population non-White by subtracting the 
White-alone percentage from 100. Since Latino or Hispanic origin are considered ethnicities, and 
not races (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). I created a demographic variable municipality percent 
non-white by calculating the non-White population of each municipality from the Not-Hispanic 
or Latino category of individuals who self-identified as White-alone in each census report. This 
was done to tease out the White population from the Hispanic and Latino population who 
identify themselves as racially White, but ethnically Latino or Hispanic. The variable percent 
non-white, then, reflects the census demographics of a municipality that self-identifies as any 
race or ethnicity but for White-alone. This variable was then coded as “0” for municipalities that 
were less than 54% non-White, and “1” for municipalities that were 54% or greater non-White, 
reflecting the mean percent non-white in the study population. 
 Multiple streams variables. 
 Multiple streams variables were collected from various open-sources including DOJ 
issued findings letters, news search queries, polling data, and governmental archives. The 






 Problem stream. 
 The problem stream has three distinct elements each having a different 
operationalization, and as such three sources were used for relevant analysis. All of the following 
data were retrieved from open sources:  
 (1) Focusing events: To determine the presence or absence of a focusing event in the 
study population, I established one condition and three discrete criterion – of which one must 
have been met – to determine applicability as a focusing event for a particular investigation. 
 First, to better understand the relationship between focusing events and DOJ’s decision-
making relative to a § 14141 investigative outcome, the condition required that the event(s) 
occurred within three years prior to the commencement of the established § 14141 investigation 
date (Childress, 2015; DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; Rushin, 2017).  
 Second, one of following three required criterion must have been met for categorization; 
(a) a focusing event must have been specifically referenced in a DOJ findings document, for 
example: “Since the August 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown, the lack of trust between the 
Ferguson Police Department and a significant portion of Ferguson’s residents, has become 
undeniable” (DOJ, 2015, p. 6); (b) the focusing event(s) are alluded to in DOJ’s findings 
document but not specifically cited, for example: “There have been a number of widely 
publicized incidents involving use of force by the police, leading to understandable public 
concern” (Smith & Durkan, 2011, p. 3); or (c) an event is not specifically mentioned or alluded 
to in an investigative findings document but publicly reported in such a way that in the 
aggregate, represents a type of singular event, for example: “Federal official first looked at 
Schenectady police after four of its officers were sent to prison on federal drug charges” 




 Using this methodology, 14 of the 24 § 14141 investigations resulting in a negotiated 
settlement had attributable focusing events, and 4 of the 9 § 14141 investigations resulting in 
technical assistance had attributable focusing events. Focusing events for each investigation were 
coded as “0” for absence, and “1” for presence, by municipal police agency. 
 (2) Indicators – early intervention systems are designed to track and monitor individual, 
and organizational performance (DOJ, 2017a). Identification and analysis of municipal police 
agency deficiencies with EISs have been a been a consistent feature of DOJ’s § 14141 
investigative findings over the life-course of the provision. The DOJ has prioritized addressing 
issues related to EISs in municipal police agencies because these systems are designed to identify 
aberrant and problematic police behavior to “prevent patterns of misconduct from emerging” 
(DOJ, 2017a, p. 31) while providing an overall assessment of a law enforcement agency (King & 
Dassin, 2009). Although EISs vary according to the needs and size of a police department 
(Walker, Milligan, & Berke, 2005), certain components are considered core to all police 
agencies, and are designed to capture generalized misconduct, therefore, make up an aggregate 
of indicators in the problem stream, these components include, but are not limited to; rates of use 
of force, citizens’ complaints, civil litigation, and use of sick time (DOJ, 2017a). As such, an 
adequate and functional EIS served as a measure for the variety of indicators in the problem 
stream.  
 As part of the analysis of the § 14141 findings letters, I searched and identified when 
present, manifest content that specifically referred to a municipal police agency having 
insufficiencies, deficiencies, or lack of an EIS. Police agencies in which the DOJ did not address 
EIS as problematic were categorized as “0”, for absence of an identified problem, and where the 




an identified problem. This methodology resulted in 20 of 24 police agencies under negotiated 
settlement with noted issues related to EIS, and 8 of 9 police agencies under technical assistance 
with noted issues related to EISs, and therefore an inadequate indictor system. 
 (3) Feedback: ProQuest Majors Dailies search of the five most popular and influential 
news organizations in the United States, including: The New York Times, The Washington Post, 
Los Angeles Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Chicago Tribune for reports related to 
municipal police agency misconduct and corruption. Using national media reporting on crime, 
terrorism, and other criminal justice issues as a methodology to analyze and discern public 
attitudes has been used scholars such as Enns (2016), and Worrell (1999). Indeed, Rushin (2017) 
acknowledges that “one way to judge the perceived importance of legal measures is to analyze 
media coverage” (p. 95), and this technique is well suited for that purpose since the “DOJ has 
relied on media coverage of police misconduct” (Rushin, 2017, p. 104) to guide decisions 
regarding which police agencies to investigate. 
 Using the name of the municipality as the primary search term, along with the secondary 
term, “police”, I identified all news articles related to a police agency within the three-year-
period prior to the established date of a § 14141 investigation. The term “police” was included in 
the secondary search term as a modifier to better distinguish news articles related to municipal 
police rather than other government agencies. Since § 14141 investigations vary in duration, and 
may take over a year (DOJ, 2017a), a standardized search period for all municipal police 
agencies of three years prior to the announcement date of a § 14141 investigation was utilized 
coinciding with the timeframe for identification of a focusing event. 
 After the initial search was conducted, ProQuest’s sorting feature allowed me to filter 




geographic location, and by terms commonly associated with police malfeasance and 
dysfunction. These filterable search terms varied from one news search to another due to the 
nuances, details, and intricacies of the misconduct related to each police agency and associated 
news story, however, when filtering I searched for, identified, and tagged for inclusion, any 
ProQuest subject that explicitly mentioned, or is commonly associated with police misconduct, 
unlawful police practice, police brutality, or police corruption. Some examples of ProQuest 
subjects that were tagged for search inclusion; false arrests, civil liberties, firings, official 
misconduct, review boards, shootings, scandals, litigation, investigations, obstruction, arrests, 
raids, minorities, firearms, deadly force, search and seizure, protests, riots, corruption, 
misconduct, brutality, and excessive force.   
 This search technique produced a final yield of news articles in the five major 
newspapers that met the following three criteria; three-year timeframe prior to the initiation of an 
official § 14141 investigation, name of the municipality and police agency under investigation, 
and news articles with applicable subject terms. I then reviewed the final yield of articles to 
identify any news reports implicating a specific municipal police agency in misconduct, 
brutality, corruption, or unlawful practices.  
 Using this methodology, 17 of the 24 § 14141 investigations resulting in a negotiated 
settlement had feedback, and 4 of the 9 § 14141 investigations leading to technical assistance had 
feedback. Municipal police agencies without national news media feedback were coded as “0”, 
and those with feedback were coded as “1”. 
 (4) Accompaniment: 
 The accompaniment variable was not collected from a public source, per se, rather it was 




 Policy stream. 
 Manifest content from the findings letters, or what Braun and Clarke (2006) refer to as  
semantic data, exists at the explicit level. As part of the thematic analysis, all findings letters 
from the N = 33 § 14141 investigations were reviewed and analyzed for manifest content 
describing insufficient, deficient, or necessary but non-existent policies. Once identified, these 
data were recorded and categorized as present or absent for each municipal police agency. After 
identification and recording, five policy clusters were formed using a process described by 
Boyatzis (1998). The resultant policy clusters were then reviewed a posteriori against previous 
research (Childress, 2015; Douglass, 2017; Rushin, 2017; Walker, 2017), and DOJ publications 
(DOJ, 2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b) to aid in ensuring trustworthiness (Nowell, et al., 2017). 
Each of the five policy clusters contained multiple policies specific to each agency under § 
14141 investigation, with cross-over between different findings letters and police agencies. For 
each police agency under investigation, noted policies within the cluster dictated if the cluster 
was rated as present or absent. In keeping with this thematic clustering methodology (Boyatzis, 
1998), frequency, intensity, or scaling were not calculated. An example of the output for the 
variety of polices clustered under the variable use of force policies can be found in Table 4.  
Table 4 
Multiple Streams – Policy Stream, Policy Cluster Variable. 
 
Policy cluster Included policies 
Use of force policies 
Use of force – general 
Use of force – pepper spray 
Use of force – reporting 
Use of force – chokeholds 
Use of force – canines 
Use of force – investigations 
Use of force – firearms 





 This process resulted in the following five distinct policy clusters; (a) use of force 
policies; (b) stop, search, and arrest policies; (c) civilian complaint system policies; (d) internal 
discipline system policies; and (e) response to special populations policies. With the exception of 
the special population cluster, all policy clusters represented specific, and explicitly named 
policies by the DOJ in need of reform. As such, four of the five policy clusters did not require 
special criteria or definitions for inclusion; mere reference as a policy deficiency in a § 14141 
investigative findings letter was enough to satisfy inclusion. An example of mere reference to an 
internal discipline policy deficiency from the Austin Police Department:  
We recommend that the APD complete the development of a discipline matrix….Such a 
matrix should detail the levels of discipline available – e.g., retraining, verbal counseling, 
letters of counseling, forfeiture of leave time, suspension, demotion, and termination – to 
address violations of policy. The matrix should specify for each type of policy violation 
what level of discipline shall be utilized for sustained violations of policy. (Cutlar, 2008, 
p. 39) 
 Special populations were defined using federal policy language that specifies protection 
of rights of identified groups of individuals on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, LGBTQ 
status, individuals in mental health crisis, and juveniles (DOJ, 2017a). Early intervention system 
policies were excluded from the policy cluster analysis since the quantification of this variable 
was included in the problem stream, operationalized as indicators.  
 For the purposes of clarity and efficiency; insufficient, deficient, or non-existent polices, 
as indicated in this section, are referred to as “policy deficiencies” or “deficient policies” 




were coded as “0” for each policy cluster, and agencies where deficiencies were noted for each 
policy cluster were coded as “1”.  
 Political stream. 
 The conceptualization of the political stream involved developing a measure of the 
national mood towards the police, and tracking administrative turnover in the federal 
government. Since Kingdon (1995) broadly describes the national mood as “changes in public 
opinion…in discernable ways” (p. 146), three specific questions related to attitude towards the 
police, and criminal justice system were collected and aggregated to develop a composite 
measure of the national mood regarding the police. Although Gallop Inc. asks and reports a 
specific question related to confidence in the police, prior research using time-series polling data 
to draw inferences regarding criminal justice topics suggests that aggregating various polling 
measures can produce a more valid and reliable dimension of a criminal justice construct then a 
single measure (Enns, 2016).  
 Guided by scholarship measuring the construct of confidence in the judicial system by 
Enns (2016), I identified six Gallop Inc. questions related to public attitudes regarding the police 
and criminal justice system. Although not a direct question related to police, the question 
regarding confidence in the criminal justice system was included since numerous § 14141 
investigations noted deficiencies related to a municipal police agency’s interaction with the 
larger criminal justice system as a root cause of organizational police dysfunction (e.g. 
Baltimore, Cleveland, Ferguson, New Orleans, Meridian, Missoula, etc.). Of the six polling 
questions, three were asked intermittently during the life-course of § 14141, therefore, excluded 
from analysis. The three remaining questions asked by Gallop Inc. that were used to form a 




• “Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how 
much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal, quite a lot, some or very 
little? The police” (Gallop Inc., 2018a, p. 22). 
• “Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how 
much confidence you, yourself, have in each one – a great deal, quite a lot, some or very 
little? The criminal justice system” (Gallop Inc., 2018a, p. 21). 
• “Please tell me how you would rate the honesty and ethical standards of people in these 
fields – very high, high, average, low or very low. Police officers” (Gallop Inc., 2018b, p. 
31). 
 Of the three polling questions, both confidence in the police, and honesty were asked and 
reported every year over the life-course of § 14141, however, the question related to confidence 
in the criminal justice system was asked every year from 1994 to 2017 with the exception of 
2001. To make up for these missing data, I used K-nearest neighbors mean imputation (Schmitt, 
Mandel, & Guedj, 2015) for each of the four possible responses from the 2001 Gallop Inc. 
question. This method was chosen over using overall-mean imputation, other imputation 
methods, or deletion since the use of polling data for the national mood was intended to identify 
over-time changes in support, not an aggregated measure of support for the criminal justice 
system. 
 Although four categories of responses were asked for all three questions, Gallop reported 
an additional category of “none” for all three questions (Gallop Inc., 2016; Gallop Inc., 2018a; & 
Gallop Inc., 2018b). The five categories of responses were then collapsed into three, since this is 
the method that Gallop Inc. (2016) uses to report their social series data. As such, responses for 




a lot), neutral responses (some & average), and negative responses (low, very low, very little & 
none).  
 The three Gallop Inc. questions and their positive responses, conceptualized as an over-
time measure of the national mood towards the police were tested for consistency using 
Cronbach’s alpha, α = .717. The responses for each of the three questions were aggregated into a 
single measure for positive, neutral, and negative national mood. Using this methodology, the 
overall average positive national mood in attitude towards the police was 46% throughout the life 
course of § 14141. Years in which the national mood was higher were coded as “1”, and years in 
which the mood was lower were coded as “0”. There were four years in which the average 
positive mood was the historical average of 46% (2006, 2011, 2013, & 2016). For these years, I 
determined the code based on changes in the negative mood, that is, when the negative mood 
was up and neutral was down, these years were coded as negative (2013 & 2016), and when 
negative mood was down and neutral was up, these years were coded as positive (2006 & 2011). 
Considering the dichotomous nature of the data after coding, and in the context of attempting to 
capture over time changes in the positive national mood towards the police, I determined to 
classify the national mood for the four years at historic average according to their trend to more 
precisely capture the mood than categorizing the historic average by an absolute binary cutoff.  
 Data regarding administrative turnover, conceptualized as the officeholder of Presidency 
of the United States and their political party, were collected from the University of Virginia, 
Miller Center, The Presidency archive. For the time period from 1994 to 2017, each president’s 
inauguration, and end date were cross-listed against DOJ’s § 14141 investigation commencement 
date. Each of the N = 33 investigation commencement dates that fell within a president’s tenure 




commenced under a Democratic administration were coded as “0”, and those commenced under 



























 Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5 for variables related to the N = 33 
investigations of municipal police. These data include variables measuring the police 
organization (size & resources), the municipal environment of the police agency (population 
category & percentage non-white), and DOJ investigative characteristics (length of investigation 
& investigative output). The descriptive statistics are presented as aggregated into a study 
population, and disaggregated by investigative outcome, revealing noteworthy information 
related to § 14141 investigations of municipal police, including the following points, many of 
which are further explored in this this study:  
• The mean size of municipal police departments appears to substantially differ based on 
investigative outcome.  
• Mean population category, and police resources appear to substantially differ based on 
investigative outcome.  
• Larger population categories of municipal police, and greater resources appear positively 
related.  
• The distribution of municipal police agencies by size is highly positively skewed, and to a 
greater extent for police agencies under negotiated settlement than under technical assistance.  
• Length of an investigation, and percentage of population non-white do not appear to vary 
based on investigative outcome. 
• The range of municipal police departments, by size, appears substantially larger for agencies 
under negotiated settlement than those under technical assistance.  





Descriptive Statistics – Study Population and by Investigative Outcome. 
 
Population Variable M SD Mdn Mode Min Max Skew 
N = 33 
Population category 4.2 1.88 5 5 1 7 -0.4 
Percentage non-white 54 25.64 58 33.1 9 97 -0.05 
Size (sworn x 10) 152.3 257.21 99.9 9.9 1.6 1203.4 3.11 
Resources (sworn per 
1,000) 2.8 1.2 2.6 - 0.6 6.1 0.75 
Length (Investigative 
months) 18.8 12.2 15 9 5 51 1.26 
Output (pages) 41.1 44.7 29 2 2 164 1.91 
Negotiated 
settlement 
n = 24 
Population category 4.5 1.96 5 6 1 7 -0.71 
Percentage non-white 55 22.46 60.1 67 10 89.5 -0.23 
Size (sworn x 10) 194.7 290.35 107.8 - 1.6 1203.4 2.64 
Resources (sworn per 
1,000) 2.9 1.24 2.6 - 0.6 6.1 0.44 
Length (Investigative 
months) 18.8 12.28 15 15 5 51 1.35 
Output (pages) 47.6 50.56 34 164 2 164 1.5 
Technical 
assistance  
n = 9 
Population category 3.4 1.51 3 3 1 6 0.14 
Percentage non-white 53 34.30 49 - 9 97 0.20 
Size (sworn x 10) 39.2 49.78 16 - 5.1 141.8 1.65 
Resources (sworn per 
1,000) 2.1 0.6 2.3 - 1.3 3 -0.06 
Length (Investigative 
months) 18.8 12.74 11 10 9 42 1.26 
Output (pages) 23.8 13.47 23 20 6 50 0.57 






• RQ1: What pattern or practice themes emerge from DOJ’s investigative findings? 
 Thematic analysis of the N = 33 findings letters yielded eight main themes, and 18 
subthemes. The themes were tabulated using a process described by Boyatzis (1998) where the 
presence or absence of a theme was counted for each police agency, rather than the frequency or 
intensity of that theme. The eight themes with their representation in the complete dataset, and as 
a percentage of investigations of municipal police agencies with findings is presented in Table 6. 
  
Table 6 











% of total 
thematic findings 
Conditions of ambiguity 21 64% 12% 
Institutionalization 28 85% 16% 
Lack of professional currency 32 97% 18% 
Leadership and management failure 15 45% 8% 
Organizational myopia 27 82% 15% 
Organizational orientation and culture 9 27% 5% 
Routinized misconduct 20 61% 11% 
Tactical discretion, weapon competency, 
equipment insufficiencies 25 76% 14% 




 Noteworthy in the initial analysis presented in Table 6 is that almost all § 14141 
investigations of municipal police (97%), the DOJ determined that there was a lack of 
professional currency embedded within the police agency. Furthermore, two other 
organizational-wide themes, institutionalization and organizational myopia, were found by the 
DOJ as deficiencies in 85% and 82% of all municipal police agencies under study. These three 
themes comprised approximately half (49%) of all themes discovered among the N = 33 
investigations of municipal police. In contrast, a different organizational-wide theme, 
organizational orientation and culture, was the least present among the themes with just 27% of 
investigations of municipal police yielding this result and the only main theme, along with 
leadership and management failure, in which less than 50% of investigations of municipal police 
were found. All remaining themes were present in more than 50% but less than 80% of 
investigative findings letters.  
 Theme one - conditions of ambiguity. 
 
 DOJ’s § 14141 findings letters frequently referenced situations in which officers, 
including both rank and file, were unsure, had contradictory information, received vague 
direction, or were confused regarding how to implement specific processes, policies and 
procedures. This confusion was often described as a lack of understanding and clarity rooted not 
in training deficiencies, rather inadequacies in policies, general guidance, clear communication, 
and officer direction. The DOJ attributed these ambiguities to causal systemic agency problems, 
generalized misconduct, and improper policing. An example of conditions of ambiguity from the 
Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police: 
The use of force policy has changed, but the policy in place at the time of our 




sufficient guidance to officers. Indeed, many officers reported to us that they did not 
understand the policy and, more generally, did not understand what level of force they 
were permitted to use under what circumstances. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 45)  
 Conditions of ambiguity were frequently organization-wide, rooted in a generalized lack 
of understanding of basic police functionality. As an example, from the Investigation of the 
Albuquerque Police Department: “We observed that there was no consistent understanding of the 
department’s community policing program within the ranks. Even commanders had inconsistent 
understandings of the agency’s program” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 40).  
 Conditions of ambiguity were often a direct cause of other systemic problems, in 
particular, the DOJ noted the relationship between vague directions and officer reporting 
requirements for use-of-force incidents, this type of ambiguity was found to allow systemic 
misconduct to proliferate when insufficiently monitored. From the Findings Letter Re: Use of 
Force by the Washington Metropolitan Police Department: “We found widespread variances in 
how MPD officers understand and define the kinds of force they need to report” (Yeomans, 
2001, p. 2). These types of procedural inconsistencies do not allow for municipal police agencies 
to accurately or reliably use critical information for internal accountability. Taken together, 
conditions of ambiguity whether in policy, organizational functionality, or reporting 
requirements, create an undercurrent of systemic problems for police agencies that contribute to 
unconstitutional policing practices.  
 Theme two - institutionalization. 
 Institutionalization as defined by O’Hara (2012), occurs when “an organization 
increasingly bases its approach to customers or clients on what best serves the comfort or 




police agencies under § 14141 investigation were consistently cited for demonstrating behaviors 
and actions appearing to best serve their members, often out of manifest partiality, and other 
times borne out of agency preference and convenience. Municipal police agencies that 
demonstrated these attributes tended to do so in two distinct ways. As such, institutionalization 
has two subthemes.  
 Subtheme one - internal partiality. 
  In DOJ’s findings letters, internal partiality is typified by an agency’s bias in outlook, 
behavior, and orientation favoring police officers in events involving police-citizen encounters 
and any subsequent investigation. An example of this type of institutionalization was 
exemplified in the City of Pittsburgh Investigative Findings Letter wherein it was noted that the 
police agency “gives greater weight to the statements of its police officers, while discounting the 
statements of witnesses for the complainant…[and] does not fully collect all evidence during its 
investigations [of police misconduct]” (Patrick, 1997, p. 2). This internal partiality towards 
police officers runs deep in many organizations, and may in fact lead to unjustified exonerations, 
and a lack of accountability for police wrongdoing; for example, the DOJ found it 
deeply troubling…that some of the specially-trained investigators who are charged with 
conducting unbiased reviews of officers’ use of deadly force admitted to us that they 
conduct their investigations with the goal of casting the accused officer in the most 
positive light possible. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 5) 
 Further, the DOJ routinely pointed out that the partiality of internal investigations can 
become compromised when “investigations of alleged criminal misconduct [are] conducted by 
officers in the same command as the officers who allegedly engaged in the misconduct, creating 




apparent in many DOJ issued findings letters, particularly when police supervisory officers were 
charged with conducting investigations in which they witnessed, or were part of a misconduct 
allegation (Rosenbaum, 2003), undermining what should otherwise have been an impartial 
investigative process. 
Subtheme two - misaligned policy and practice.  
 Many of DOJ’s findings indicated that a municipal police agency was not adhering to its 
own policies, in these circumstances policies are clear and appropriate, yet the police agency 
accepts practices from its employees that routinely ignore those policies, adhering to accepted 
alternatives for organizational and officer convenience. With misaligned policy and practice 
findings, operational convenience and organizational practicality, rather than systemic 
misconduct is implied. An example of misaligned policy and practice from the Investigation of 
the Miami Police Department: 
Although DO 2.7 (Firearms Procedures) requires officers to qualify every year with every 
kind of firearm the MPD allows them to use, we learned from command staff and officers 
that the MPD does not enforce this requirement. We learned that, in practice, officers can 
remain qualified for up to eighteen months to two years before having to requalify. 
(Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 8) 
 Failing to adhere to organizational standards, when those standards are necessary and 
appropriate, was noted as a contributor to unconstitutional policing in the investigation of the 
Ferguson Police Department, as stated: “Perhaps the greatest deviation from FPD’s use-of-force 
policies is that officers frequently do not report the force they use at all. There are many 
indications that this underreporting is widespread [and that] these policies are routinely ignored” 




 Institutionalization in a municipal police agency manifests though agency practices that 
favor its members both to the exclusion of impartiality for internal bias, and the avoidance of 
established protocols for practicality and operational convenience. Considering that such a high 
percentage of police agencies under § 14141 investigation demonstrated attributes of 
institutionalization is highly suggestive of internal compliance and culture as significant 
contributors to deep systemic problems, and the potential for unconstitutional policing.   
 Theme three - lack of professional currency.  
 With the notable exception of one municipal police agency that discontinued cooperating 
with the federal government during the investigation of the agency (Perez, 2012), all § 14141 
letters are suffused with findings of municipal police departments that have failed to establish, or 
maintain, acceptable standards in systems, procedures, policies, and practices. Differentiated 
from conditions of ambiguity where a generalized lack of clarity exists regarding policies and 
practices, or institutionalization where policies are not adhered to in favor of convenience, 
practicality, or partiality, a lack of professional currency suggests that a municipal police agency 
does not observe generally accepted practices of its own profession whether by intent, design, or 
structure. A municipal police agency symptomatic of a lack of professional currency has been 
found to behave in three distinct, but often overlapping ways. Hence, three subthemes. 
 Subtheme one - deficient selection criteria. 
 Routine and characteristic of many municipal police agencies under § 14141 
investigation was the selection and appointment of personnel to agency positions in which they 
were not qualified, trained, prepared, and in some instances, disqualified but assigned 
nonetheless. These deficiencies centered on five critical police agency positions including; field 




and field supervisor. Out of need, expediency, neglect or indifference, critical positions 
throughout many municipal police agencies were filled by individuals unqualified to be there, 
this as suggested, was to the great detriment of the police agency, the public it serves, and makes 
a police agency susceptible to unconstitutional policing practices. One such example of deficient 
criteria selection from the Investigation of the Alabaster Police Department:  
Well-qualified FTO instructors are critical to ensuring well-trained police recruits. APD’s 
current policy appears to contain no criteria to evaluate the qualifications or effectiveness 
of those providing field training. The APD has no eligibility criteria for FTOs pertaining 
to the applicants’ complaint and disciplinary histories, performance levels or special 
skills. (Cutlar, 2004, p. 21)  
 The Investigation of the Yonkers Police Department findings suggest that qualifications 
in these essential positions are paramount to preventing unconstitutional policing, and that this 
could be rectified through the implementation of formalized selection criteria because “well-
qualified FTOs are critical to ensuring well-trained police recruits. The YPD, however, has no 
formal policy addressing the selection [of FTO’s]” (King & Dassin, 2009, p. 30). Furthermore, 
deficiencies in agency selection criteria extend to in-service police trainers, that is, police trainers 
who are responsible for training experienced officers:   
All training [should] be conducted by instructors who have been trained and certified to 
be instructors, and who are competent in the subject matter they are to teach. 
Accordingly, the WPD should validate the qualification and expertise of its current 
trainers. The WPD may do so through certification programs outside of the WPD. 




 The lack of staff preparation, and inadequacies of training instructors and qualifications 
for assignment wean their way through the entire organizational structure in some municipal 
police departments. This is particularly troubling as it impacts specialized units such as SWAT, 
and other enforcement units that may be called upon to appropriately react in high-liability 
circumstances, for example, in the Miami Police Department there is “a lax recruitment process 
that insufficiently vets officer suitability for assignment [to a specialized enforcement unit]” 
(Perez, 2013, p. 9). Even more troubling is when commanders of such specialized units are 
unprepared or unqualified for assignment, such was the finding when the DOJ investigated the 
Albuquerque Police Department: “[T]he SWAT commander had not received adequate training 
and appeared to lack the experience to direct a disciplined and effective SWAT unit” (Samuels & 
Martinez, 2014, p. 35).  
 The DOJ has also made numerous findings of police agencies that place officers as well 
as civilian staff into internal investigative positions without preparation, necessary qualifications, 
or sufficient experience to hold such a position (Rosenbaum & Collins, 2002). This suggests that 
a relationship between a lack of professional currency in selection criteria, and internal partiality 
of investigations exists, as employees who may be unqualified and partial, are charged with 
conducting what ought to be impartial and thorough investigations. As an example, findings 
from the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:   
The NPD has failed to appropriately train its investigators. NPD command staff and 
officers, IA investigators, and Integrity Compliance Officers (“ICO”) consistently 
reported that investigative experience has not been required to become an 
investigator….This failure must be addressed if the NPD is to ensure adequate 




 Subtheme two - failure to maintain standards in systems, practices, and policies. 
 The DOJ frequently attributed underlying organizational problems to systemic 
deficiencies, inadequacies, and insufficiencies in internal control systems, common police 
practices, internal communication failures, and training. This subtheme reflects similar global 
assessments of § 14141 investigations made by scholars such as Walker (2017) who have studied 
DOJ’s pattern or practice enforcement through content analysis. Police organizations that were 
found to have these attributes had many, if not all of the capabilities to adhere to professional 
standards, but they failed to do so. These failures cover a broad spectrum of police organizational 
and operational functions. Taken together, this best reflects the failure of a municipal police 
agency to operate as a professional organization. As such, many of these deficiencies are directly 
implicated in a municipal police department’s failure to engage in constitutional policing. From 
the Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department: 
NOPD still does not provide meaningful in-service training to officers on how to properly 
carry out stops, searches, and arrests. Throughout the Department, and among other 
stakeholders in the criminal justice system, we heard broad and emphatic consensus that 
officers have a poor understanding of how to lawfully execute searches and seizures.  
NOPD’s failure to train officers or otherwise provide guidance on the limits and 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment contributes directly to the pattern of 
unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests. (DOJ, 2011, p. 28) 
 As part of their investigation of a municipal police agency, the DOJ reviews policy and 
procedure manuals wherein they have often found outdated procedures, convoluted and 
disorganized operational guides, failure to effectively communicate procedural changes to rank 




 The following serve as examples of such deficiencies. 
 A complete lack of policy or training of basic police functionality from the Investigation 
of the Steubenville Police Department was noted in that “The City has no policy and provides no 
training about what types of force are useful and acceptable in different types of situations. In 
addition, it fails to require use-of-force reports or otherwise investigate or review uses of force” 
(Pinzler, 1997, p. 2).  
 Many municipal police agencies that did have policies and procedures in place suffered 
from failures to update them in a timely manner, from the Investigation of the Miami Police 
Department:  
The [use of force] matrix we saw at survival training is outdated, and does not include 
some of the specific types of force MPD officers use, such as canines and Tasers. Lack of 
specific guidance may lead officers to believe they are justified in using force in 
situations in which it would be unreasonable or unnecessary. (Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 3) 
 An example of ineffective internal communication and accountability related to 
procedures:  
It is our understanding that there is no process for reviewing or updating the Manual on a 
regular basis. Instead, new and revised policies are added to the disk upon approval by 
the Chief, and the disks are then reissued to officers. (Cutlar, 2004, p. 2) 
 The lack of internal communication, and failure to update officers regarding policy and 
procedural changes in a timely manner was noted in the Investigation of the Cleveland Division 
of Police findings letter:  
When a policy is revised, even significantly so, officers are advised of that change in roll-




revised policy simply is distributed to officers and read aloud. The officer in charge of the 
training division informed us that no training on that revised policy will occur until the 
next in-service training, which may be many months away. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, 
p. 44) 
 As well, generally disorganized and outdated policy manuals from the Investigation of 
the Easton Police Department:  
At the time of our initial tours, EPD policies and procedures were in a binder called the 
“Black Book,” a hodgepodge of policies and procedures, that in many instances had not 
been updated since the 1980s. With the exception of special orders or unofficial 
procedural documents that have been distributed over the years, the “Black Book” served 
as the primary document governing the field services and administrative actions of EPD. 
(Cutlar, 2007, p. 2)  
 Failure to maintain currency in systems, collect and review data for risk management and 
early intervention systems were commonly implicated as a direct contributor of systemic 
misconduct and unconstitutional policing practices beginning with § 14141’s first publicly issued 
investigative findings; from the City of Pittsburgh Investigative Findings Letter:  
The PBP does not monitor complaints filed against its officers as a means of detecting 
problems before they occur. Such a tracking system would alert management to a 
potential problem and to the need for counseling, retraining or other intervention 
techniques. (Patrick, 1997, p. 2) 
 As well, the failure of municipal police agencies to maintain adequate performance 




failure to identify organizational trends and officers responsible for unconstitutional policing 
practices. From the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:  
NPD [has not] taken adequate steps to implement an early warning system that would 
track and identify officers’ problematic behavior. As a result of these systemic 
deficiencies, the NPD does not discern or respond to problematic trends in officer 
conduct that could constitute or lead to misconduct….The NPD further must collect and 
analyze data related to stops, searches, and arrests, so that it can minimize the disparate 
impact of its enforcement efforts and avoid bias in policing. (DOJ, 2014, pp. 3-4) 
 Subtheme three - failure to adhere to established best practices. 
 Differentiated from subtheme two by a focus on adherence to external professionalism 
standards rather than internal, failure to adhere to established best practices was noted in several 
findings letters as symptomatic of systemic problems that placed an agency at risk of 
unconstitutional policing practices. From the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:  
A full understanding of the race-based effects of the NPD’s policing practices is made 
more difficult by the NPD’s failure to track and analyze data with respect to race, which 
is unusual, and at odds with sound policing practices, for a police department in a major 
city, especially one with such diversity. (DOJ, 2014, p. 36) 
 Deviation from tactical best practices was also noted as contributing to the detriment of 
the public and officer safety: “We recommend that the MPD follow the trend in most police 
departments by setting a reasonable restriction on the speed for continuing a vehicle pursuit, and 
add this specific limitation to the DO” (Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 14). As well, with best practices 
related to the use of force, from the Investigation of the Portland, Maine Police Department: 




useful tool in training officers to consider lower levels of force first, which protects the safety of 
both the officer and the civilian” (Brown Cutlar, 2003, p. 4).  
 Theme four - leadership and management failure. 
 Contained within many findings letters were references, both direct and indirect, to 
systemic problems attributable to a lack of leadership and effective management. These failures 
focused on the upper layers of the organizational hierarchy and reflected deficiencies of 
accountability within the chain-of-command, including leadership indifference to institutional 
problems, lack of vision for the organization, and a generalized lack of investment in supporting 
or guiding the police organization. The Investigation of the New Orleans Police Department 
reveals how detrimental that leadership and management failure can be to an organization:  
Our investigation further showed a lack of accountability throughout the chain of 
command sufficient to ensure that field sergeants are properly supervising their 
subordinates. Much of the work supervisors do requires review or approval by the chain 
of command. Commanders seem to take no notice of, much less hold accountable, 
supervisors who approve egregious uses of force without question, conduct obviously 
flawed investigations, sign off on clearly deficient arrest reports, or who simply do not 
supervise. (DOJ, 2011, p. xv) 
 Similarly, this up-the-chain lack of accountability was found in other police 
organizations, however, the DOJ attributed these deficiencies to management’s desire to avoid 
responsibility:  
The hundreds of less lethal force reports we reviewed were almost entirely devoid of any 
analysis by anyone in the chain of command regarding whether the force was reasonable.  




if the goal of the chain of command in many incidents is not [emphasis in original] to 
create a complete record of the incident that can be subjected to internal and external 
review, instead of the opposite. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 31) 
 Leadership and management failure have been attributed to overall organizational 
dysfunction, and have been implicated as leading to unnecessary use of deadly force: “We 
further noted a near absence of organizational accountability. Officers are simply afforded too 
much autonomy, which has contributed to even greater insularity from the department’s 
accountability systems, ineffective deployments and tragic shootings that could have been 
avoided” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 35).  
 The DOJ alludes to the importance of necessary leadership investment, and appropriate 
communication with the organization as a whole, as leadership and management deficiencies can 
infect many parts of a police agency’s operations, which may lead to unconstitutional policing 
practices:  
The responsibility for correcting the NPD’s unconstitutional policing practices lies at 
every level within the Department. NPD supervisors and command leadership must 
ensure that officers receive the training, guidance, and direction necessary to police 
effectively and constitutionally, and clearly communicate to officers that constitutional 
policing and effective law enforcement are not in tension with each other, but rather are 
interdependent. (DOJ, 2014, p. 4) 
 Theme five - organizational myopia.  
 Organizational myopia as described by Catino (2013) is “the limited capacity on the part 
of an organization to evaluate the facts as they actually are and in terms of their possible 




manifests itself in two distinct ways: (1) the incapacity to detect potential signs of danger, 
undermining an organization’s survival or compromising its regular operations, and (2) the 
incapacity of an organization to detect potential opportunities that favor its survival and 
adaptation to the environment (Catino, 2013). Analyzing § 14141 findings letters, it became clear 
that many municipal police agencies had systemic problems related to short-term thinking and 
planning; exhibited insularity, did not adapt to their external environment, and were unaware, or 
indifferent to potential dangers and risks posed to their organization. Municipal police agencies 
under § 14141 action that suffered from organizational myopia were characterized by at least one 
of four subthemes.  
 Subtheme one - adaptation failure. 
 Adaptation failure is best interpreted as a municipal police agency’s failure to adapt to 
changing external conditions in an appropriate manner to the point of detriment to that agency 
and community served. This type of failure was evident in a number of § 14141 investigative 
findings, and manifested in the organization as an inability of a municipal police agency to 
effectively communicate or interact with members of the community served, thereby increasing 
the potential for excessive or unnecessary force. An example of this type of failure, from the 
Investigation of the Yonkers Police Department is instructive: “In light of the diversity of the 
Yonkers community, we also recommend that any warnings issued to individuals prior to the 
deployment of the K-9 Unit be issued in Spanish, as well as in English” (King & Dassin, 2009, p. 
17).  
 Adaptation failure was also noted in other municipalities with diverse populations, such 
as New Orleans: “NOPD is dangerously limited in its capacity to communicate effectively and 




members in the Latino and Vietnamese communities” (DOJ, 2011, p. xii). The DOJ noted the 
dangers inherent with a police department failing to adapt to their environment in the 
Investigation of the Miami Police Department: “Failure to require multiple and complete 
warnings in a language that the subject can understand can result in excessive force being used, 
because it eliminates the opportunity for a subject to surrender before getting bitten” 
(Rosenbaum, 2003, p. 6).  
 Subtheme two - conflicts of interest.  
 Conflicts of interest in the context of organizational myopia are practices in opposition to 
the interest or autonomy of a municipal police agency. By allowing and accepting certain 
practices that are in conflict with a police agency’s core function and mission, conflicts of 
interest may allow unconstitutional policing to proliferate. One such example of a police 
department absolving itself of a core responsibility – enforcement discretion, and ensuring that a 
necessary legal standard for seizure is met for all arrest situations – led to findings of a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional policing in Meridian, MS. As indicated: 
MPD policy requires officers to automatically arrest a student whenever school staff 
indicate that they would like to press charges. MPD officers who respond to District 
referrals do not asses the facts or circumstances of the alleged charge, or whether the 
alleged conduct actually qualifies as an arrestable offense….MPD’s pattern or practice of 
automatically arresting children referred by the District constitutes a blanket failure to 
apply probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (Perez, 2012, p. 2)  
 Conflicts of interest can also be entrenched, system-wide, corrupting, and yet endorsed 
by leadership and management, creating conflicts with organizational priorities and chain-of-




The Detail system is essentially a form of overtime work for officers. Officers may work 
ad hoc Details providing, for example, extra security for special events or individuals 
visiting New Orleans. Or an officer may have a regularly-scheduled Detail, such as being 
hired by a business to provide security in a retail establishment or by a neighborhood 
association to patrol the neighborhood. When on Detail, however, officers are paid and 
largely controlled by entities other than NOPD [emphasis added].….Virtually every 
officer works a Detail, wants to work a Detail, or at some point will have to rely on an 
officer who works a Detail. The effects of Details thus permeate the entire Department.  
It is widely acknowledged that NOPD’s Detail system is corrupting. (DOJ, 2011, p. xvi)  
Subtheme three - deficient interaction with external organizations.  
 Organizational myopia is also characterized by a police agency’s failure to effectively 
communicate and interact with partner organizations including community groups, oversight 
bodies, and other law enforcement organizations. This lack of interaction in many instances led 
to deficiencies in operations, organizational performance, and accountability allowing 
unconstitutional policing to proliferate. One such example from the United States’ Investigation 
of the Missoula Police Department, attributed poor external communication to violations of 
equal protection, and as such, unconstitutional policing:  
Communication between police, prosecutors, and others is critical to ensure effective 
investigations and prosecutions. MPD engages in insufficient communication and 
cooperation with its law enforcement and community partners regarding their response to 
reports of sexual assault. This lack of collaboration weakens the efficacy of MPD's 
response to reports of sexual assault by inhibiting coordination and information-sharing 




compounds the other deficiencies we found in the investigative process. (Perez & Cotter, 
2013, p. 10) 
 Subtheme four - research, planning, and resource allocation.  
 Municipal police agencies that fail to use, collect, or analyze operational information for 
the betterment of police functionality, fail to research and learn, fail to conduct internal studies, 
assessments, review allocation of resources, and make well-informed operational decisions have 
been found to be at risk of engaging in unconstitutional policing through insufficient knowledge, 
feedback, and even fatigue. From the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department:  
BPD fails to adequately support its officers with adequate staffing and material resources.  
The Department lacks effective strategies for staffing, recruitment and retention, forcing 
officers to work overtime after long shifts, lowering morale, and leading to officers 
working with deteriorated decision-making skills. (DOJ, 2016, p. 11) 
 Failure of a municipal police agency to research, review, and learn from mistakes was 
indicated by the DOJ to have future consequences: 
We found that the files for recently completed investigations revealed little administrative 
or operational analysis by MPD. As a consequence, the opportunity to learn from an 
incident and apply lessons learned to future incidents, at both the individual and 
departmental levels, was lost. (Perez, 2013, p. 11)  
 Lack of internal research and planning has also been indicated to lead to operational 
problems involving routine police duties for supervisors, adding to cynicism, and overall 
deficiencies:  
Supervisors also reported that their workloads are simply unmanageable. Sergeants told 




might be responsible for five less lethal force investigations during one shift in addition 
to various other duties….supervisors appeared to have difficulty balancing their 
responsibility to effectively lead, manage, and hold officers accountable. (Gupta & 
Dettelbach, 2014, p. 33) 
 Theme six - organizational orientation and culture.  
 Many § 14141 findings letters are highly suggestive of a deeply entrenched cultural view, 
organizational and officer perspective, and enduring organizational legacy as root causes of 
systemic problems that when left unaddressed, led to unconstitutional policing. Without 
specification, in many § 14141 investigations, the DOJ was implying that frequently municipal 
police agencies were conducting legitimate practices but for illegitimate ends, as such, were 
engaged in unconstitutional policing.   
 When analyzing § 14141 investigative findings letters, it became clear that police 
organizations that suffered from organizational orientation and cultural problems, were deeply 
troubled. This theme then, revealed itself in two distinct, but often connected ways.  
 Subtheme one - focus on enforcement, activity, and arrests. 
 Characteristic of municipal police departments that had attributes of this subtheme were 
often based on legacy perspectives that a police agency’s first and most important priority is to 
fight crime. While prioritizing police resources to fight crime is a legitimate goal of police, often 
the byproduct of an enforcement-first orientation for many of these police agencies were ends 
that were highly problematic, discriminatory, and often illegitimate. An example from New 
Orleans:  
The Department’s organizational focus on arrests, particularly in combination with its 




downs, and arrests without probable cause. NOPD’s focus on statistics…amplifies the 
risk that officers will execute illegal searches and seizures…many officers described a 
strong and unyielding pressure to increase numbers…As one commander told us, “[t]hese 
officers are under the gun to make arrest, arrest, arrest, which leads to civil rights 
violations and complaints.” Detached as it is from problem-oriented policing, community 
partnerships, or long-term strategies, there is no indication that NOPD’s emphasis on 
arrests results in better crime prevention or safer communities. To the contrary, NOPD 
recently acknowledged that the Department’s staggering volume of arrests for low-level 
offenses is counter-productive. (DOJ, 2011, p. viii) 
 An organizational culture that focuses on arrests and enforcement has also been noted to 
create problems between the police and the community. Additionally, these practices were often 
not just found to be acceptable by management, but were viewed as an appropriate and valuable 
police function, and often required:  
During various time periods in recent years, NPD leadership reportedly instituted a quota 
to encourage officers to increase the number of citations issued. Officers’ eligibility for 
overtime and desirable assignments apparently were linked to meeting the Quality of Life 
citation quota, thus giving officers an incentive to issue more….Officers and residents 
alike perceive that the NPD issues these citations in order to satisfy quotas rather than to 
improve public safety. This perception alienates many community members. (DOJ, 2014, 
p. 21) 
 An example from the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department 




demands for enforcement activity produces illegitimate ends through the corruption of legitimate 
means, resulting in unconstitutional policing:  
BPD’s legacy of zero tolerance enforcement continues to drive its policing in certain 
Baltimore neighborhoods and leads to unconstitutional stops, searches, and arrests.  Many 
BPD supervisors instruct officers to make frequent stops and arrests – even for minor 
offenses and with minimal or no suspicion – without sufficient consideration of whether 
this enforcement strategy promotes public safety and community trust or conforms to 
constitutional standards. (DOJ, 2016, p. 5)  
 Subtheme two - prevailing cultural view.  
 Contained within findings letters from many police departments investigated under § 
14141, existed widely-held viewpoints and perspectives as part of the broader police culture. 
Often, the DOJ would specifically mention the culture of an organization, and attribute systemic 
problems to that culture, other times the attribution was implied. Apart from the differences in 
latency, a prevailing cultural view, or dominant way of thinking by officers, was regularly a 
contributing factor to systemic problems, police-community strains, and often unconstitutional 
policing.  
 In conducting their investigation of the Albuquerque Police Department, it was noted that 
“problematic behavior continues to be viewed as reasonable, even exemplary….These 
deficiencies demonstrate a failure to embrace policing fundamentals, namely, recognizing and 
enabling officers’ duty to protect both the public’s safety and civil rights” (Samuels & Martinez, 
2014, p. 21). This type of prevailing cultural view is indicative of a police agency with “an 




example of this aggressive culture was noted in that “subjects of force are…referred to as 
‘combatants’ in APD policy” (Samuels & Martinez, 2014, p. 31).  
 A police agency with a problematic cultural view was viewed to have difficulties 
embracing modern policing strategies because of that culture, and to resist organizational change. 
The DOJ gives an example of how a prevailing cultural view creates rifts between the police and 
community, and how difficult that culture can be to change within a police department. From the 
Investigation of the Cleveland Division of Police:  
Some officers hold views that are incompatible with community policing principles, and 
that this attitude is tolerated and encouraged by at least some members of command staff.  
A former actual Commander of community policing for CDP told us that he believes the 
culture within CDP is antithetical to a community policing mentality and that officer 
training instills in officers an “us-against-them” mentality. During an interview with one 
district commander, he referred to his district as a “forward operating base,” and we later 
observed a large sign hanging in the vehicle bay of that district station identifying it as 
such. Such metaphors have no place in a community-oriented police department. (Gupta 
& Dettelbach, 2014, p. 51) 
 Theme seven - routinized misconduct.  
 Many § 14141 investigative findings contained references and examples of misconduct, 
malfeasance, and otherwise criminal conduct committed by officers routinely occurring within a 
police agency. Although the federal government has the authority to bring criminal civil rights 
charges against individual officers, §14141 investigations focus on systemic problems rather than 
individual wrongdoing (DOJ, 2017a). Furthermore, although the DOJ has indicated that 




have informed that individual incidents of misconduct may suggest systemic problems, and 
therefore be part of an investigative finding (DOJ, 2017a). To that end, numerous investigative 
findings letters provided detailed examples of individual occurrences of police misconduct as 
exemplary incidents of larger systemic problems. These examples repeatedly comprised one of 
four types of police misconduct indicative of unconstitutional policing. As such, there are four 
subthemes to routinized misconduct.   
 Subtheme one - abuse of authority. 
 Department of Justice findings from a number of investigations indicated that officers 
routinely used their police authority in an intentionally abusive, often unnecessary, and 
frequently excessive manner. Officers who abused their authority often had sufficient legal 
justification to take enforcement action, but the poor use of discretion often led to what was 
classified as unconstitutional policing. An example from the Lorain Police Department: 
We noted several incidents in which LPD officers deployed ECWs [electronic control 
weapons] to apprehend subjects in situations in which LPD officer's only recorded 
knowledge at the time of deployment was that the subject was fleeing for an unknown 
reason after a minor infraction, such as walking in the roadway or jaywalking. Similarly, 
LPD has deployed its canine in find-and-bite apprehensions when subjects fled but did 
not offer any resistance. In one such situation, LPD use-of-force reports show that LPD 
had its canine pursue and eventually bite one subject who fled from a car pulled over 
only for a window-tint violation. (Smith, 2012, p. 3) 
 An example of unreasonable use of force and poor discretion from the Investigation of 




We received reports about CPD officers using chemical irritant at closer range than is 
allowed pursuant to the CPD's policy, or in quantities that seem unreasonable. For 
example, interviewees related instances in which officers emptied entire canisters of 
chemical irritant on a single subject or sprayed chemical irritant up subjects' noses or 
down their throats. (Rosenbaum, 2001, p. 2) 
 Abuse of authority was also evident in non-use-of-force situations where an officer’s 
actions were legally justified, but by all appearances were unreasonable, yet deemed acceptable 
by the organization because of a widespread culture and management acceptance of abusive 
practices. From the Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department: 
FPD officers routinely issue multiple citations during a single stop, often for the same 
violation. Issuing three or four charges in one stop is not uncommon….Officers 
sometimes write six, eight, or, in at least one instance, fourteen citations for a single 
encounter. Indeed, officers told us that some compete to see who can issue the largest 
number of citations during a single stop. (DOJ, 2015, p. 11) 
 Finally, abuse of authority frequently involved situations in which officers used force or 
took enforcement action for the purpose of punishment and retaliation. In these situations, the 
DOJ found the initial use of force may have been legally justified, but the excessive or 
unreasonable nature of its use was believed to be abusive relative to the facts, circumstances, and 
context that the force was used. An example of this finding from the Investigation of the 
Cleveland Division of Police:  
Despite the fact that there were two officers present, the officers drive-stunned Jason 
twice while he was handcuffed and on the ground. This use of force was unreasonable.  




him twice appears to have been made more to punish Jason for running rather than to 
gain control of him, which could have been accomplished with less force, if any. (Gupta 
& Dettelbach, 2014, p. 22) 
 Subtheme two - biased-based practices. 
 Policing practices that are motivated by bias towards any particular class or group of 
persons was repeatedly evident in numerous investigative findings letters. Throughout many § 
14141 investigations, the DOJ informs that biased intent need not be present for a police 
department to engage in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, rather differential 
impact may satisfy this standard. Both biased intent, and differential impact were evident in a 
number of § 14141 investigative letters, where unconstitutional policing practices were 
committed by a number of police agencies affecting a wide array of groups including those 
identified as women, Blacks, Hispanics, LGBTQ, Asians, and persons in mental health crisis. 
Routinized misconduct against these groups manifested itself in one of three, but not necessarily 
mutually exclusive ways: Biased intent, denial of adequate services, or biased differential 
impact.  
 An example of intentional bias from the Investigation of the New Orleans Police 
Department: 
Transgender women complained that NOPD officers improperly target and arrest them 
for prostitution, sometimes fabricating evidence of solicitation for compensation.  
Moreover, transgender residents reported that officers are likelier, because of their gender 
identity, to charge them under the state’s “crimes against nature” statute – a statute whose 




nature” statute, unlike Louisiana’s general prostitution statute, require registration as a 
sex offender. (DOJ, 2011, p. x) 
 An example of bias through the denial of adequate services from the Investigation of the 
Missoula Police Department:  
We found practices that discourage female victims of sexual assault from cooperating 
with law enforcement and thereby significantly compromise the investigative 
process…these investigative weaknesses appear due, at least in part, to stereotypes and 
misinformation about women and victims of sexual assault. (Perez, 2013, p. 6) 
 An example of bias through differential impact from the Investigation of the Newark 
Police Department: 
This investigation found that black people in Newark have been stopped and arrested at a 
significantly higher rate than their white and Hispanic counterparts. This disparity is stark 
and unremitting. Approximately 80% of the NPD’s stops and arrests have involved black 
individuals, while Newark’s population is only 53.9% black. Black residents of Newark 
are at least 2.5 times more likely to be subjected to a pedestrian stop or arrested than 
white individuals. (DOJ, 2014, p. 16) 
 Subtheme three - cultural deviation. 
 Cultural deviation is a phenomenon described by O’Hara (2012) as occurring “when 
elements of the organization increasingly operate according to their own standards, with little 
regard for the organization and its rules” (pp. 19-20). Expanding on this definition to specifically 
include the violation of laws and criminal activity committed by subgroups of officers within a 
police department, it was evident that cultural deviation was a form of routinized misconduct 




 An example of cultural deviation within a subgroup manifested as criminal conduct, from 
the Investigation of the Newark Police Department:  
The evidence makes clear that theft from arrestees has been more than an aberration 
limited to a few officers or incidents within NPD. Examples of the problem include 
allegations of theft of money and drugs during arrests and allegedly deliberate failure to 
return money and property such as wallets, cell phones, jewelry, and car keys upon 
arrestees’ release by the NPD….that theft of civilians’ property and money by officers 
was particularly problematic in the NPD’s specialized units, such as narcotics and gangs, 
and in the prisoner processing unit at the NPD’s Green Street Cell Block. (DOJ, 2014, p. 
31)  
 When cultural deviation exists outside of subgroups, that is, within the broader 
organizational context, it suggests that cultural deviation may be intertwined with other thematic 
failures including culture and leadership, the combination of which, may be responsible for 
unconstitutional policing practices.  
 An example from the Investigation of the Baltimore City Police Department is 
instructive:  
In some cases, unconstitutional stops result from supervisory officers’ explicit 
instructions. During a ride-along with Justice Department officials, a BPD sergeant 
instructed a patrol officer to stop a group of young African-American males on a street 
corner, question them, and order them to disperse. When the patrol officer protested that 
he had no valid reason to stop the group, the sergeant replied “Then make something 
up.” [emphasis added]. This incident is far from anomalous. (DOJ, 2016, p. 29) 




 The final type of routinized misconduct contained within § 14141 investigative findings 
related to individual, and organizational enforcement actions that occurred without meeting a 
necessary or sufficient legal standard. Municipal police agencies wherein unjustified 
enforcement actions were found, typically revolved around police actions involving seizures, 
searches, arrests, and detainments without proper legal justification.  
 An example of unjustified enforcement from the Columbus Findings Letter served as an 
example of unjustified enforcement actions early in the life of § 14141: “Many of the victims of 
excessive force, false arrest or charges, and/or an improper search are, at the time when the 
misconduct occurs, carrying out some ordinary, routine daily activity” (Lann Lee, 1999, p. 1). As 
well, in the investigation of the LAPD, the DOJ directly implicated systemic unconstitutional 
policing practices with unjustified enforcement actions “including improper officer-involved 
shootings; improper seizures of persons, including making stops not based on reasonable 
suspicion and making arrests without probable cause” (Lann Lee, 2000, p. 2).  
 The DOJ frequently identified unjustified enforcement actions where a specific legal 
threshold was met only after an unjustified action had taken place. This ex post facto application 
of a necessary and appropriate burden of proof is unconstitutional, and when municipal police 
departments have patterns or practices of such, formed the basis for a negotiated settlement. 
Newark Police Department provides and instructive example of this finding:  
NPD officers also regularly have justified stops based solely on information or evidence 
discovered after the stop was initiated. Examples include “Individual Was Stopped on 
Bicycle No Proper ID” and “A Record Check of the Above Individual Revealed an Open 
Warrant”….Similarly, officers have justified stops based on the fact that the individual 




have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in order to conduct a stop, and the 
discovery of evidence during or after the stop that provides probable cause for arrest 
cannot be used to retroactively establish reasonable suspicion for the stop. (DOJ, 2014, 
pp. 11-12)  
 Theme eight - tactical discretion, weapon competency, and equipment inadequacies. 
 In the course of regular police duties, use of force may be necessary to gain control of a 
suspect, prevent escape, or defend human life. The DOJ acknowledges these facts in many of 
their findings reports (Samuels & Martinez, 2014), yet they also make efforts to point out when 
the use of force goes beyond what may be necessary.  
 Frequently cited by the DOJ were situations in which police officers used force, and were 
justified in using that force, however, the amount of force, or under specific circumstances, albeit 
constitutional, constituted poor choices and discretion including when the use of force, justified 
at the moment, could have been avoided. When it is determined that these poor tactical decisions 
are systemic within an organization, the DOJ suggests that it contributes to unconstitutional 
policing practices. Furthermore, the DOJ views officer’s availability of suitable equipment, and 
competency to use that equipment effectively as a contributor to systemic misconduct and 
possible unconstitutional policing practices. As such, this theme is comprised of the following 
three subthemes.  
Subtheme one - inappropriate tactical discretion.  
 Police officers have a variety of tools to choose from when taking appropriate and 
necessary law enforcement action. The application of these tools falls on what is referred to as a 
force continuum. A force continuum is the standard in which police use of force guidelines are 




and at its highest, deadly physical force (National Institute of Justice, 2009). In many § 14141 
investigative findings letters, there were frequent references to situations in which officers used 
force, albeit within policy guidelines and legally justified under the circumstances, that resulted 
in unnecessary public risk, injury, or death.  
 An example of poor use of tactical discretion and its implications from the Investigation 
of the Albuquerque Police Department: “Officers frequently use takedown procedures in ways 
that unnecessarily increase the harm to the person. Finally, officers escalate situations in which 
force could have been avoided had they instead used de-escalation measures” (Samuels & 
Martinez, 2014, p. 3).  
 Poor tactical choices by police officers have also been found to contribute not just to 
injury, but risk of death to innocent civilians:  
We found that officers sometimes draw, point and/or fire their weapons without 
considering their environment, or the potential harm to bystanders or nearby residents.  
Officers do not adequately consider the potential destination of rounds fired especially if, 
as often happens, they miss their intended targets. (Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014, p. 26) 
 The DOJ has concluded that poor tactical discretion can contribute to unconstitutional 
policing through unnecessary force, in addition to contributing to the erosion of police-
community relations: “BPD uses overly aggressive tactics that unnecessarily escalate encounters, 
increase tensions, and lead to unnecessary force, and fails to de-escalate encounters when it 
would be reasonable to do so” (DOJ, 2016, p. 8).  
 Subtheme two - equipment inadequacies.  
 Although not directly implicated as a cause of unconstitutional policing, equipment 




been attributed to a police organization not supporting their officers to do the job for which they 
are tasked.  
 In an example of the risks inherent in not providing officers the appropriate equipment, 
the DOJ suggests that officers who are not issued appropriate and necessary equipment, may use 
the equipment they have improperly: “Officers may unnecessarily resort to their firearms if 
intermediate force options are not available, we recommend that the APD require all officers to 
carry a chemical weapon, in addition to an impact weapon” (Cutlar, 2008, p. 13). Other times, it 
was noted that the failure of a police agency to properly equip their officers contributes to a less 
effective agency: “Cleveland police officers are not given the basic equipment, the physical 
structures, and the technology required to perform their jobs safely and effectively” (Gupta & 
Dettelbach, 2014, p. 55). 
 Subtheme three - weapon competency. 
 Tying together a lack of professional currency with equipment inadequacies, the DOJ 
identified many instances of officers who appeared to use their weapons and tactics without the 
requisite competence. This to the detriment of public safety, and potentially leading to 
unconstitutional policing. An example from the Investigation of the Portland Police Bureau:  
We found instances that support a pattern of officers using multiple cycles of shock 
without waiting between cycles to allow the suspect to comply, or officers failing to 
utilize control tactics during ECW cycles to properly affect handcuffing without having 
to resort to repeated ECW shocks. (Perez & Marshall, 2012, p. 3) 
 The DOJ directly implicated a lack of weapon competency with unjustified use of force 





CDP officers use their guns to strike people in the head in circumstances where the use 
of deadly force is not justified. Striking someone in the head with an impact weapon is 
deadly force, as CDP’s own policies recognize….CDP officers have hit suspects in the 
head with their pistols in circumstances that do not warrant deadly force. This practice is 
partially a result of tactical errors where officers drawn their firearms at inappropriate 
times. In these circumstances, when officers ultimately engage physically with suspects, 
they do so while holding a firearm. This is an extremely dangerous practice, increasing 
the risk of an accidental discharge – which has happened on more than one occasion 
involving CDP officers – and the risk that a suspect will gain control of the weapon. It 
also limits the less-lethal options an officer has available to bring an actively resisting 
subject under control because one of his hands is occupied holding the firearm. (Gupta & 
Dettelbach, 2014, pp. 18-19) 
Unconstitutional Policing 
 Police practices adhering to constitutional standards were differentiated from 
unconstitutional police practices through § 14141 investigative outcomes. For the n = 24 police 
negotiated settlements, the DOJ determined there was reasonable cause to believe that the 
municipal police agency was engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, 
whereas for the n = 9 police agencies under technical assistance, the DOJ made no such 
affirmative determination. By comparing themes associated with each investigative outcome, a 
clearer picture emerges of the contours of unconstitutional policing.  
 Since an investigative outcome differentiates patterns or practices of constitutional from 
unconstitutional policing, it was posited that the number and types of themes between these two 




• H1: Thematic findings will differ between municipal police agencies under negotiated 
settlement, and those under technical assistance. 
 A two-tailed z-score test for two population proportions was conducted on the total 
number of thematic findings, and for each of the eight themes by investigative outcome to test 
H1, that thematic findings would differ between municipal police agencies under negotiated 
settlement, and technical assistance. This type of test can be used to determine if two population 
proportions significantly differ for categorical data (Laerd, 2016a). Since each of the eight main 
themes, and total number of themes by investigative outcome were measured as presence or 
absence of the theme, and H1 is a non-directional prediction, a two-tailed test was appropriate for 
this hypothesis. Although not statistically significant at the p < .05 level, proportions of total 
thematic findings were found to be marginally significant between agencies under negotiated 
settlement (.70), and technical assistance (.58), z = 1.84, p = .066. However, as indicated in Table 
7, police agencies under negotiated settlement had a significantly higher proportion of 
organizational orientation and culture thematic findings (.38) than those under technical 
assistance (.00) z = 2.15, p = .032. As well, there were significant differences in proportions of 
the theme routinized misconduct by investigative outcome, z = 2.76, p = .005, with the police 











Thematic Analysis Findings by Investigative Outcome. 
 
 Negotiated settlements (n = 24) Technical assistance (n = 9) 
Theme 
# of investigations 
with thematic 
finding 
% of investigations 
with thematic 
finding 
# of investigations 
with thematic 
finding 
% of investigations 
with thematic 
finding 
Conditions of ambiguity 14 58% 7 78% 
Institutionalization 21 88% 7 78% 
Lack of professional 
currency 23 96% 9 100% 
Leadership and 
management failure 12 50% 3 33% 
Organizational myopia 20 83% 7 78% 
Organizational 
orientation and culture 9* 38% 0* 0% 






18 75% 7 78% 
Total 135 70% 42 58% 
*p < .05; **p < .01     
 Having established that there were differences in two specific themes by investigative 
outcome, and that overall differences in total thematic findings by investigative outcome 
marginally differ, a more nuanced and detailed analysis at the subtheme level should then 
provide greater insight into the differences in findings by investigative outcome. As such, the 
following hypothesis was offered and tested: 
• H2: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have more scaled 




 Using a process described by Boyatzis (1998), all subthemes were scaled to the thematic 
level, and measured by presence or absence in the same manner as the themes. Comparisons 
were then made between proportions in the presence or absence of total scaled themes by 
investigative outcome. A one-tailed z-score test for two population proportions was conducted to 
test H2, that municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have more scaled 
subtheme findings than those under technical assistance. This type of test can be used to 
determine if two population proportions significantly differ for categorical data (Laerd, 2016a). 
Since each of the scaled subthemes, and total number of scaled subthemes by investigative 
outcome were measured as presence or absence, and H2 is a directional prediction, that is, it is 
expected that the proportion of themes present will be greater for negotiated settlements than 
technical assistance outcomes, a one-tailed test was appropriate for this hypothesis. 
 As indicated in Table 8, police agencies under negotiated settlement had a significantly 
higher proportion of total scaled subtheme findings (.49), than agencies under technical 
assistance (.40), z = 2.00, p = .022. Additionally, significant differences were found between 
police agencies by investigative outcome in the failure to adhere to best practices subtheme (.71), 
to (1.00), z = -1.82, p = .034, although this result was significant opposite of the hypothesized 
relationship.  
 As one subtheme of organizational orientation and culture – prevailing cultural view – 
the proportion of police agencies with this theme under negotiated settlement significantly 
differed from the proportion under technical assistance (.38) to (.00), z = 2.15, p = .016. In the 
routinized misconduct theme, the proportion of police agencies significantly differed by 
investigative outcome for the abuse of authority subtheme (.67) to (.22), z = 2.28, p = .011, and 




of police agencies under negotiated settlement significantly differed from those under technical 
assistance for the unjustified enforcement actions subtheme (.54) to (.00), z = 2.83, p = .002. All 
other scaled subtheme differences by investigative outcome were not statistically significant. 
Table 8 
Scaled Thematic Findings by Investigative Outcome. 
  Negotiated settlements (n = 24) Technical assistance (n = 9) 
Scaled theme 








Conditions of ambiguity 14 58% 7 78% 
Internal partiality 17 71% 7 78% 
Misaligned policy and practice 14 58% 5 56% 
Deficient selection criteria 13 54% 4 44% 
Fails to maintain established standards… 22 92% 9 100% 
Failure to adhere to best practices 17 71% 9* 100% 
Leadership and management failure 12 50% 3 33% 
Focus on enforcement, activity and arrests  4 17% 0 0% 
Prevailing cultural view 9* 38% 0 0% 
Adaption failure 8 33% 3 33% 
Conflicts of interest 3 13% 0 0% 
Deficient interaction with external organizations 16 67% 7 78% 
Research, planning and resource allocation 15 63% 4 44% 
Abuse of authority 16* 67% 2 22% 
Biased-based policing 10* 42% 0 0% 
Cultural deviation 6 25% 1 11% 
Unjustified enforcement action 13** 54% 0 0% 
Inappropriate tactical discretion  16 67% 4 44% 
Equipment inadequacies 3 13% 3 33% 
Weapon competency 6 25% 4 44% 
Total 234* 49% 72 40% 




Analysis of Theoretical Issues 
Disjointed Incrementalism 
 Lindblom’s (1979) disjointed incrementalism proposes that an organization will engender 
small changes in the application of their decision-making authority over-time through trial, error, 
and minor revisions as appropriate to changing internal and external conditions. As applied to 
DOJ’s decision-making regarding § 14141, over-time adjustments should be revealed through 
variables related to year-over-year investigations. Two related outcomes that would be expected 
to change through disjointed incrementalism then are efficiency and productivity. As measured 
by the average number of scaled themes per investigation over the life-course of § 14141, the 
phenomena of disjointed incrementalism is clearly revealed in Figure 3 through increases in 
productivity.  
  
Figure 3. Average Number of Scaled Themes per Investigation by Year: 
1994 - 2017 
 
 Having visually established that DOJ’s approach to § 14141 is indicative of disjointed 
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the application of § 14141 would be revealed through DOJ’s output. As such, the following 
hypothesis was offered and tested:   
• H3: Second-generation DOJ output will be significantly longer than first-generation 
DOJ output.  
 The DOJ categorizes their § 14141 investigations by generation; first-generation 
investigations were those initiated between 1994 and 2005, and investigations initiated after 
2005 are referred to as second-generation (DOJ, 2017a). One way to test over-time changes in 
organizational decision-making as it relates to unconstitutional policing is to quantitatively 
measure the output (i.e. findings letters length) of § 14141 investigations. To that end, a one 
tailed t-test for two independent means was conducted on the length of § 14141 output to test H3, 
that second-generation output will be significantly longer than first-generation output. See Table 
9 for the estimated mean length of the output, disaggregated by generation. 
Table 9 
Mean Length of DOJ’s Output by Generation. 
 
 95% CI 
Generation n M (SD) LL UL 
First 16 20.06 (14.06) 12.56 27.55 
Second 17 60.88 (54.33)** 32.94 88.81 
Total 33 41.09 (44.7) 25.2 56.93 
**p < .01 
 The results of a one-tailed t-test with unequal variances indicate that there were 
significant differences in the length of DOJ’s output between first-generation (M = 20.06, SD = 
14.06), and second-generation output (M = 60.88, SD = 54.33); t(18) = -2.99, p = .004, d = 1.02. 
Furthermore, separate one-tailed t-tests with unequal variances were conducted on the length of 
DOJ’s investigative output between first and second-generation investigations disaggregated by 




generation negotiated settlement (M = 18.45, SD = 16.72), and second (M = 72.23, SD = 56.83); 
t(14) = -3.24, p = .003, d = 1.28. However, the results of the one-way t-test for length of DOJ 
output under technical assistance was not significant t(3) = -0.04, p = .49. Summary statistics can 
be found in Table 10. 
Table 10 
Mean Length of DOJ’s Output by Generation and Investigative Outcome. 
 
 Negotiated Settlements Technical Assistance 
Generation n M SD n M SD 
First 11 18.45 16.72 5 23.6 4.5 
Second 13 72.23** 56.83 4 24 23.36 
Total 24 47.58 50.55 9 23.78 13.47 
** p < .01 
 Analyzed ordinally without disaggregating § 14141 findings letters into two generations, 
the scatterplot in Figure 4 illustrates a positive association between temporal order, and DOJ’s 
output while the average length of an investigation remains unchanged. Suggestive of disjointed 
incrementalism through the increased efficiency of DOJ’s output relative to their investigation 
length, three Spearman’s correlations were conducted to assess the bivariate relationship between 
temporal order and output length. This type of test can be used to measure the association 
between an ordinal and continuous variable (Onwuegbuzie, Daniel, & Leech, 2017). Since 
DOJ’s findings letters were measured ordinally as depicted in Figure 4, and the length of an 
investigation, measured as the number of months, is a continuous variable, a Spearman’s 
correlation was the most appropriate inferential test for this analysis.  
 The results indicate a strong positive significant correlation for the N = 33 study 




agencies under negotiated settlement, (rs = .79, p < .001), and a moderately negative non-
significant relationship for the n = 9 agencies under technical assistance, (rs = -.30, p = .404). 
 
Figure 4. Changes in § 14141 Investigation Length and Output 
 
 Having established that a relationship exists between output length and the order of § 
14141 investigations, the application of disjointed incrementalism to § 14141 investigations 
suggests that investigative efficiency would be revealed through lesser investigative length for 
more recent investigations compared to earlier investigations. As such, the following hypothesis 
was offered and tested: 
• H4: First-generation § 14141 investigations will have lasted longer than second- 
generation investigations.  
 To test the hypothesis that first-generation investigations lasted longer than second-
generation investigations, and this hypothesis is directional, that is, first-generation 
investigations are expected to be longer than second, a one-tailed t-test for two independent 
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investigations by generation were found t(31) = 0.12, p = .45, summary statistics can be found in 
Table 11. 
Table 11 
Length of Investigation by Generation (in months). 
 
 95% CI 
Generation n M (SD) LL UL 
First 16 19.06 (13.72) 11.75 26.37 
Second 17 18.52 (11) 12.86 24.17 
Total 33 18.79 (12.2) 14.46 23.11 
 
 Two separate one-tailed t-tests for two independent means were conducted for the length 
of an investigation by investigative outcome, disaggregated by generation as a further test of H4. 
The results presented in Table 12 indicate that the mean difference between first and second-
generation investigation length for police agencies under negotiated settlement was not 
significant, t(15) = 1.20, p = .12. Although the mean difference in length of investigation for 
police agencies under technical assistance was close to significant, with unequal variances, t(3) = 
-1.83, p = .081, this difference was opposite of the hypothesized relationship.  
Table 12 
Length of Investigation by Generation and Outcome (in months). 
 
 Negotiated Settlements Technical Assistance 
Generation n M SD n M SD 
First 11 22.18 15.51 5 12.2 4.38 
Second 13 15.92 8.3 4 27 15.64 
Total 24 18.79 12.27 9 18.78 12.73 
 
 Having established that the length of an investigation does not differ by generation, nor 




to glean a more complete analysis of disjointed incrementalism’s effect on DOJ’s § 14141 
investigative process. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:   
• H5: The length of an investigation will be negatively associated with the number of 
scaled thematic findings, controlling for the size of a police department.  
 Disjointed incrementalism applied to § 14141 investigations suggests that the DOJ would 
become more efficient in their investigative process, resulting in greater thematic findings in 
shorter investigative time periods. An illustration of this relationship in Figure 5 for the N = 33 
study population indicates a slight negative trend in the relationship between investigation length 
and number of scaled thematic findings.  
 
Figure 5. Relationship Between Length of Investigation and Scaled Thematic Findings 
 
 A Pearson’s r correlation was conducted to assess the relationship between the length of 
investigation, and total scaled findings for the N = 33 investigations, (r = -.22, p = .199), 
indicating a weak negative, non-statistically significant relationship. Similarly, Pearson’s r 





























findings for the n = 24 negotiated settlements, (r = -.18, p = .399), indicating a weak negative, 
non-statistically significant relationship, and the n = 9 agencies under technical assistance, (r = -
.64, p = .061), although a moderate negative relationship, this difference was marginally, but not 
statistically significant.  
 Since it was hypothesized that length of investigation, and scaled thematic findings 
would be negatively associated, three one-way Pearson’s partial correlations were conducted to 
bring the size of a police agency in as a control variable. Disjointed incrementalism applied to § 
14141 decision-making suggests that over-time efficiency by the DOJ would be revealed by 
producing a greater number of findings, in less time, holding the size of the police department 
constant. The results of these partial correlations indicate that a weak negative, marginal, but 
non-significant relationship exists between investigative length and scaled findings, controlling 
for the size of a police agency in the study population, (r = -.265, p = .072), a weak negative non-
significant relationship exists for the n = 24 agencies (r = -.209, p = .169), and a moderately 
strong negative and significant relationship exists for the n = 9 police agencies (r = -.661, p = 
.037). 
 Having established that disjointed incrementalism marginally affects DOJ’s investigative 
efficiency in a statistically significant manner controlling for the size of a police department for 
the entire study population, a second approach to assessing disjointed incrementalism’s influence 
on organizational decision-making relative § 14141 enforcement was taken. Here, disjointed 
incrementalism’s influence on outcomes over-time was assessed, and as such, the following 
hypothesis was offered and tested:  




 Supported by disjointed incrementalism’s core characteristics, changes in the number, 
and types of findings over the course of § 14141 enforcement should reveal themselves through 
the aggregation of findings by generation, and disaggregated by findings between generations. 
As such, to test H6, that DOJ’s number and type of findings change over-time, a two-tailed z-
score test for two population proportions was conducted for the total number of scaled findings 
between first and second-generation investigations with statistically significant differences found 
between generations (.38) to (.54), z = -3.96, p < .001.  
 Each of the 20 scaled thematic findings were tested for over-time changes by generation 
using a two-tailed z-score test for each of two population proportions, significant differences 
were found between first and second-generation findings for the following six scaled themes: (a) 
leadership and management failure (.19) to (.71), z = -2.99, p = .003; (b) focus on enforcement, 
activity, and arrests (.00) to (.24), z = -2.06, p = .038; (c) prevailing cultural view (.00) to (.53), z 
= -3.41, p < .001; (d) biased-based policing (.13) to (.47), z = -2.16, p = .031; (e) cultural 
deviation (.06) to (.35), z = -2.04, p = .041; and, (f) weapon competency (.13) to (.47), z = -2.16, 
p = .031. All other scaled thematic differences between generations were not significant. See 












Differences in Scaled Themes by Generation. 
  
  First Generation n = 16 Second Generation n = 17 
Scaled theme 








Conditions of ambiguity 12 75% 9 53% 
Internal partiality 12 75% 12 71% 
Misaligned policy and practice 7 44% 12 71% 
Deficient selection criteria 8 50% 9 53% 
Fails to maintain established standards… 16 100% 15 88% 
Failure to adhere to best practices 13 81% 13 76% 
Leadership and management failure 3 19% 12** 71% 
Focus on enforcement, activity and arrests  0 0% 4* 24% 
Prevailing cultural view 0 0% 9*** 53% 
Adaption failure 3 19% 8 47% 
Conflicts of interest 0 0% 3 18% 
Deficient interaction with external organizations 10 63% 13 76% 
Research, planning and resource allocation 11 69% 8 47% 
Abuse of authority 6 38% 12 71% 
Biased-based policing 2 13% 8* 47% 
Cultural deviation 1 6% 6* 35% 
Unjustified enforcement action 6 38% 7 41% 
Inappropriate tactical discretion  7 44% 13 76% 
Equipment inadequacies 4 25% 2 12% 
Weapon competency 2 13% 8* 47% 
Total 123 38% 183*** 54% 






 Having established that DOJ’s findings differed between first and second-generation 
investigations, applying disjointed incrementalism beyond investigations and findings to 
exploring differences in the characteristics of the municipal police agencies between generations, 
the following exploratory hypothesis was offered and tested:  
• He: Organizational and environmental characteristics for municipal police will differ 
between first and second-generation investigations. 
 Independent sample t-tests were run for the four variables; population category, percent 
non-white, size, and resources by generation. Differences in the population category by 
generation were not significant, t(31) = 0.142, p = .44; nor were differences in the size of a police 
department by generation, with unequal variance, t(31) = -0.03, p = .48; nor were differences in 
resources, t(31) = 0.09, p = .46. However, differences in the percent non-white significantly 






Means of Environmental and Organizational Variables by Generation. 
 
  
First Generation (n = 16) 
 
 
Second Generation (n = 17) 
  95% CI  95% CI 
 
Variable M (SD) LL UL M (SD) LL UL 
Population 
category 3.9 (2.02) 2.8 4.9 4.5 (1.7) 3.6 5.4 
Percent non-
white 45.1 (24.9)* 31.8 58.4 62.6 (23.9)* 50.3 74.9 
Size (sworn 




2.8 (1.29) 2.1 3.5 2.7 (1.05) 2.16 3.24 





 The application of deterrence to DOJ’s § 14141 decision-making suggests that 
municipalities and their police agencies are specifically targeted for enforcement action under § 
14141 authority because of their size. For example, data in Figure 6 illustrate that the DOJ 
initiated § 14141 investigations against municipal police agencies disproportionate to their 
representation in the U.S. population as aggregated (BJS, 2015), implying that the largest 
municipal police agencies, as measured by total sworn employees, are the focus of § 14141 
investigations.  
 
Figure 6. Share of Municipal Police Departments Subject to § 14141 by Agency Size 
 
 Concerning the data presented in Figure 6; the percentage of municipal police agencies 
categorized by total sworn employees was calculated by multiplying the number of local police 
agencies per category by .98. Since BJS (2015) informs that 98% of local police departments in 
the U.S. serve municipalities, that product was then divided by the total number of municipal 













Municipal Police Agencies by Number of Total Sworn Employees




employees, quantitatively supporting the inference of targeted enforcement by the DOJ. 
Moreover, the application of § 14141 against municipal police agencies appears to concentrate 
among few states; of the N = 33 investigations in this study, 57% were concentrated in just six 
states, as presented in Table 15.  
Table 15 
DOJ Investigation of Municipal Police by State. 
  
State 
# of N = 33 
Investigations 
% of N = 33 
Investigations 
Ohio 7 21% 
California 3 9% 
New York 3 9% 
Florida 2 6% 
Illinois 2 6% 
Pennsylvania 2 6% 
All others 14 43% 
Total 33 100% 
 
Having established that the DOJ targets larger municipal police agencies disproportionate 
to their representation in the general U.S. population, the application of deterrence theory to § 
14141 enforcement suggests that these investigative decisions are intentional ones because of a 
greater societal benefit in reforming a few large municipal police agencies to serve as an 
example for the many smaller municipal police agencies in the United States. Since 
characteristics of large municipal police agencies and their parent jurisdiction differ from smaller 
ones, the following hypothesis was offered and tested: 
• H7: Environmental and organizational characteristics will differ between police 
agencies found to engage in unconstitutional policing, and police agencies without 
such findings. 
 Two variables were conceptualized to represent municipal police agency environmental 




conceptualized to represent organizational characteristics (size – total sworn, and resources – 
sworn per 1,000 population). See Table 16 for summary statistics of these variables for the N = 
33 investigations of municipal police by investigative outcome.   
  
 Results of a two-tailed t-test for two independent means for the variable population 
category did not significant differ by investigative outcome, t(31) = 1.4, p = .17. As well, results 
of a two-tailed t-test for two independent means for the variable percent non-white was not 
significant by investigative outcome, t(31) = .189, p = .85. Results of a two-tailed t-test for 
independent means with unequal variances for the variable size (sworn x 10) significantly 
differed by investigative outcome, t(26) = 2.52, p = .018, and differences in independent means 
with unequal variances for the variable resources (sworn per 1,000) by investigative outcome 
was also statistically significant, t(29) = 2.6, p = .014.  
 Deterrence – economic theory of public enforcement of law as applied to § 14141, when 
viewed through a resource dependence lens suggests that municipal police agencies with fewer 
resources will have more organizational problems due specifically to their reliance on economic 
Table 16 
Means of Environmental and Organizational Variables by Investigative Outcome. 
 
 Negotiated settlement (n = 24) Technical assistance (n = 9) 
  95% CI  95% CI 
Variable M (SD) LL UL M (SD) LL UL 
Population 
category 4.5 (1.96) 3.7 5.3 3.4 (1.51) 2.2 4.6 
Percent non-
white 54.7 (22.46) 45.2 64.2 52.7 (34.3) 26.3 79.1 
Size (sworn 




2.9 (1.24)* 2.5 3.5 2.1 (0.6)* 1.6 2.6 




support from public funding. Therefore, municipal police agencies with less economic support 
should have more institutional and systemic problems. As such, the following hypothesis was 
offered and tested:   
• H8: Municipal police agency resources will be negatively associated with the number 
of scaled findings, controlling for the size of a police department. 
 Since the average number of sworn employees per 1,000-person population is known to 
vary according to the size of a police department and their municipality (BJS, 2015), the size of a 
police agency was used as a control when correlating police resources and total scaled findings. 
A one-tailed Pearson’s partial correlation was conducted to test H8, that a police agency’s 
resources and the number of scaled findings will be negatively associated, controlling for the size 
of a police department. Results indicate these variables were moderately associated and 
statistically significant, however, opposite of the hypothesized relationship, (r = .402, p = .011).   
 These results present a mixed interpretation regarding the conceptualization, 
measurement and application of a dimension of deterrence theory to § 14141 enforcement of 
municipal police. In particular, the partial correlation that resulted in a statistically significant but 
reverse finding calls into question the conceptualization of a resource dependence perspective of 
deterrence for § 14141. This and other results are discussed more fully in the discussion chapter.  
Multiple Streams 
 Problem stream.  
 Applying the multiple streams framework to all N = 33 investigations, and comparing the 
variables from that framework across § 14141 investigative outcomes allowed for an analysis of 
organizational decision-making, and by which variables, if any, that DOJ is influenced. The 




and feedback, all three of which are posited to influence problem recognition, therefore assisting 
in decision-making, and facilitating a problem to influence a policy outcome.  
 Focusing events. 
 The first of the elements in the problem stream are focusing events, in the MS framework 
focusing events are known to bring attention to a problem. As applied to § 14141, focusing 
events should be an indication of highly dysfunctional organizational behavior in municipal 
police. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:   
• H9: Municipal police agencies experiencing a focusing event are more likely to have 
been found to engage in unconstitutional policing than those that have not 
experienced a focusing event.   
 A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to assess H9, that police agencies with a focusing 
event would be more likely to have engaged in unconstitutional policing than municipal police 
agencies that have not experienced a focusing event. This test can be used to determine if two 
dichotomous variables are independent of each other similar to a chi-square test of independence, 
however, since the chi-square test cannot be run on small sample sizes including those with cell 
frequencies less than five (Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, 2014), a Fisher’s exact test is the appropriate 
test of association. Crosstabulations for these two variables are presented in Table 17. The results 
of the one-sided Fisher’s exact test were not statistically significant (p = .37), indicating that 
focusing events and investigative outcome are independent of each other.  
Table 17   
Crosstabs: Focusing Event by Investigative Outcome. 
Outcome Focusing Event Row Totals  
Yes No 
 
Negotiated Settlement  14 10 24 
Technical Assistance 4 5 9 





 Having established that focusing events within the problem stream do not by themselves 
effect the outcome of a policy output (viz., constitutional or unconstitutional policing findings), 
the MS framework suggests that indicators are a second element in the problem stream that may 
influence the policy output. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:  
• H10: Municipal police agencies found to have deficient intervention systems will be 
more likely to engage in unconstitutional policing than municipal police agencies 
without such deficiencies.  
 A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to assess H10, that police agencies found to have 
engaged in unconstitutional policing are more likely to have deficient intervention systems than 
police agencies that have not been found to have engaged in unconstitutional policing. This test 
was used as an alternative to a chi-square test of independence since two cell frequencies have 
fewer than five observations. Crosstabulations for these two variables are presented in Table 18. 
Results of a one-sided Fisher’s exact test were not statistically significant (p = .58), indicating 
that deficient intervention systems, and investigative outcome are independent of each other. 
Table 18   
Crosstabs: Indicators by Investigative Outcome. 
 
Outcome Deficient Indicator System Row Totals  
Yes No 
 
Negotiated Settlement  20 4 24 
Technical Assistance 8 1 9 













 The third individual element in the problem stream is feedback. As an individual 
variable, feedback was tested by investigative outcome to determine its relationship with an 
investigative outcome. In the MS framework, feedback’s influence is typically measured as an 
interaction with focusing events in what Kingdon (1995) refers to as accompaniment, the concept 
of which was tested, and is reported in the next section. Since feedback as a stand-alone variable 
is rarely measured and tested in MS, a specific hypothesis was not offered for the following 
inferential test. However, assessing feedback’s relationship with the investigative outcome was 
critical for subsequent analysis in this dissertation, as such, a Fisher’s exact test was conducted to 
determine if feedback and investigative outcome are independent of each other, the result was not 
significant (p = .23), indicating that feedback and an investigative outcome are independent. 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 19.  
Table 19   
Crosstabs: Feedback by Investigative Outcome. 
 
Outcome Feedback Row Totals  
Yes No 
 
Negotiated Settlement  17 7 24 
Technical Assistance 4 5 9 
Total 21 12 33 
 
 Accompaniment.  
  
 Having established that focusing events alone are insufficient to determine the 
relationship with investigative outcome, the MS framework suggests that the influence of 
feedback along with a focusing event forms a type of accompaniment that can affect a policy 
decision, and therefore a § 14141 outcome. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and 





• H11: Municipal police agencies with associated focusing events are more likely to  
 
have accompaniment in the form of feedback than agencies without focusing events. 
 
 A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to assess H11, that municipal police agencies with 
associated focusing events are more likely to have accompaniment, in the form of feedback from 
the national news media than police agencies without focusing events. Crosstabulations for the 
variables focusing events and feedback are presented in Table 20.  Results of the Fisher’s exact 
test of independence were statistically significant (p = .014), indicating that focusing events and 
feedback are interdependent variables, forming a type of accompaniment.  
Table 20 
Crosstabs: Accompaniment - Focusing Events by Feedback.  
 
Focusing Event Feedback Row Totals  
Yes No 
 
Present* 15 3 18 
Absent* 6 9 15 
Total 21 12 33 
*p < .05    
 Policy stream. 
 The second stream in the MS framework consists of policies that rise to actionable status 
as solutions to problems identified in the problem stream through focusing events, indicators, 
feedback, and accompaniment. To test whether deficient policies are related to investigative 
outcomes, and serve as a root cause of municipal police agency dysfunction, the following 
hypothesis was offered and tested:  
• H12: Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have a greater 
number of policy deficiencies than those under technical assistance.  
 Multiple one-way z-score tests for two population proportions were conducted to test H12, 




policy deficiencies than agencies under technical assistance. The results presented in Table 21 
indicate that by investigative outcome, police agencies under negotiated settlement have a 
significantly higher proportion of deficient policy findings compared to police agencies under 
technical assistance by total (.78) to (.56), z = 2.78, p = .003; for stop, search, and arrest policies 
(.75) to (.33), z = 2.22, p = .013; for response to special populations policies (.50) to (.00), z = 
2.66, p = .004; and for internal discipline policies (.88) to (.56), z = 1.99, p = .023.  
Table 21 
Differences in Deficient Policies by Investigative Outcome. 
 
 Negotiated settlements (n = 24) Technical assistance (n = 9) 
Policy cluster # of agencies with policy cluster 
% of agencies with 
policy cluster 
# of agencies with 
policy cluster 
% of agencies with 
policy cluster 
Use of force 21 88% 9 100% 
Stop, search & arrest 18* 75% 3 33% 
Response to special 
populations 12** 50% 0 0% 
Civilian complaint 
system 21 88% 8 89% 
Internal discipline 21* 88% 5 56% 
Total 93** 78% 25 56% 
*p < .05; **p < .01     
 Having established that the number and type of policy deficiencies are related to 
investigative outcome, to further test the influence of the policy stream on an investigative 
outcome and organizational decision-making, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:  
• H13: The number of deficient policies will be positively associated with the number of 
thematic findings. 
 Three separate one-way Pearson’s r correlations were conducted, one for the study 




thematic findings are positively associated. A Pearson’s r correlation is a measure of association 
between two variables measured at the interval or ratio scale (Laerd, 2016b). Since both the 
number of deficient policies and the number of thematic findings are measured as continuous 
variables, and have a linear relationship, a Pearson’s r is the appropriate test for H13. The results 
indicate that very strong, positive, and statistically significant associations exist between the 
number of policy deficiencies and thematic findings for the N = 33 investigations of municipal 
police, (r = .79, p < .001); the n = 24 police agencies under negotiated settlement, (r = .79, p < 
.001); and the n = 9 police agencies under technical assistance (r = .71, p = .033). 
 Political stream. 
 Administrative turnover. 
 The third, and what Kingdon (1995) argues as the most important of the three streams in 
the MS framework is the political stream. The combination of elements including administrative 
turnover and the national mood exert the most pressure on an issue rising to actionable status, 
effecting a policy output. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and tested:  
• H14: The number of observed § 14141 investigations occurring during the tenure of 
each president will differ from expected observations.   
 A chi-square goodness-of-fit crosstabulation with observed and expected § 14141 
investigations by presidential officeholder is presented in Table 22. This type of test can be used 
when one variable is nominal and there are at least five expected frequencies in each group of the 
nominal variable (Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, 2014). The chi-square goodness-of-fit test is the 
preferable test for H14 because the null assumes that there would not be any differences between 
the number of expected and actual observations of the nominal variable (presidential 




 Since § 14141 spans two of three president’s complete tenure, I calculated the life of § 
14141 for each president by months served in office beginning with initiation of the first § 14141 
investigation. That is, § 14141 was passed in September 1994, with the first investigation 
occurring 28 months into President Clinton’s tenure for a total of 68 months, whereas President’s 
Bush and Obama each served 96 months in office concurrent with §14141. I then calculated an 
expected number of § 14141 investigations of municipal police to compare against actual 
observations to test H14, that administrative turnover effects decision-making as suggested by the 
MS framework. The number of months in office for each president was multiplied by the ratio of 
total municipal police agency investigations (33), to months of presidential tenure (260). An 
expected number of § 14141 investigations during each president’s tenure was then calculated by 
the product of the resultant .13 ratio, and number of months in office. The results of these 
calculations are presented in Table 22. 
Table 22      
Expected and Observed Investigations by president.  
 
President Political Party Months in Office Ratio Expected Observed 
Clinton Democratic 68 .13 9 7 
Bush Republican 96 .13 12 13 
Obama Democratic 96 .13 12 13 
 
 A chi-square goodness-of-fit test was performed to determine whether there were 
differences between the number of expected and observed § 14141 investigations against 
municipal police during the tenure of each president. The results presented in Table 22, indicate 
that the observed and expected number of § 14141 investigations based on the presidential 
officeholder did not significantly differ, (χ2 = 0.611, p = .73).  
 Since administrative turnover as conceptualized by officeholder of the president did not 




turnover was further conceptualized to reflect the political party of the president rather than 
officeholder, since a changeover in party may better reflect a changeover in administrative 
turnover rather than presidential officeholder. As such, the following hypothesis was offered and 
tested: 
• H15: Investigative outcomes will differ between political parties.  
 A Fisher’s exact test was conducted to determine if there were differences in a § 14141 
investigative outcome based on the political party of the president when aggregated. Significant 
differences were found (p < .001), indicating that political party, and category of § 14141 
investigative outcome are interdependent. See Table 23 for summary statistics. 
Table 23    
Political Party and Investigative Outcome. 
 
Political Party Negotiated Settlement 
Technical 
Assistance Row Totals 
Democratic*** 19 1 20 
Republican*** 5 8 13 
Total 24 9 33 
***p < .001    
  
 National mood.  
 The MS framework posits that the combination of administrative turnover and the 
national mood exert the strongest influence within the political stream – and the political stream 
is powerful enough influence agenda-setting and organizational decision-making because of the 
power of the presidency. As applied to § 14141, the combination of the national mood and 
administrative turnover were calculated to identify over-time changes in the public’s positive 
attitude towards the police, and contrasted with presidential turnover.  
 From 1994 through 2017, the national mood related to attitude towards the police was 
more positive than average positive for 12 years, and less positive than average positive for 12 




negotiated settlement, and six investigations leading to technical assistance. In contrast, the 12 
years in which the national mood was less positive than average, 10 § 14141 investigations were 
initiated leading to a negotiated settlement, and three investigations were initiated leading to 
technical assistance. Since the national mood data reflect over-time changes, a more instructive 
presentation of these data can be found in Figure 7, visually presenting the N = 33 investigations, 
national mood, and average positive national mood, suggesting that a relationship between the 
national mood, political leadership, and the initiation of § 14141 investigations existed through 
the provision’s life-course.  
 
Figure 7. National Mood and Number of § 14141 Investigations: 1994-2017 
 The influence of both the national mood and administrative turnover on § 14141 
decision-making becomes more discernable when viewed only as the n = 24 negotiated 
settlements, disaggregated by president, since this investigative outcome is indicative of 
unconstitutional policing, hence, more serious systemic misconduct. As indicated in Figure 8, 
































































































negotiated settlement appear to mirror the national mood, and are aligned with changes in 
presidential leadership during the following terms: Clinton, 1994-2001; Bush, 2001-2009; 
Obama, 2009-2017.5 
 From the passage of § 14141 until the year 2000, the positive national mood toward the 
police was less than average positive compared over the life-course of § 14141. This time period 
saw the initiation of five investigations, all of which led to a negotiated settlement. The year 
2000 coincided with the election of George W. Bush to the Presidency, and the first time over 
the life-course of § 14141 where the positive national mood in attitude toward the police was 
higher than historic average, with that trend continuing through 2006. During this time period, 11 
§ 14141 investigations were initiated, five of which resulted in technical assistance, coinciding 
with the § 14141 life-course historical peak positive support for the police.   
 During the final two full years of the Bush Presidency, 2007-2008, four new § 14141 
investigations were initiated, three of which resulted in technical assistance. These two years 
corresponded to a drop in the positive mood from historic average towards police to lower than 
historic average at 42% and 45% positive. A changeover in administrations occurred in early 
2009 from President Bush to President Obama. During the Obama Administration, 13 new § 
14141 investigations of municipal police were conducted, one of which resulted in technical 
assistance. During the first four years of the Obama Administration the national mood towards 
the police was above historic positive, yet, this time period accounted for 9 of the 13 
investigations of municipal police during the entire Obama Presidency, including a spike of 
investigations by the DOJ occurring in 2011. In 2014, the national mood towards police was at 
                                                 
5 The term of the president begins on January 20th. As such, the final year of the three presidential terms do not 
reflect the entire calendar year. Accordingly, calculations for the number of § 14141 investigations reflect full years 




its second-lowest throughout the life-course of § 14141. The only year in which the mood 
towards the police was less positive was in 1994, the year § 14141 was passed into law.  
 
 
Figure 8. National Mood and Negotiated Settlements, 1994-2017 
 To better determine the combined influence that the national mood and presidential 
administration have on DOJ decision-making related to § 14141 enforcement, three separate 
correlations were conducted6 which included two point-biserial correlations and one Pearson’s r 
correlation. A point-biserial correlation is used when one variable is measured on a continuous 
scale and the other is dichotomous (Laerd, 2016c). The results of the first point-biserial between 
the national mood, and political party of the president found a moderate, positive, marginal, but 
non-statistically significant relationship, (rpb = .395, p = .062). A second point-biserial 
                                                 
6 Data from the year 2017 were excluded from these analyses since a new president was inaugurated on January 20th, 
2017, and the purpose of these analyses were to identify the over-time interaction between elements in the political 
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correlation was run between the political party of the president and the number of § 14141 
investigations, wherein a weak, positive, non-statistically significant relationship was found, (rpb 
= .118, p = .590). Finally, a Pearson’s correlation was run on the number of investigations and 
national mood wherein a weak, positive, non-statistically significant relationship was found, (r = 
.268, p = .216). 
 A summary of all hypotheses tested, and their results can be found in Appendix G. 
Binary Logistic Regression 
 A binary logistic regression was conducted using select variables from the MS and 
deterrence framework to better understand, and predict how the DOJ identified a specific 
municipal police agency engaged in unconstitutional policing. This type of regression is used 
when a researcher wants to predict the probability that an observation falls into one of two 
categories based on one or more categorical independent variables (Laerd, 2015). Since the 
dependent variable being tested is binomial, and the independent variables have been dummy 
coded categorically, a binomial regression is the most appropriate inferential test to determine 
which independent variable(s) best predict an outcome of unconstitutional policing. Variables 
from disjointed incrementalism were intentionally excluded since as applied in this study, 
disjointed incrementalism was used to identify, explore, and explain over-time changes in § 
14141 investigative findings, and changes in productivity and investigative efficiency throughout 
the provision’s life-course. Implicit in this application is that a decision to conduct a § 14141 
investigation by the DOJ has already been made. As such, deterrence and MS, as applied, are 
used in an attempt to explore and explain how the DOJ made their decision regarding which 




 Since the study population consisted of just 33 cases, all independent variables could not 
be used in one predictive model. Although it falls below the events per variable (EPV) “rule of 
thumb” of 10 events for the smaller of the two outcomes per independent variable (Austin & 
Steyerberg, 2017), scholars have argued that between five and nine independent variables per 
event can also produce valid results when properly constructed (Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 
2007). Using the above described rationale, there was a need to identify the fewest independent 
variables to stay within an acceptable EPV ratio considering the smaller of two outcomes was the 
n = 9 municipal police agencies under technical assistance.   
 Based on the need to reduce the number of variables to create a workable and valid 
regression model, purposeful variable selection (Bursac, Gauss, Williams, & Hosmer, 2008) was 
conducted in two analytical phases: First, phi coefficients were run between all independent 
variables to identify those with significant relationships, see Appendix D, with the objective of 
teasing out binary combinations with a coefficient of a ϕ > .50.  
 Using the described analytic technique, 19 combinations of binary variables were found 
to be significant at p < .05, and in two of those combinations the ϕ > .50 threshold was violated. 
The relationship between the policy stream independent variable civilian complaint systems and 
problem stream independent variable indicators was very highly correlated, (ϕ = .879, p < .001). 
Moreover, two policy stream independent variables, civilian complaint systems and use of force 
were found to be moderately correlated, but above the established threshold, (ϕ = .528, p < .01). 
No other binary independent variables met or exceeded the established threshold. This 
information was used to assist in independent variable model inclusion after completion of the 




 Following the first phase, the four deterrence-supported independent variables, 
percentage non-white, size, resources, and population group were reviewed for previous 
inferential testing where the independent variable and investigative outcome had a statistically 
significant relationship. Two of the four independent variables from the deterrence framework, 
size, and resources, were found to significantly differ by investigative outcome at p < .05 in 
previously run independent samples t-tests, as such, both were considered for model inclusion. 
  Inferential tests by investigative outcome were reviewed from each of the three streams 
to identify the most appropriate variable for model inclusion. Although all three variables in the 
problem stream were not significantly related to the investigative outcome, the third variable in 
the problem stream, feedback, had the lowest p value of the three; focusing events, (p = .37), 
indicators, (p = .58), and feedback, (p = .23). Moreover, the variable feedback was significantly 
related to focusing events, yet below the established maximum threshold for model inclusion (ϕ = 
.449, p < .01). As well, the variables feedback and focusing events were significantly related, 
acceding to the interdependence of the MS concept accompaniment (Fisher’s exact, p = .014). As 
such, the variable feedback was considered for model inclusion, whereas the two other problem 
stream variables, focusing events and indicators, were excluded from consideration. Within the 
policy stream, three independent variables, measured as policy clusters, significantly related to 
the investigative outcome, these included: Stop, search, and arrest; response to special 
populations; and, internal discipline. As such, all three variables were initially considered for 
model inclusion. Within the political stream, only Presidential party was inferentially tested 
against the dependent variable, however, since this variable was also found to have a statistically 
significant relationship by investigative outcome, it was the only one of the political stream 




 The candidate variables for selection were then analyzed and compared to each other 
with phi coefficients. Since the deterrence variable size, had a significant phi correlation with 
two other deterrence variables, percent non-white (ϕ = .389, p < .05), and resources (ϕ = .344, p 
< .05), whereas the variable resources was significantly correlated with only the variable, size (ϕ 
=.344, p < .05), size was selected as the most fitting and best representative deterrence-supported 
variable for the binary regression.  
 Of the three statistically significant independent variables by investigative outcome in the 
policy stream, the response to special populations policy cluster variable was excluded from 
consideration because of a lack of variation in the distribution of the outcome, that is, 12 
agencies under negotiated settlement had this deficiency, whereas there were none under 
technical assistance: This lack of an affirmative outcome for one of the binary options proved 
inappropriate for the regression model. The other two significant variables; stop, search, and 
arrest policies, and internal discipline system policies were both included in the model. The 
variable stop, search, and arrest was significantly correlated to response to special populations, 
(ϕ = .440, p < .05), and the variable internal discipline system was significantly correlated to the 
variable use of force, (ϕ = .352, p < .05), as well as significantly correlated with civilian 
complaint system, (ϕ = .489, p < .01). Since two variables in the policy stream accounted for 
significant relationships with the other variables in the policy stream but did not violate the ϕ > 
.50 threshold, it was decided to include both variables in the model since they best represent the 
entire influence of the policy stream for the regression model.   
 Using the described analytical strategy and methodology, five independent variables were 
selected for initial model inclusion. This produced a final yield of events per variable of less than 




for model validity; noting that an EPV of less than 5:1 consistently produces problems in logistic 
regression models (Vittinghoff & McCulloch, 2007).  
 As a workaround to the low EPV, I chose to run a backward-stepwise-Wald binary 
logistic regression including the five independent variables: size; feedback; stop, search, and 
arrest; internal discipline system; and Presidential party to identify which of the purposefully 
chosen MS, and deterrence-supported variables, or combination of two, best predict a § 14141 
investigative outcome. Conducting this type of stepwise regression eliminated each independent 
variable that did not contribute to the significance of regression model based on the Wald chi-
square statistic. Running the analysis with all five independent variables, and eliminating each 
using this technique allowed the regression to identify the fewest independent variables 
necessary while maintaining model significance. This technique produced five regression 
iterations with the best fitting model including only one independent variable – Presidential 
party. The one-variable model was found to be statistically significant over the null, χ2 (1, N = 
33) = 13.409, p < .001, and explained 48% (Nagelkerke R2) of the variance in the dependent 
variable, operationalized by investigative outcome as unconstitutional policing. As well, this 
model correctly classified 89% of technical assistance outcomes, and 79% of negotiated 
settlement outcomes for an overall successful classification rate of 82%. Of the five predictor 
variables in the first model, only Presidential party significantly contributed to the model’s 
overall significance throughout the five regression iterations resulting in a final EPV ratio of 9:1; 
this was in keeping with Vittinghoff and McCulloch’s (2007) recommendation of maintaining a 
minimum EPV of between 5:1 and 9:1 to ensure model validity when using the purposeful 
variable selection method. All summary statistics for the five iterations of backward-stepwise 




 Deriving the probability of an investigative outcome based on the regression model 
produced the following probabilities: When the president is a Democrat and there is a § 14141 
investigative outcome, there is a .95 probability that the outcome will be a finding of 
unconstitutional policing (negotiated settlement). In contrast, when the president is a Republican 
and there is a §14141 investigative outcome, there is a .39 probability that the outcome will be a 
finding of unconstitutional policing (negotiated settlement).  These probabilities were derived 
using the following formulas: (1) odds equation, (2) probability equation, (3) probability of 
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𝑝𝑝 = 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
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Backwards Stepwise Logistic Regression Predicting an Outcome of Unconstitutional Policing. 
 
        95% CI 
 Variable Model B SE Wald df OR LL UL 
Iteration 1          
 Size  1.205 1.162 1.076 1 3.337 .342 32.539 
 Feedback  -.047 1.186 .002 1 .954 .093 9.751 
 Stop, search, & arrest  1.646 1.175 1.963 1 5.187 .519 51.858 
 Internal discipline  .969 1.316 .542 1 2.634 .200 34.724 
 Presidential party  -2.886 1.289 5.012* 1 .056 .004 .698 
 Constant  .543 1.790 .092 1 1.721   
 χ2 17.557**        
 df 5        
 Nagelkerke R2 .598        
Iteration 2          
 Size  1.208 1.161 1.082 1 3.345 .344 32.561 
 Stop, search, & arrest  1.636 1.149 2.030 1 5.137 .541 48.795 
 Internal discipline  .959 1.290 .552 1 2.609 .208 32.712 
 Presidential party  -2.874 1.248 5.300* 1 .056 .005 .652 
 Constant  .519 1.680 .095 1 1.680   
 χ2 17.555**        
 df 4        
 Nagelkerke R2 .598        
Iteration 3          
 Size  1.334 1.145 1.356 1 3.795 .402 35.814 
 Stop, search, & arrest  1.529 1.099 1.935 1 4.611 .535 39.744 
 Presidential party  -3.001 1.245 5.807* 1 .050 .004 .571 
 Constant  1.324 1.258 1.108 1 3.758   
 χ2 16.990**        
 df 3        
 Nagelkerke R2 .583        
Iteration 4          
 Stop, search, & arrest  1.515 1.057 2.054 1 4.549 .573 36.112 
 Presidential party  -3.264 1.212 7.255** 1 .038 .004 .411 
 Constant  2.031 1.143 3.161 1 7.625   
 χ2 15.576***        
 df 2        
 Nagelkerke R2 .545        
Iteration 5          
 Presidential party  -3.414 1.174 8.463** 1 .033 .003 .328 
 Constant  2.944 1.026 8.236 1 19.000   
 χ2 13.409***        
 df 1        
 Nagelkerke R2 .484        





Thematic Analysis - Interpretation 
• RQ2: What patterns or practices does DOJ find contribute to unconstitutional policing?  
 Although the differences in proportions of total themes by investigative outcome was not 
significant, when individually disaggregated, differences in proportions for two of the eight 
themes by investigative outcome were statistically significant. These differences, as well as an 
analysis of differences in proportions at the subtheme level by investigative outcome, provide 
insight into the contours of unconstitutional policing, its symptoms, causes, and how the 
interpretation of patterns or practices of systemic police dysfunction and misconduct influence 
DOJ’s decision-making regarding the constitutionality of police action.  
 Of the eight themes analyzed, most prevalent among the N = 33 investigations of 
municipal police was a lack of professional currency. In 97% of the § 14141 investigations there 
was at a minimum, sufficient cause to believe that a municipal police agency suffered from 
failures to adhere to generally accepted practices within the policing profession, including any or 
all of the following; failing to maintain standards in systems, practices, and policies; 
inappropriately selecting personnel for assignment; or a failure to adhere to the police 
profession’s best practices. The mere fact that the DOJ identified at least one of these subthemes 
as systemic failures in every investigation, but one, suggests that a lack of professional currency 
is both a cause, and symptom of a poorly performing police agency at risk of engaging, or 
engaged in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. Put another way, a lack of 
professional currency may not differentiate municipal police agencies that have been found to 
engage in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing from agencies where the DOJ made 




very well differentiate poorly performing municipal police agencies from better performing 
police agencies in the global population of municipal police under the jurisdiction of the DOJ.  
 This interpretation is supported by the fact that at the thematic level, there were no 
significant differences in proportions of municipal police agencies exhibiting symptoms of a lack 
of professional currency by investigative outcome. There was, however, an unexpected 
difference in proportions at the subtheme level. The failure to adhere to best practices subtheme 
significantly differed for police agencies by investigative outcome opposite of the hypothesized 
relationship. This difference was unexpected, and the following three plausible explanations are 
offered; (a) adhering to best practices does not necessarily shield a municipal police agency from 
unconstitutional policing practices, (b) the DOJ’s orientation towards certain police agencies 
under § 14141 is reflective of assisting an agency with appropriate reform, rather than 
compelling agency change through force of law. This carrot-and-stick approach is indicative of a 
bias embedded in DOJ’s findings letters, consequently, investigative outcomes reflect this bias, 
since a finding of a pattern or practice of a failure to adhere to best practices may not by itself 
elicit an unconstitutional policing finding by the DOJ, yet, other pattern or practices could. 
Finally, (3) my interpretation of DOJ’s findings letters lacked reliability. Of the three 
explanations offered, I believe a combination of both (a) and (b) to be the most strongly 
supported.  
 The rationale for this interpretation is that in adhering to certain best practices, if poorly 
constructed, or through the misapplication of a law, rule, or policy, would not ensure a lack of 
misconduct or prevent unconstitutional policing. Normalized police conduct, and common police 
practices can still produce differential outcomes when inappropriately applied. These outcomes 




policing, such as in the Investigation of the Newark Police Department (DOJ, 2014), thereby 
negating any benefit of adhering to best practices. 
 Concerning the second explanation, when the outcome of a § 14141 investigation led to 
technical assistance, DOJ’s findings letters reflected a more conciliatory, and cooperative tone 
than findings letters issued to police agencies subject to a negotiated settlement; an example from 
a technical assistance letter:  
As an initial matter, we would like to thank you…for the considerable cooperation and 
assistance we have received since the beginning of our investigation. We appreciate the 
City’s commitment to improving police practices in Portland, and we commend the 
PPD’s willingness to review, analyze, and revise its policies and procedures as needed. 
(Brown Cutlar, 2003, p. 1).  
Contrasting the tone of a negotiated settlement: 
The NOPD has long been a troubled agency. Basic elements of effective policing – clear 
policies, training, accountability, and confidence of the citizenry – have been absent for 
years. Far too often, officers show a lack of respect for the civil rights and dignity of the 
people of New Orleans. (DOJ, 2011, p. vi) 
 By directing a municipal police agency towards best practices, the DOJ is leading an 
agency towards learning and self-improvement that the agency may not have otherwise 
considered. Moreover, through an agreement to adhere to professional best practices, the DOJ is 
endorsing specific policies and practices as meaningful and appropriate mechanisms within the 
profession. However, this does not speak to how a police agency implements, or applies those 
best practices. Municipal police agency failure to properly implement best practices can 




this possibility, three municipal police agencies among the N = 33 were the subject of two 
discrete § 14141 investigations, with all three secondary § 14141 investigations reflecting a 
failure to fully implement previous agreed-upon reforms (DOJ, 2011; Gupta & Dettelbach, 2014; 
Perez, 2013).  
 The third possible explanation for this result relates to reliability of my interpretation of 
the qualitative data. For two distinct reasons I believe this is the least likely explanation of the 
three offered. First, in conducting this research, I strictly adhered to established protocols for 
thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and sought to meet all the trustworthiness criteria as 
established in previous research (Nowell, et al., 2017). Second, among the themes and subthemes 
analyzed, the failure to adhere to best practices was among the richest, most detailed, and 
manifest of § 14141 reported findings. While much of the thematic analysis relied heavily on 
interpretation, the failure to adhere to best practices was frequently explicitly stated, therefore, 
could be more objectively identified. An example: “It is apparent that officers have not received 
guidance nor have been trained on well-established best practices [emphasis added] for police 
interactions with juveniles” (DOJ, 2016, p. 78). As such, both an emphasis on misapplied best 
practices, and DOJ investigative bias best explain the results opposite of the stated hypothesis.  
 Institutionalization, and organizational myopia were two themes that characterized a very 
high percentage of municipal police agencies, 85% the former and 82% the latter. These findings 
suggest that municipal police agencies investigated under § 14141 suffered from issues related to 
internal partiality, misaligned policies and practices, inwardness, short-term thinking, and 
conflicts of interest. These attributes did not appear to be root causes or effects of 
unconstitutional policing practices, but through their embeddedness in a police agency, allow 




 This interpretation is based off two interrelated factors. First, both themes 
institutionalization, and organizational myopia characterized more municipal police agencies 
than any other but for a lack of professional currency, yet there were no significant differences in 
proportion of police agencies with either of these themes by investigative outcome. Second, 
unlike a lack of professional currency, there were no significant differences for 
institutionalization, or organizational myopia at the subtheme level in either direction. This 
suggests that by investigative outcome, neither institutionalization, nor organizational myopia are 
specifically associated with unconstitutional policing practices after a municipal police agency 
has been selected for § 14141 investigation. Rather, organizational problems associated with 
institutionalization, and organizational myopia appear to be deeply embedded in many troubled 
municipal police agencies, and although they are undifferentiated by investigative outcome, they 
may very well be the manifestation of problematic organizational attributes that bring a troubled 
municipal police agency to the attention of the DOJ for initial § 14141 investigation.  
 The theme tactical discretion, weapon competency, and equipment insufficiencies was 
the fourth most common finding with 76% of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police 
exhibiting related systemic problems. Differences in the proportions of police agencies with this 
finding at the thematic, and subthematic level did not differ based on investigative outcome. 
Noteworthy, however, at the subtheme level, 67% of municipal police agencies under negotiated 
settlement were found to have utilized inappropriate tactical discretion compared to 44% for 
agencies under technical assistance. While these differences were not statistically significant, 
they are meaningful nonetheless. Tactical discretion is closely tied to the use of force and 
discretion, that is, choices that police officers make regarding the appropriateness of coercive 




unconstitutional forms of policing when inappropriately applied by individual police officers, 
however, the DOJ differentiates acts of unconstitutional policing committed by individual 
officers, and those acts that rise to the subjective level of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional 
policing. It is my interpretation then that the proportion of municipal police agencies with this 
subthematic finding were not specifically found to engage in unconstitutional policing on a 
systemic level, but through officer use of inappropriate tactics, and the application of poor 
discretion, engaged in individual acts of unconstitutional policing. The aggregation of these acts 
assisted in differentiating municipal police agencies found to engage in unconstitutional policing 
from investigations where no such conclusion was made.  
 Both themes – conditions of ambiguity, and leadership and management failure – did not 
have any subthemes, and as appropriate, were analyzed by proportions only at the thematic level 
wherein no statistically significant differences were found by investigative outcome. Even with 
this result, a qualitative interpretation of these two themes suggests they both relate to overall 
municipal police agency dysfunctionality. The role they play in that dysfunction has been 
interpreted in the following way.  
 It is possible that conditions of ambiguity in policing are the result of the opaque nature 
of the profession. That is, policework is comprised of, and police officers must respond to, a 
wide-array of scenarios that may be unpredictable, chaotic, mutable, and disorganized. In such 
scenarios a reliance on common sense and good judgement may guide officer conduct more 
effectively than a policy or procedure. Simply put, no police department can have a policy or 
procedure for every situation that an officer or police organization will encounter. Perhaps then, 
conditions of ambiguity are an embedded aspect of the profession. Alternatively, the conditions 




which well-functioning, and properly led municipal police agencies should have had appropriate 
guidelines and clarity for their officers, the failure of which to provide officers with is a 
symptom of a poorly run police department. It is this latter explanation that I find more valid 
based on my research, subsequent analysis, and interpretation.  
 This line of reasoning then points to a cause of conditions of ambiguity – the failure of 
leadership and management. Vision, clarity, direction, and efficiency should be characteristics 
that effective police leadership instills within their organization; by extension, conditions of 
ambiguity are then a symptom of a poorly led, and ineffectively managed police agency. Since 
not all police agencies that exhibited conditions of ambiguity also had findings of leadership and 
management failure, my interpretation is based on a qualitative understanding of these themes, 
and how they apply to the content and interpretation of DOJ’s findings. To the extent that 
conditions of ambiguity in § 14141 findings were more symptomatic of municipal police 
agencies with leadership deficiencies, than conditions of ambiguity were symptomatic of the 
opaqueness of policework, suggests that leadership deficiencies are a primary cause of 
conditions of ambiguity. 
 As an example of the connection between leadership failure and conditions of ambiguity, 
scholars of police leadership have noted that agency dysfunction and mismanagement are often 
attributed to unclear goals and objectives, poor command and control, a lack of accountability, 
and ineffective and unclear communication (Dias & Vaughn, 2006); attributes at the root of 
conditions of ambiguity. Moreover, poor police leadership is identified as a “recurrent factor in 
organizational failures” (Schafer, 2010, p. 738). By extension, deficient leadership is more 
relevant to conditions of ambiguity than the opaqueness of policework, since a failure of 




such, conditions of ambiguity are directly tied into leadership and management failure even 
when that leadership failure is a residual of a past leadership and management deficiency.  
 Of the eight themes analyzed, both organizational orientation and culture, and routinized 
misconduct were the only two that significantly differed in proportions by investigative outcome. 
The theme organizational orientation and culture had two subthemes, however, only the 
prevailing cultural view subtheme statistically differed by investigative outcome. Upon further 
analysis, it became clear that the DOJ identified the culture of an organization as a contributing 
factor in few and select pattern or practice investigations of unconstitutional policing. This is a 
reasonable, and in all likelihood, strategic decision by the DOJ considering that during the course 
of a § 14141 investigation, the DOJ is attempting to legally justify a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing. To that end, the culture of an organization may be more difficult to 
assess, and develop necessary reasonable cause to believe that a pattern or practice of 
unconstitutional policing is occurring, than an objective numerically based analysis of deficient 
policies, procedures, and systems. Indeed, organizational culture is characterized as “the climate 
and practices that organizations develop around their handling of people, or to the espoused 
values and credo of an organization” (Schein, 2016, p. 302), defined this way, organizational 
culture is very difficult to empirically measure under § 14141.  
 The prevailing cultural view of a municipal police department was identified to be a root 
cause of unconstitutional policing in some, but among the most egregious and highly detailed § 
14141 investigations, including the following municipal police departments: Albuquerque, 
Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Ferguson, New Orleans, Newark, Portland (Oregon), and 
Yonkers. Indeed, no municipal police agencies under technical assistance had this finding, and 




had one other distinctive commonality – they were all second-generation, suggestive of a DOJ 
orientation towards seeking to reform municipal police agencies for systems, practices, policies, 
and culture – specifically during the second half of the life-course of § 14141. Thus, reflecting 
DOJ’s position in their over-time enforcement of § 14141 that their “priorities change over time 
as the Division is responsive to contemporary issues in policing and the law” (DOJ, 2017a, p. 6). 
Concerning over-time enforcement of § 14141 against municipal police, it is apparent that 
reforming a deeply-embedded culture within police agencies was a priority in the second-half of 
§ 14141 enforcement with what was viewed as a primary cause of unconstitutional policing.  
 The second subtheme of organizational orientation and culture was an orientation 
towards enforcement, arrests, and officer activity. Although four municipal police agencies under 
negotiated settlement had findings indicative of this orientation compared to none under 
technical assistance, the difference in proportions by investigative outcome was not significant. 
This result is interpreted in the following three ways, (a) it supports the importance of the 
subtheme prevailing cultural view as attributable to unconstitutional policing practices, (b) since 
all four of these police agencies had more than the mean number of total findings, and were 
investigated during the second-half of the second-generation of § 14141 investigations, it 
supports the previous conclusion that the DOJ sought out more complex and intricate systemic 
police agency problems later in the life of §14141 whereby attributing unconstitutional policing 
causes to culture, and (c) a larger study population would be more helpful in determining how 
this attribute of organizational orientation and culture can lead to unconstitutional policing, as the 





 The proportions of municipal police agencies with the theme routinized misconduct 
significantly differed by investigative outcome. Moreover, routinized misconduct has four 
discrete subthemes, three of which were found to significantly differ by investigative outcome. 
In two of the three routinized misconduct subthemes that significantly differed by investigative 
outcome – biased-based policing, and unjustified enforcement actions – no municipal police 
agencies under technical assistance had any such findings, suggesting that these two subthemes 
were critical to the differentiation of municipal police agencies with widespread unconstitutional 
policing and generalized misconduct from those with systemic problems not rising to a pattern or 
practice of unconstitutional policing in most, but not all § 14141 investigations.  
 For the abuse of authority subtheme, just two of the n = 9 agencies had such findings 
while 16 of the n = 24 police agencies had this finding, suggestive of a widespread tolerance for 
abusive police behavior that is an effect of unconstitutional policing. This inference is further 
supported since the final subtheme in routinized misconduct – cultural deviation – was the only 
one in which no significant differences were found in proportions by investigative outcome. 
There are two takeaways here; (a) since the subtheme cultural deviation was found to be 
applicable more to subgroup behavior rather than organizational behavior, this supports the other 
three routinized misconduct subthemes and their contributions to widespread unconstitutional 
policing practices, and (b) cultural deviation when widespread and organizational rather than 
embedded within a subgroup, better reflects the theme organizational orientation and culture. 
 There are other analyses and interpretations which speak to the importance of routinized 
misconduct as highly influential to a finding of unconstitutional policing. Indeed, routinized 
misconduct findings were associated with municipal police agencies in which DOJ findings 




interpretation. First, beginning in 2002, the DOJ appeared to move away from negotiated 
settlements as a method of enforcement against municipal police, preferring to engage in a 
collaborative approach towards reform. This interpretation is evinced by the data which informs 
that all n = 9 investigations resulting in technical assistance commenced between 2002-2009, 
while just four of the n = 24 investigations resulting in a negotiated settlement were initiated 
during that same timeframe. 
  Second, the transition in emphasis away from findings of routinized misconduct 
facilitated investigative outcomes that allowed for technical assistance in lieu of a negotiated 
settlement. It is possible this was an intentional choice as these transitions coincide with the 
changeover in presidential administration from Clinton to Bush, and Bush to Obama, as well as 
by political party, Democrat to Republican and Republican to Democrat. These facts support 
Kingdon’s (1995) contention that administrative turnover in the political stream exerts a 
powerful influence on the agenda. Taken together, this could suggest that seeking out routinized 
misconduct in municipal police departments was the orientation for early § 14141 investigations, 
and for some of the more recent. Moreover, avoiding a finding of routinized misconduct could be 
argued as necessary to obviate a negotiated settlement for technical assistance – reflecting the 
influence of political preference in the enforcement of § 14141 against municipal police.  
Disjointed Incrementalism - Interpretation 
• RQ3: Have DOJ’s pattern or practice investigations changed over-time?  
 The application of § 14141 authority by the DOJ over the life-course of the law is 
indicative of disjointed incrementalism in a number of ways including; changes in the number of 
thematic findings per investigation, length, complexity and nuance of the output, and variations 




 Between the two generations of investigations, the average number of total scaled 
findings per year increased from five to 13, reflecting changes in productivity, while the length 
of a § 14141 investigation remained the same, the combination of these two variables reflects 
increases in investigative efficiency. Indeed, as predicted in H3, the output between first and 
second-generation investigations significantly increased for the entire N = 33 study population, 
and n = 24 negotiated settlements, while the output for the n = 9 technical assistance letters 
remained the same, reflecting the prioritization of one investigative outcome over the other. It is 
not just that DOJ’s output increased in length, a qualitative interpretation reveals changes in 
complexity, nuance, and depth of analysis. Moreover, as predicted in H6, second-generation 
investigations were more closely associated with addressing issues related to police culture, 
criminal misconduct, unnecessary use of weapons, and poor tactical decisions, in addition to 
leadership deficiencies as causes and effects of unconstitutional policing practices contrasted to 
first-generation investigations.  
 Along with these expected changes, there were unexpected results as well. The 
hypothesized relationship between an increase in the variable length of an investigation between 
first and second-generations, as predicted in H4, was not statistically significant. The mean of 
this variable remained remarkably similar for all N = 33 investigations when aggregated and 
compared between both generations. Additionally, when disaggregated both by investigative 
outcome and generation, there was a non-significant decrease in the length of investigation for 
negotiated settlements, and a non-significant increase in the length of an investigation for those 
resulting in technical assistance.  
 To the first result; although not a significant decrease in investigation length, this result 




One possibility for non-significance is that for this test there were variables which were 
unaccounted for that mitigated the influence of the downward trend. Concerning the second 
result; although close to statistical significance opposite of the hypothesized relationship, this 
result supports other interpretations and conclusions in this dissertation, specifically, that the 
DOJ deprioritized their use of technical assistance as a tool of § 14141 in lieu of greater 
enforcement under negotiated settlements during the second half of second-generation 
investigations. That is to say, technical assistance cases during the second-generation of § 14141 
were not prioritized by the DOJ relative to investigating and uncovering more serious patterns or 
practices of organizational police behavior that in the aggregate, were believed to be 
unconstitutional. 
  Moreover, investigations of larger police departments were prioritized during the 
second-generation of § 14141 investigations leading to technical assistance, and this is supported 
by the opposite, but marginally non-significant finding related to length of investigation for those 
police agencies. As an example, of the four investigations resulting in technical assistance, the 
two agencies from the smaller jurisdictions, Lorain and Harvey, had § 14141 investigations 
lasting more than three years, whereas the two agencies from the larger jurisdictions, Austin and 
Inglewood, had investigations lasting 19 months the former, and nine months for the latter 
agency. These results support the inference that differences in length of investigations reflect 
DOJ priorities in § 14141 enforcement of larger, and more complex agencies with an emphasis 
towards findings of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing and reforming larger police 
agencies.   
  To the non-significant finding in H4 for the entire study population, it is my speculation 




completion of a § 14141 investigation within a specific timeframe. This supposition is based off 
my interpretation of the data, professional experience, and knowledge of general investigative 
procedures whereby investigators are required to follow standardized internal protocols including 
adhering to pre-specified timelines. Disjointed incrementalism then, without considering any 
other variables in H4, appears to offer an incomplete explanation of length of investigation and 
over-time changes as operationalized. I considered these as possible complicating factors when 
constructing this hypothesis, and as a result of that reasoning, offered the next hypothesis, H5, to 
bring in the size of a police department as a control. By controlling for the number of sworn 
employees, and correlating for findings, it was believed that disjointed incrementalism would 
more clearly be revealed. Consider; if the length of an investigation experienced no changes over 
the two generations, but the output had become longer, more complex, and nuanced, then 
disjointed incrementalism should be revealed through changes in variables such as the number 
and types of findings, in addition to output productivity. This should then be revealed more 
clearly holding the size of a municipal police department constant. 
 The result of this partial correlation was marginal, but not statistically significant for the 
entire study population and negotiated settlements, but significant for agencies under technical 
assistance. Even with these mixed results, there is meaningful information here. The direction of 
the relationship between length of investigation and number of scaled findings was accurate, and 
this I believe speaks to DOJ’s productivity and efficiency. Yet the deficiency of H5, is what is 
unknown regarding the cooperation that existed between a municipal police agency and the DOJ; 
information which was not regularly recorded in § 14141 findings letters, and as such, went 
unaccounted for. Exceptions to this qualitative information existed in one notable investigation. 




that the city did not cooperate, or fulfill requests for information, data, or records (Perez, 2012). 
This lack of cooperation had two meaningful consequences: First, the City of Meridian Police 
Department was the only municipal police agency found not to suffer from a lack of professional 
currency. Second, this investigation lasted just eight months – from commencement to issuance 
of DOJ’s investigative findings letter – the third shortest investigation of the N = 33.  
 When considering the implications of the result of the marginally, but not statistically 
significant partial correlation from H5, for the study population and significant relationship for 
agencies under technical assistance, along with the results of the Meridian investigation, two 
meaningful inferences can be drawn. First, for the DOJ to make a finding related to the 
appropriateness of a municipal police department’s systems, procedures, practices, and policies, 
the DOJ requires access and cooperation of the police agency under investigation. Second, 
cooperation with an investigation, and the length of investigation may be related, evinced 
through the Meridian investigation being the third shortest of all the § 14141 investigations. Yet, 
it is unknown if the opposite is true, that greater cooperation between organizations equates 
longer investigations, as it is unknown which agencies cooperated with a § 14141 investigation, 
or what the optimal municipal police agency cooperation to investigation relationship is. The 
meaningfulness of this marginally statistically significant result then is that investigation length, 
agency cooperation, and the number of scaled findings may be related. Such that when 
controlling for the size of a municipal police department, the relationship between the length of 
an investigation, and number of scaled findings may reflect a previously unknown, and currently 
unaccounted for variable – cooperation between agencies.   
 The final hypothesis of research question three, H6, predicted that investigative findings 




were found between first and second-generation § 14141 investigative findings by total, and in 
six of the 20 scaled themes, all of which were present in greater proportions for second-
generation investigations. The interpretation of this finding is twofold: First, for second-
generation investigations, DOJ was seeking out, and identifying a greater number of systemic 
deficiencies within municipal police agencies. Second, during second-generation investigations, 
the DOJ was also seeking to address and define systemic problems differently from first-
generation investigations. In particular, the DOJ identified problems with municipal police 
agencies in second-generation investigations related to police culture, routinized misconduct, 
weapon competency, and failures of leadership to a greater extent than during first-generation 
investigations. These findings reflect a departure from, and change in the orientation of § 14141 
enforcement over-time, changes in the subjective interpretation of unconstitutional policing, and 
how the application of that interpretation changed through organizational decision-making. 
 Further supporting this conclusion, results from the exploratory hypothesis indicate that 
between first and second-generation § 14141 investigations, the DOJ sought to enforce findings 
of unconstitutional policing practices against police departments with a greater non-White 
municipal population. Bringing together differences in themes, and the targeted enforcement of 
larger police agencies, DOJ investigations of more diverse jurisdictions appears to be intentional 
decision-making, and conforms to what DOJ indicates in their technical reports (2017a) that the 
focus of their enforcement changes over-time. It appears that over the two generations of § 
14141, the DOJ was targeting municipal police agencies for greater levels of misconduct, 
leadership failure, use of weapons, and orientation and culture problems in municipalities where 
there was a significantly higher percentage of the jurisdiction that identified as non-White; 




Disjointed incrementalism, along with MS and deterrence, supports why, and how these changes 
occurred. 
Deterrence - Interpretation 
• RQ4: What organizational characteristics, and environmental conditions existed in 
municipal police departments prior to a § 14141 investigation?  
  Of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police in this study, 19, or 57% involved 
police agencies with more than 500 sworn employees. This by itself is unrevealing, however, 
when compared to the percentage of police agencies in the United States that serve 
municipalities, a much different picture emerges. Municipal police departments with more than 
500 sworn employees make up 0.9% of all local police departments in the U.S. (BJS, 2015), but 
made up 57% of the study population. Even more revealing is that of these 19 municipal police 
agencies, 16 had over 1,000 sworn employees. Municipal police departments in the United States 
with over 1,000 sworn employees comprise just 0.4% of all local police departments nationwide 
(BJS, 2015), yet made up almost fifty percent (48%) of the § 14141 investigations in this study. 
These large differentials and their lack of representativeness in the general population, cannot be 
due to chance.  
 When viewed in the context of municipal police agency size from the previous 
interpretation, it was unsurprising that there was a disproportionate number of large 
municipalities, as measured by population, represented among the N = 33 investigations of 
municipal police. For example; 0.8% of police agencies in the United States serve municipalities 
with a population greater than 250,000 persons (BJS, 2015), yet police agencies serving these 




   Both of these analyses reflect an interpretation that the DOJ targeted large 
municipalities, and large police departments for §14141 enforcement both for symbolic, and 
pragmatic reasons. This is supported by work done by police scholars such as King (2014) who 
has noted that larger police departments are better able to withstand, and better able to respond to 
crises than smaller police departments, which may be put at risk of demise when faced with 
external or institutional intrusion. These results also suggest that the DOJ used their limited 
resources for enforcement of §14141 as a deterrence strategy, which is supported by their policy 
language (DOJ, 2017a), and by their choices of police agencies deemed suitable to conduct a 
§14141 investigation – preferring to be responsible for reforming a large troubled police agency, 
rather than being perceived as leading to the demise of a smaller police agency.  
 Moreover, larger police agencies serve larger jurisdictions, and although the non-White 
population of the N = 33 remained the same over different investigative outcomes (55% n  = 24, 
53% n = 9), the change in the non-White population over the two generations, increases in DOJ 
thematic and scaled findings, as well as emphasis on unconstitutional policing determinations 
during the second half of the second-generation investigations suggests that DOJ was targeting 
larger police agencies serving more diverse populations later in the life-course of § 14141 
specifically to address problematic police practices made against more diverse populations.  
 Another aspect of my analysis that supports the interpretation of targeted enforcement 
and deterrence revolves around the concept of clustering. As described by King (2014), when 
discussing the phenomena of police organizational demise, clustering occurs when “the 
disbanding of a police agency increases the likelihood that geographically proximate police 
agencies will suffer disbanding as well” (p. 685). Indeed, Kingdon (1995) has a similar construct 




a window of opportunity will open in adjacent policy areas – often geographically. Applying the 
phenomena of clustering and spillovers to the initiation of a § 14141 action against a municipal 
police department, the triggering of a new investigation in proximate municipalities, and for 
similar reasons, should not then be unexpected.  
  This “clustering” or “spillover” effect was found in my analysis wherein many § 14141 
investigations involved geographically proximate municipal police departments. For example, 
seven of the N = 33 investigations involved cities in Ohio. Moreover, the first two municipalities 
subject to a § 14141 investigation leading to a negotiated settlement were roughly adjacent cities 
albeit in different states – Pittsburgh and Steubenville – the latter of which is located in Ohio. 
This for a state whose population reflects 3.7% of the overall U.S. population (U.S. Census, 
2010a), and is but one of 50 states and numerous territories to which DOJ has jurisdiction. In 
fact, just six states accounted for 19 of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police under study, 
further suggesting the clustering and spillover effect of §14141 enforcement.  
 Also supporting an interpretation of targeted enforcement, deterrence, and a clustering 
effect were the results from H7, that environmental, and organizational characteristics would 
differ by investigative outcome. For both environmental variables, population category and 
percent non-white, there were no significant differences by investigative outcome, suggesting 
that the size of a municipality, by category, and racial composition make no difference to the 
outcome of a § 14141 investigation. An explanation for the rejection of the alternative hypothesis 
for the variable population category relates to the chosen methodology. By creating seven 
categories of municipal populations, the sensitivity of analysis was reduced as the largest 
municipalities (e.g. Los Angeles & Chicago) are many times larger than the second largest 




of largest of the large municipalities – Los Angeles, population 3,694,820 (U.S. Census, 2000), 
and comparing that to the smallest of the second largest category – Albuquerque, population 
545,695 (U.S. Census, 2010a) produces a population ratio of almost 7:1. Assigning 
municipalities to categories based on population size makes the analysis more manageable, but 
less sensitive to large differentials, and as such, less sensitive to precision analysis.  
 Although differences by investigative outcome for the variable percent non-white were 
not statistically significant, when contrasted to the general U.S. population of 39.3% non-White 
(U.S. Census, 2010a), differences in racial and ethnic make-up appear to be substantial. Two 
inferences can be drawn this information. First, municipalities in the study population are 
misrepresented in terms of population characteristics for the nation as a whole, and second, the 
racial and ethnic make-up of a municipality is not differentiated by investigative outcome. Put 
another way, the N = 33 investigations of municipal police agencies are more diverse than the 
general population, but diversity does not relate to investigative outcome after a municipality has 
been selected for § 14141 action by the DOJ. As well, the exploratory hypothesis supports that 
the DOJ changed their orientation in second-generation investigations, seeking to address police 
misconduct in municipalities with greater non-White populations. 
 Both organizational variables, size, and resources, significantly differed by investigative 
outcome. A non-directional hypothesis was offered here as I reasoned that the variable size 
would be significantly larger for municipal police under negotiated settlement – this was 
supported by the test results. However, I reasoned that resources would be significantly different 
wherein municipal police agencies with fewer resources would have more problems. As such, 
police agencies with fewer resources would be more likely to be subject of a negotiated 




 The size of a police department is the total number of sworn employees, and is largely a 
reflection of the size of the municipality served in terms of overall population. In fact, the 
variables size and population group were very highly associated when correlated categorically, r 
= .86, and r2 = .74. The variable resources, however, is a ratio of total sworn employees to 
overall population, and was conceptualized to measure a municipality’s ability to sufficiently 
support a police agency, and determine what if any effects strained resources have on 
organizational performance.  
 Considering that the n = 24 municipal police agencies were more highly skewed in a 
positive direction than the n = 9 municipal police agencies (2.64 to 1.65), and that negotiated 
settlements reflect a more involved investigative outcome, it was unsurprising that there were 
significant differences in the size of a municipal police department by investigative outcome. Put 
simply, larger police departments because of their size, have the potential for greater systemic 
problems than smaller departments, and in DOJ’s enforcement strategy, larger police agencies 
require more substantial interventions to fix.  
 The variable resources significantly differed by investigative outcome. As well, this was 
a non-directional hypothesis, however, I reasoned that fewer resources would be associated with 
more problems, and more problems would be reflected in both the number of findings, and the 
type of investigative outcome. The results differed from this expectation, and my interpretation 
follows.  
 According to data from BJS (2015), smaller police agencies by category have less sworn 
officer-to-population ratios than larger police agencies by category. These data may better reflect 
that small and large police agencies have different needs based on their population to a greater 




external control of organizations, resource dependence model to support a resource interpretation 
appears incomplete. That is, this perspective does not take into consideration the policing needs 
and differentials between large and small municipalities. Simply put, smaller police departments 
with fewer resources may have plenty of resources to meet their specific, and often, more limited 
mission, whereas large police agencies that serve large municipalities may require many more 
resources to meet their more complex tasks, and the more robust mission inherent in policing a 
large municipality.  
 This interpretation also then accounts for the unexpected result opposite of the next 
hypothesis, H8, that a municipal police agency’s resources, and scaled findings will be negatively 
associated when controlling for the size of a police department. From this statistically significant 
result, I can say the opposite is true; that greater resources are positively associated with the 
number of findings. My interpretation of this unexpected result is twofold. First, conceptually, 
the variable resources is more closely aligned with size of a police agency than economic 
constraints, and second; larger municipal police agencies have more systemic problems than 
smaller police agencies, simply as a consequence of their size.  
Multiple Streams - Interpretation 
• RQ5. How does the DOJ identify a specific municipal police agency engaged in 
unconstitutional policing?  
 Regarding the choice of a municipal police agency to investigate under § 14141 
authority, the DOJ has indicated that a high-profile event (focusing event) never justifies a § 
14141 decision, per se (2017a). The DOJ does, however, use focusing events as a basis to initiate 
an investigation since a focusing event may serve as a symptom of deeper and more systemic 




agency to investigate, and their decision-making could only be tested indirectly here, but through 
a non-significant finding, it was revealed that focusing events are independent of investigative 
outcome.  
 Through further analysis of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police in this study, it 
was found that 18 had focusing events, and 15 did not. This equates to 55% for the former, and 
45% for the latter. These differences were not statistically significant as predicted and in contrast 
to the alternative hypothesis in H9. The inferences drawn from these analyses are that; (a) 
although DOJ’s attention may be drawn towards a police agency because of a focusing event, 
that event is not necessary or sufficient for a § 14141 action, and (b) focusing events have no 
relationship to DOJ’s investigative outcome, per se. The interpretation of the rejection of the 
alternative hypothesis here is twofold. First, as described by Kingdon (1995), focusing events by 
themselves are typically insufficient to raise an issue to agenda status (as applied, the policy 
output), and DOJ’s claim regarding the role of focusing events accurately reflects their practice 
concerning municipal police.  
 The presence or absence of an insufficient intervention system served as indicators in this 
study. That is, in findings letters wherein the DOJ noted deficiencies in EISs, that municipality 
was categorized as having deficient indicators. The sufficiency of an indicator system was not 
interdependent with the type of investigative outcome as predicted in the alternative hypothesis 
in H10, however, in 28 of the N = 33 (85%) investigations, municipal police agencies were found 
by the DOJ to have deficiencies in indicator systems. This suggests not that the DOJ seeks to 
investigate municipal police agencies because of their deficient indicator systems, rather, it 
suggests that a deficient indicator system is endemic to a poorly functioning police agency. This 




in this study, the DOJ did not find issues with the municipal police agency’s indicator system, 
yet there was no statistically significant relationship by investigative outcome. This does not 
mean or suggest then that a properly implemented and performing indicator system obviates a 
DOJ investigation, clearly it does not and cannot, because findings regarding the adequacy of an 
EIS are only made after a § 14141 investigation has concluded.  
 Although there is disagreement in the literature as to whether focusing events require 
accompaniment to reach agenda status and become actionable (Worrall, 1999), in keeping with 
Kingdon’s (1995) contention, feedback was operationalized as national news reports, and when 
corresponding to the same time period as a focusing event, albeit not necessarily because of that 
focusing event, was operationalized as the presence or absence of accompaniment. For this 
hypothesis, H11, the null was rejected as it was found that focusing events and feedback are 
interdependent, and form a type of accompaniment. Considering this result in combination with 
the null finding from focusing events in H9, supports Kingdon’s (1995) position that focusing 
events require accompaniment to become actionable, however, this was not true in all cases. In 
12 of the N = 33 investigations, the focusing event did not have accompaniment. There are two 
plausible explanations for this result; (a) certain types of focusing events do not require 
accompaniment to reach agenda status (viz., the policy output) in keeping with Worrall’s (1999) 
conclusion, and (b) there are other variable(s) that share greater responsibility in a municipal 
police department being selected by the DOJ for §14141 investigation other than a focusing 
event, with or without accompaniment.  
 Since the second stream of the MS framework involves policies, and policies are the 
result of both technical feasibility and value acceptability, it was reasoned that policy clusters 




clusters better reflect the core concept of value acceptability insofar as elements in the policy 
stream are responsible for its movement into agenda status, including those of an interested 
public. This public would be more amenable to police policies that are not too esoteric, granular, 
or highly nuanced, as policy clusters are easier to interpret and understand to an interested, but 
non-expert public. Second, the technical feasibility aspect of the policy stream is implicit in 
DOJ’s policy recommendations.   
 The DOJ employs subject matter experts in their investigations, many of whom have 
executive-level law enforcement experience (DOJ, 2017a), and through the negotiation process 
with the offending police agency, derives policy suggestions that typically conform to common 
police practices which must be implementable by the municipal police agency. Overly technical, 
complex, or intricate policies can lead to implementation failure, which then would lead to one 
of two outcomes; (a) the DOJ could not close their § 14141 action, or (b) in a scenario where the 
implementation failure was really a sustainability failure, the DOJ could open a new § 14141 
action against that same agency. This scenario occurred in three cases; New Orleans, Miami, and 
Cleveland, wherein the justification for initiating a new § 14141 investigation was based on the 
failure to institutionalize agreed-upon reforms. Although the closing of an investigation is 
beyond the scope of this study, what is known about the reform agreement process, and 
accompanying reform implementation timelines, suggests that all §14141 actions of municipal 
police will close eventually. Just as the two largest municipal police agencies under DOJ’s § 
14141 authority, which are two of the three largest police departments in the United States – 
LAPD and Chicago Police Department – both closed, albeit for different reasons.  
 Of the five policy clusters analyzed, three significantly differed by investigative outcome 




As well, there were significant differences in the total proportion of police agencies with 
deficient policies by investigative outcome, conforming to the hypothesized relationship. These 
results suggest that policy deficiencies are a main contributor to unconstitutional policing, but 
they also suggest that specific polices, particularly those related to the use of force, and civilian 
complaint systems, although not significantly different by investigative outcome, are a main 
contributor to a type of dysfunctionality that brings a municipal police agency to the attention of 
the DOJ for a § 14141 investigation. 
 Put another way, since 91% and 89% of the N = 33 investigations of municipal police in 
this study had policy deficiencies regarding use of force, or civilian complaint systems, but the 
differences by investigative outcome were undifferentiated, strongly suggests that these two 
deficient policy areas, more than any of the others, contribute to dysfunctionality that is endemic 
to a troubled municipal police agency. As such, these two deficient policy areas appear to 
contribute to behaviors making the DOJ aware that systemic problems exist within a municipal 
police agency, whereas other policy deficiencies make it more likely that patterns or practices of 
unconstitutional policing will proliferate. 
 A second explanation for the differentials in policy findings between outcomes relates to 
a municipal police agency’s size. That is, police agencies under negotiated settlement are larger 
in terms of sworn employees than police agencies under technical assistance. Larger police 
agencies have more complex structures, missions, and scope, or what is referred to as 
bureaucratization (King, 2014). It stands to reason then that larger police agencies would require 
more policies to manage their more complex and detailed function. Hence, larger municipal 
police agencies are more likely to have a greater number of policy deficiencies than smaller 




 This interpretation is supported by the rejection of the null hypothesis for H13, wherein 
deficient policies and thematic findings were significantly correlated in a positive direction for 
the study population, and by investigative outcome. Since the variable resources was interpreted 
to closely represent municipal police agency size, as the unexpected result of H8 suggests, and 
resources and scaled findings were positively correlated, then the number of thematic findings 
and deficient policies should be positively correlated because they contain the specific common 
element of size.  
 The choice in this hypothesis to use thematic findings instead of scaled thematic findings 
was a strategic and methodological one. I reasoned that since the policy stream was measured in 
clusters, that any comparison between variables would require measurement at that same level. 
Scaled findings are measured at a more granular level but when appropriate for analysis, scaled 
findings provide for more finely tuned nuance and analysis. When comparing across variables, I 
felt it was necessary to compare similar levels for consistency and accuracy, and comparing 
themes to cluster, and vice versa, was the appropriate way to do this.   
  The third of the streams tested in the study was the political stream. In the MS 
framework, Kingdon (1995) argues that changeover in administration has the strongest effect on 
a problem becoming actionable and effecting the policy output. To test this idea, and to facilitate 
an understanding of the influence of political turnover on complex organizational decision-
making and a policy output, two inferential tests were conducted. The first test, a chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit test, was used to detect any differences that may have existed between the 
number of §14141 actions involving municipal police with the number of § 14141 actions 




argument, this test revealed that changeover in administration was unrelated to the number of 
observed § 14141 actions.  
 When changeover in administration was operationalized as changes in political party 
rather than turnover in the presidency and tested by investigative outcome, significant 
differences were found as predicted in H15. Indicating that although presidential administration is 
independent of the initiation of a § 14141 action, the political party of the president is directly 
related to the type of investigative outcome. This finding is quite revealing, the results of which 
coincide with the change in orientation of § 14141 after 2002. After the changeover in political 
party from Democrat to Republican, and after 2002 no municipal police agency had a DOJ 
finding characterized by routinized misconduct. This trend continued until 2009 with a 
changeover in political party of the administration from Republican to Democrat. This suggests 
that a finding of unconstitutional policing, and specifically routinized misconduct, is as much 
influenced by political orientation as the legality of the police action. Operationalizing 
Kingdon’s (1995) turnover in administration then as turnover in political party, accedes to the 
notion that turnover in the political stream is the most influential factor within in the streams, 
albeit after a decision has been made to conduct a § 14141 investigation of municipal police.  
 Analyzing the influence of the national mood on § 14141 as a discrete measure leads to a 
mixed interpretation. That is, the national mood by itself appears to have some influence on both 
the outcome of an investigation, and the number of investigations. For example, when the 
national mood is more positive, the DOJ is more likely to engage in technical assistance, and 
when less positive, the DOJ is more likely to engage in investigations leading to negotiated 




 More strikingly, however, it appears that the national mood is most accurately reflected 
by the president, and who was president is most reflective of the type of investigative outcome. 
For example: President Clinton was in office for seven full years during the life-course of § 
14141 – in six of those seven years, the national mood was less positive than average, with all § 
14141 investigations during those years leading to a negotiated settlement. President Bush was in 
office for eight full years during the life-course of § 14141 – in six of those eight years the 
national mood was more positive than average, and of the 13 § 14141 investigations conducted 
during that time, eight, or 62% resulted in technical assistance. Lastly, President Obama was in 
office for eight full years during the life-course of § 14141 – for this time period the national 
mood was an even split between four years more positive than average, and four years less 
positive than average, however, of the 13 § 14141 investigations initiated against municipal 
police, only one led to technical assistance.  
 In an attempt to tease out the influence of the national mood and administrative turnover, 
three correlations were run between variables measured at different scales. The three correlations 
in the political stream; mood associated with political party, political party associated with 
number of investigations, and the number of investigations associated with mood, were all non-
significant, however, all associations were positive, supporting the previous inference that the 
national mood is reflective of the president, and the party of the president is reflective of 
investigative outcome. Indeed, the results of the marginal, but not significant association 
between the national mood, and political party support this conclusion, insofar as when the 
administration is led by a Republican, the national mood is more positive, and there are fewer § 




 Regarding the influence of public opinion on policy, scholars such as Burstein (2003) 
have argued that “public opinion influences policy most of the time, [and] often strongly” (p. 
29). To what degree that public opinion influences policy is a question that is beyond the scope 
of this study, what is relevant, however, is that public opinion, and public policy regarding the 
application of § 14141 against municipal police appear to conform to Kingdon’s (1995) position 
that elements in the political stream, specifically the combination of national mood and 
administrative turnover, are highly influential on the agenda, and for this study, highly influential 
on the policy output. It is suggested by my analysis that changes in administration conform to the 
national mood, which then conforms to § 14141 investigative outcomes. What is unknown from 
this analysis is which way the influence runs. That is, did the national mood drive the agenda of 
the president, or the president drive the agenda and lead the national mood?  
 When conducting an analysis of the relationship between public opinion towards crime, 
and political elites including the president, Enns (2016) concludes that although there is a give 
and take between the two, public opinion leads political elites, including the president. Yet, 
Kingdon (1995) asserts that “there is little doubt that the president remains a powerful force in 
agenda setting, particularly compared to other actors” (p. 23). The analysis in this dissertation 
does not answer which way the influence runs, but what is clear is that both the national mood 
and administrative turnover had a role in DOJ’s § 14141 decision-making and outcomes.  
 The results of the stepwise-backward regression model also support Kingdon’s (1995) 
notion regarding administrative turnover in the political stream exerting the biggest influence on 
the agenda, and in the case of § 14141 of municipal police, it was the variable that was 
significantly related to the investigative outcome. Consider, in the one-variable significant 




finding by a factor of .033. Put another way, when only considering a § 14141 investigation 
leading to a finding of unconstitutional policing, the odds of a municipal police agency being 
found to engage in unconstitutional policing after a DOJ investigation increases by a factor of 
30.4 with a change in Presidential party from Republican to Democrat, this for an outcome that 
was already highly differential; 73% of outcomes were negotiated settlements compared to 27% 
for technical assistance. In terms of probabilities, the differences between the two political 
parties that an affirmative §14141 investigation will result in a finding of patterns or practices of 
unconstitutional policing are almost two-and-a half-times as probable when a Democrat is 
president compared to a Republican, .95 to .39. 
 Even with these compelling results, some caution is necessary when drawing conclusions 
regarding a specific political party and their orientation toward the enforcement of patterns or 
practices of unconstitutional policing. As further elaborated as a study limitation, this model does 
not allow for the accounting of § 14141 investigations that did not lead to any findings. That is, 
what is being predicted in this model is the investigative outcome based on the political party of 
the president, but only after a decision has been made by the DOJ to commit their resources 
towards enforcement of pattern or practices of unconstitutional policing or systemic misconduct. 
 Municipal police agencies that were investigated under § 14141, but those investigations 
were closed without a finding were not part of this study, thus, unattributable to a political party. 
As such, the political influence on the decision not to pursue a § 14141 may be as important to 
understanding political stream influence on a DOJ decision as it is on the influence of the 
investigative outcome. Until that knowledge is gleaned, it can only be inferred from the result of 




DOJ decision regarding the differentiation of patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing 

























• RQ6: How can § 14141 support police departments to practice constitutional policing?  
 Answering this research question required four discrete but interrelated components. 
First, to understand constitutional policing, the knowledge gained from this study was applied to 
the concept of unconstitutional policing; providing a clear, distinct and explicated differentiation 
of constitutional and unconstitutional policing in the context of § 14141. Second, supporting 
municipal police agencies to practice constitutional policing required a compendium of policies, 
practices, and procedures that by deduction, analysis, and interpretation of DOJ’s § 14141 
findings letters, were found necessary to shield, forestall, or course correct police agencies 
engaged in, or at risk of engaging in, unconstitutional policing. Third, police leaders must have 
an awareness, and knowledge of internal and external conditions that have been linked to 
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. This presupposes that municipal police leaders 
know when, where, and for what to look – which cannot be taken as a given, since preemptively 
addressing unconstitutional policing, or alternatively, course-correcting patterns or practices of 
systemic misconduct that may lead to unconstitutional policing, requires not just knowledge 
acquisition, but knowledge application. As such, a pragmatic, and workable model was 
conceptualized, grounded in this study’s findings that when followed by municipal police, 
supports them forestall unconstitutional policing. Finally, to fully explain how § 14141 can 
support municipal police agencies to police constitutionally, it was necessary to explore DOJ’s 
decision-making regarding enforcement of § 14141. To that end, an exploration of rational 
decision-making related to past enforcement of §14141 was conducted; using the knowledge of 




to explore options for future enforcement of § 14141. The combination of these four elements, 
offer municipal police leadership the answer to the final research question.  
Unconstitutional Policing 
 Concerning the differentiation of constitutional and unconstitutional policing; it is 
through their numerous findings letters and technical reports that the DOJ, and by extension, the 
federal government have defined unconstitutional policing as the accumulation of patterns or 
practices of systemic police misconduct that violate federal laws or constitutional rights (DOJ, 
2010; DOJ, 2017a; DOJ, 2017b; DOJ, 2018). Throughout the life-course of § 14141, special 
emphasis has been placed on modifying police behaviors that in the aggregate, violate the first, 
fourth, fifth, and fourteen amendments to the Constitution (DOJ, 2017a) – individual protections 
that relate to free expression, search and seizure, standards of proof, use of force, due process, 
and equal protection. As well, the DOJ has regularly made known that isolated and individual 
acts of officer misconduct, when unconstitutional, per se, are insufficient to warrant a finding of 
a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a). Unconstitutional policing then, 
requires that individual police misconduct be systemic, representative, or typical conduct within 
a police agency.  
 Using this standard, constitutional policing requires the absence of individual acts of 
police misconduct that violate federal laws, or civil rights of individuals, and specific groups 
people within a jurisdiction that when aggregated, represent conduct typical of organizational 
police behavior, or is systemic within a police agency. Noteworthy in this description is that 
constitutional policing does not equate to good policing, yet, unconstitutional policing is clearly 
poor policing. The differentiation of what constitutes good and bad policing has been discussed 




elaboration and differentiation of these two concepts is beyond the scope of this study. Since 
unconstitutional policing is the aggregation of behaviors, then municipal police agencies require 
the knowledge to address those behaviors in order to ensure constitutional policing.  
Compendium of Policies, Procedures, and Practices  
 Through the research, analysis, and interpretation conducted in this study, the following 
policy recommendations are offered as necessary to forestall, shield, or course correct, municipal 
police from engaging in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing: 
• Address organizational-wide lack of professional currency in policies, systems, 
procedures, and training.  
• Review, revise, and require adherence to a comprehensive set of use-of-force policies that are 
in keeping with well-established professional practices, comport with constitutional standards 
and applicable law, are clear and understandable, and are guided by restraint, discretion and 
overall safety.  
• Enforce full-compliance with use-of-force reporting, review, and investigative follow-
through. 
• Individuals considered for specialized units must meet all qualifications prior to assignment. 
Personnel decisions within municipal police agencies cannot be made solely on familiarity 
with the officer or nepotism. Criteria that would exclude a candidate from a position must be 
adhered to in practice, and officers in positions for which they are not qualified, must not 
remain in those positions. 
• All training staff must be competent in the material they teach, and must be officially 




• Training materials must be memorialized and documented. Records of who was trained, on 
what material, when, and if a refresher is required must be recorded, maintained, and updated 
at regular intervals. 
• Ensure that an updated data-driven early intervention system is implemented, with 
appropriate and comprehensive measures entered into the system on a regular basis. 
• Early intervention systems must have reasonable and objective triggering mechanisms where 
appropriate intervention is required of supervision who must then document findings, and be 
held accountable for outcomes and appropriate follow-through. 
• Address attributes of an institutionalized police agency.  
• Internal investigations must be conducted in an unbiased and impartial manner by employees 
who are immaterial to the incident or officer under investigation. Investigators must orient 
themselves towards seeking truth, rather than officer exoneration. To that end, statements 
from complainants, and the accused officer must be given equal weight during internal 
investigations. 
• Refusal to accept, or dissuasion of civilian complaints must be unacceptable in all 
circumstances. All complaints of officer misconduct must be recorded, investigated, and 
disposed of in an impartial and objective manner.  
• If a policy or practice is impractical, routinely ignored, or outdated, it must be appropriately 
revised or expurgated. Police departments cannot condone widespread non-compliance of 







• Address organizational characteristics of shortsightedness, conflicts-of-interest, 
learning, and environmental awareness. 
• An awareness of, and flexibility with, the external environment must be fostered. This can be 
facilitated by police agencies dedicating themselves to ongoing learning, innovation, 
adaptation, and openness to change. 
• Police agencies must better conform to the needs of the citizens in their subject jurisdiction, 
and adapt to those needs as necessary, particularly with communities in which changing 
demographics, language differences, and evolving norms are prevalent.  
• Have clear, appropriate, and conflict-free guidelines and policies. Organizational and 
individual decision-making must always be conflict-of-interest free. Officers and the police 
organization must always act in accordance with the Constitution, applicable laws, and 
appropriate standards of proof. Every police decision must be at a minimum, legally justified, 
but also appropriate to the circumstances, and made in the interest of just enforcement of law. 
• Policies and procedures must be routinely reviewed; a dedicated research and development 
unit must be created to keep current and abreast of professional standards and changing 
environments, facilitating innovation in a police agency. 
• Foster communication with law enforcement partners, other public service agencies, and the 
general public. 
• Address tactical deficiencies, weapon competencies, and improve officer equipment. 
• Require that all sworn members of the police agency regularly engage in tactical training 
with a variety of officers and different units. Focus tactical training on high-liability 
encounters, specializing in scenarios with individuals who are emotionally disturbed, elderly, 




• Prioritize de-escalation techniques during use of force training with special emphasis on 
interacting with individuals who are emotionally unstable, intoxicated, or otherwise in crisis.  
• Use-of-force and de-escalation training should be both lecture and scenario-based, and all 
officers must be required to participate. All officers must be evaluated on the application of 
this training, and meet minimum performance requirements for full-duty responsibilities.  
• Sufficiently train officers in the proper use of their equipment, and provide officers with 
appropriate, high-quality equipment that is necessary to help accomplish the task for which 
they have been given. 
• Restrict the use of weapons and equipment only to their designed use, absent exigent 
circumstances. To that end, provide officers with the requisite tactical equipment and 
sufficient training to cover the entire use-of-force continuum.  
• Clarify policies, procedures, and general expectations by reducing internal conditions of 
ambiguity. 
• Policies and procedures must be clear, legally sound, and easily understood by all agency 
employees. 
• Any new policy, or policy change, must immediately be made known to all sworn 
employees. Sufficient training must be conducted with all policy or procedural changes for 
all sworn employees, and that training must commence upon promulgation by the police 
agency. 
• Policy and procedure manuals must be updated regularly, distributed to all officers, and made 






• Address leadership and management deficiencies.  
• Leadership must set the agenda of reform, and create a vision for the police agency. 
Supervisors must be tasked with seeing that vision through, and held accountable for the 
performance of the officers under their supervision. 
• Leadership and management must look to the external environment for signals of 
problematic agency behavior including, focusing events, media reports, and community 
feedback. 
• Leadership and management must be attuned to their organizational soft-spots, and 
vulnerabilities including; being a very large or very small police agency, having police 
agencies in their proximate area being investigated, externally controlled, or in the process of 
demise. 
• Leadership and management must remain aware of the national political environment and 
mood, as the orientation towards intervention of police is mutable.  
• Address misconduct through strict enforcement of ethical guidelines, compliance, 
investigation, and discipline.  
• Work to eliminate bias and deviance within the department by having clear codes of ethics, 
and corruption and misconduct guidelines that all members of a police agency must follow – 
without exception – leadership included. Police agencies should regularly engage in integrity 
tests, and inspection checks across all ranks of the organization to ensure compliance with 
policies, procedures, and general guidelines. 
• Monitor, track, and discipline employees who have numerous or substantiated allegations of 
excessive force, abuse of authority or other similar allegations of misconduct. Discipline 




• Address the culture and orientation of an organization to reflect community needs and 
realities of modern policing.  
• Foster a culture of service over enforcement; of cooperation with the community over 
conflict. 
• Eliminate officer enforcement activity as a primary metric of officer performance. 
• Seek to recruit organizational police leaders, and officers who share in a vision of 
collaboration, learning, and continuous improvement.  
 Necessary and sufficient elements. 
 Two global elements have been found critical to the success of reforming a municipal 
police department under § 14141; committed leadership, and the dedication of adequate 
resources (Morgan, Murphy, & Horwitz, 2017). First, concerning leadership; municipal police 
agencies must be headed by individuals who have the requisite leadership abilities, and desire to 
foster change as the success of lasting reform in police agencies under § 14141 has been closely 
linked to reform-minded police leaders (Kalyal, Huey, Blaskovits, & Bennell, 2018; Scott, 
2017). The concept of leadership, as described for the purpose of overseeing necessary change in 
a municipal police department can best be defined as “a process whereby an individual 
influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal” (Northouse, 2001, p. 3). Applying 
this definition of leadership to municipal police, the common goal is the reform of a municipal 
police department to conform with modern and professional practices, for promoting an 
organization of learning, transformation, and compliance with strict internal standards and 
regulations, while policing within the restrictions of applicable law, and boundaries set forth by 




 When discussing the importance of leadership as a necessary component for 
organizational change in policing under § 14141, Scott (2017) posits that police officers are more 
likely to accept internally driven changes rather than externally forced ones – by extension, 
leadership from police executives who have bought into the notion of reforming their agencies 
prior to, or in lieu of, external intervention. Furthermore, police chiefs as leaders of police 
organizations are better suited to gain the compliance of subordinates because “police officers 
tend to respect and comply with police chiefs’ rules, even if they do not like them” (Scott, 2017, 
p. 610). This requires sufficient financial support (Kalyal, et al., 2018), and an acknowledgment 
that leadership is directly tied into the dedication of adequate resources. For example, when 
analyzing why police reforms fail, Skogan (2008) noted that for reforms to last “the astute 
change manager has to ensure that they are the department’s and even the city’s project, not just 
their own” (p. 33). This orientation will help facilitate greater buy-in from the public, and 
provide a municipal police leader the necessary political leverage to help fund the changes a 
police leader deems necessary. The issue that accompanies this orientation then is this: How 
should those resources be allocated?  
 After leadership, adequate investment of resources was indicated to be the most critical 
element of lasting success of police reform under §14141 (Morgan, Murphy, & Horwitz, 2017). 
By extension, reform of a municipal police agency can occur prior to, or in lieu of federal 
intervention with appropriate and dedicated leadership, sufficient allocation of resources, and the 
identification of troublesome environmental and organizational areas. Since the above policy 
recommendations revolve around policies, procedures, practices, and systems, the primary 




planning, this investment will facilitate municipal police agencies to become learning 
organizations (Geller, 1997).  
 In the 1967 U.S. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
report: The Police, the call for police to develop a greater openness to research, and to apply the 
byproduct of that research to policing was made (Skogan, 2018). Since then, research and 
planning units within police agencies have been associated with the potential for innovation that 
can support an organization to be more forward-thinking, dynamic, adaptive to change, and 
responsive to the needs of the public (Bond & Gabriele, 2018). Police research and planning 
units were initially conceptualized to engage in a variety of activities related to researching best 
practices, planning, review of equipment needs and quality, conducting needs assessment, and 
evaluation of programs (Bond & Gabriele, 2018). However, the extant literature on research and 
planning units in police agencies indicates that these units are more likely to engage in 
administrative functions instead of their intended purpose of research, evaluation, and promoting 
innovation (Haberman & King, 2011).  
 An optimal investment in research and planning for municipal police is the second policy 
component that municipal police should embrace to prevent their agencies from engaging in 
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. This investment must not just be financial, but 
as important, the role of research and planning, and tasks they are assigned must be for 
organizational development, and an orientation towards learning and continuous improvement. 
 The specific policies, procedures, practices, and systems that have been found to allow 
for patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing to proliferate have now been identified, how 
these comport with what each individual municipal police agency does must then be left to that 




in research and planning can facilitate that necessary change, internally, which has been found 
critical to the success of police reform, whereby preventing decent into patterns of behavior that 
may leave a police agency susceptible to loss of reputation, loss of autonomy, and potentially, 
federal intervention.   
The SIRR Model - Forestalling Unconstitutional Policing 
 Although the previously described policy recommendations can be used to address an 
array of municipal police agency behaviors, these recommendations alone do not inform police 
leaders when, or how that knowledge should be applied. To this end, it is critical that police 
leadership not just have the appropriate model, process, and structure to identify internal and 
external threats to constitutional policing within their agencies, but they must also have 
appropriate guidelines in place to know when to initiate the model as a preemptive, or course-
correcting mechanism against unconstitutional policing. The proposed model, below, does just 
that.   
 In a four-stage model consisting of scanning, identifying, relating, and responding 
(SIRR), applied from the knowledge created in this study, municipal police leaders can more 
readily identify both internal and external operational threats that are linked to patterns or 
practices of unconstitutional policing, providing a municipal police agency with the timing, tools 
and know-how to forestall the potential for federal investigation, loss of autonomy, national 
stigma, and organizational demise.  
 The four-stage SIRR model employs a mixed-scanning approach (Etzioni, 1967) to 
identify and review variables indicated to pose threats to constitutional policing. In this sense the 
model is fully grounded in a pragmatist orientation of knowledge application. Described by 




that takes pictures of general patterns yet can focus in on smaller more nuanced details to gain a 
more granular view of problematic areas. A mixed-scanning pragmatist perspective is embedded 
in the orientation of SIRR; variables within the model exist on multiple levels – some within the 
broader environment, and others deep in the police organization. A visual representation of the 


















Figure 9. The SIRR Model: Forestalling Unconstitutional Policing 
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 Step one - initiate a scan. 
 The first step in forestalling, course-correcting, or addressing threats to constitutional 
policing involves deciding when to initiate a scan. Scholars of mixed-scanning, such as Etzioni 
(1967) have argued that for decision-making to be most effective, an encompassing scan is 
required at least sporadically, or at set intervals because scanning is “aligned with improved 
organizational performance” (Choo, 1999, p. 22). As such, scanning should be conducted 
continually by criminal justice administrators to be better prepared for changing environments 
while allowing the organization to be more responsive to external and environmental demands 
(Stojkovic, Kalinich, & Klofas, 2015). Other scholars of strategic management and police have 
suggested less planned-out methods for identifying organizational issues (Loo, 2002). Regardless 
of timing, researchers of strategic planning note that police organizations frequently conduct less 
than detailed scans, and that there’s a notable a lack of attention being paid to this phase of 
organizational planning resulting from an absence of competition among police services (Rogers, 
McIntyre, & Caputo, 2019). To work-through the issues and discrepancies presented above, 
applying a detailed and pragmatic mixed-scanning approach as the first step of the SIRR model 
to forestall unconstitutional policing, and obviate a § 14141 action, a formal, detailed, and 
complete scan should be initiated at one planned annual, and two discrete intervals as conditions 
dictate. 
 A planned mixed-scan should be initiated every year as part of an annual budget review 
in keeping with Etzioni’s (1967) suggestion that “annual budget reviews, and the State of the 
Union messages provide, in principle, such occasions [for a scan]” (p. 389). Although both of 
these suggestions are sensible for municipal police, since municipal police agencies are primarily 




review is a more relevant and pragmatic interval to initiate the SIRR process. Moreover, 
conducting an annual scan prior to, or in anticipation of an annual budget review provides 
municipal police leadership the necessary knowledge for leveraging additional resources as 
deemed necessary. This orientation is in keeping with the lessons learned from many police 
leaders who sought out § 14141 to gain resources that were not otherwise available to their 
police agency, and although this leverage may originate differently – internal and preemptive vs. 
external and compelled, the end-goal is the same, securing additional resources to address 
problematic organizational police behavior. As such, there would be no more opportune moment 
throughout the year to conduct an annual scan than prior to an annual budget review.  
 In addition to an annual mixed-scan, the initiation of a complete scan should take place 
each time one of two variables are present; political turnover, and during times of 
accompaniment. First, since the variable Presidential party best predicted a DOJ finding of a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing in the logistic regression, this should serve as an 
indication to municipal police leadership that a scan of the agency is required every time there is 
a turnover in executive officeholder – both at the federal and state level – the latter for reasons 
that are explicated in the next section.  
 Although administrative turnover at the federal executive level was not significant by 
investigative outcome, when operationalized as turnover in political party, significant differences 
emerged by investigative outcome, and since changes in the political stream are mutable, as 
indicated by the combination of the national mood and presidential officeholder, it best serves 
the municipal police agency to initiate a scan for each executive-level turnover regardless of 




 Second, the initiation of a mixed-scan is recommended whenever a municipal police 
agency is subject to the combination of a focusing event, and negative national news media 
attention. As formulated in the MS framework and operationalized in this study, the combination 
of the variables focusing events and feedback through negative national news media attention 
formed the variable accompaniment. As individual variables, neither focusing events, nor 
feedback were significantly interdependent with the investigative outcome, however, they were 
significantly related to each other. Furthermore, although accompaniment was also independent 
of investigative outcome, the combination of focusing events and feedback presents another 
opportune moment for a municipal police agency to initiate a sporadic scan.  
 Empirical considerations aside, initiating a sporadic scan during times of accompaniment 
is also qualitatively supported by DOJ’s past § 14141 enforcement policies. Indeed, the DOJ has 
noted in their technical reports that neither a focusing event, nor media attention alone serve as 
the basis for a finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing (DOJ, 2017a), 
however, the DOJ has made no known policy statement regarding the combination of these two 
variables. Moreover, the DOJ has publicly noted that high-profile events, and national media 
attention are two sources they have used throughout the life-course of § 14141 to identify police 
agencies at risk of patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.  
 Pragmatically, initiating a scan when a police agency has experienced both a focusing 
event and feedback can serve as an indication to both an interested public, and the DOJ that at a 
minimum, the municipal police agency is taking necessary action to address ongoing or 
emerging problems – potentially forestalling external review, investigation, and intervention.  
 Using this approach, responsible and forward-thinking municipal police leadership must 




and at sporadic intervals, thereby placing their agency in a better position to examine 
organizational and environmental threats at different levels within and about their agency, prior 
to falling into, or to course-correct, patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.  
  Step two - identify variables. 
 After the decision to initiate a scan has been made, police leaders must then identify 
variables relevant to their agency so they can detect linkages that put their agencies at risk of 
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. At this stage, scanning of the variables takes 
place on multiple levels, reflecting both an orientation towards mixed-scanning, and the 
combination of variables from the MS and deterrence framework, such that scanning exists at the 
national, state, municipal, organizational, system, and policy levels. Each of these levels has 
accompanying variables as conceptualized by the MS framework and deterrence.  
 In keeping with a mixed-scanning orientation, some variables are more manifest than 
others (e.g. Presidential party, size vs. indicators, use of force policies). This differentiation, and 
more specifically, the subject area specialties that are required from municipal police to identify, 
capture, and to understand the finely grained nuances of, underscore the need for a research and 
planning capacity. Indeed, this capacity must have a dual-role to ensure the success of the model 
at this stage. First, the capacity and orientation of a research and planning apparatus must exist, 
and be appropriately supported by municipal police leadership to conduct objective internal 
reviews. Second, that research and planning capacity must also have the ability to look beyond 
their agency, to professional associations, to seek-out best practices that can be made applicable 
to their own agencies.  
 This inside-outside research and planning orientation is supported by findings from this 




professional currency main theme – the most commonly attributed theme across all N = 33 
investigations of municipal police. This subtheme was found to be statistically significant 
opposite of the hypothesized relationship by investigative outcome. As addressed in the 
discussion chapter, there are reasons this unexpected result came to pass, but noteworthy here is 
that DOJ’s reliance on suggesting adherence to professional best practices was a form of risk 
reduction for municipal police, since the lack of a capacity to recognize, and adhere to 
professional best practices was endemic to police agencies with systemic problems found to be at 
unreasonable risk of engaging in patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. Additionally, 
by directing a municipal police agency towards adherence to professional best practices, the DOJ 
is endorsing specific practices as appropriate, and in keeping with the highest standards of 
professional conduct. As such, this inside-outside focus by research and planning, at a minimum, 
can help shield a police agency from allegations of deviation from professional standards, and if 
properly implemented, patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing.  
 Step three - relate variables to themes. 
 All independent variables in this dissertation were correlated with themes using phi 
coefficients (Appendix E). After the research and planning apparatus has identified all the 
variables relevant to their agency through mixed-scanning, the next step is to relate those 
variables to themes from past § 14141 investigations. From the results of the thematic analysis, 
and associations that were empirically shown to have linkages with the independent variables, 
municipal police leadership can better identify what variables (potential problems) have allowed, 
or put at risk of allowing, past municipal police departments to engage in patterns or practices of 




 Once related to a specific municipal police agency, independent variables that have been 
significantly associated with a theme require prioritization for two reasons. First, significant 
relationships between variables and themes are those that have been empirically shown to have 
the strongest, non-random relationship justifying their prioritization. Second, the practicality of 
organizational focus is important, as an organization that attempts to prioritize all related 
problems will likely end up diluting focus, having the effect of prioritizing none. To facilitate the 
process of identifying variables and prioritizing the associated themes, relationships between 
independent variables and themes have been categorized according to primary, secondary, and 
tertiary priority – determined by their significance and strength of association. See Appendix F 
for a matrix of these relationships.  
 The processes involved in this step provide municipal police agencies with the requisite 
knowledge of where to look both organizationally and environmentally, to protect against 
patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. Themes rather than subthemes were the chosen 
level of association in this step since themes provide police agencies the specificity to know 
where to look organizationally and environmentally, without too great a specificity that they 
overlook other problematic areas within a particular theme.  
 Step four - respond to thematic findings. 
 The fourth step in the SIRR model requires that municipal police leaders appropriately 
respond to related recommendations from the compendium of policies, procedures, and practices 
necessary to forestall patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing by addressing and 
sufficiently implementing linked recommendations. Here the importance of forward-thinking, 
and effective leadership is most critical. As previously discussed, reforming a police department 




sources. To that end, prioritization must involve: (1) significant thematic relationship that have 
been most closely attributed to unconstitutional policing (i.e. organizational orientation and 
culture, and routinized misconduct), (2) addressing the strongest significant relationship among 
all the variables and themes, and (3) addressing themes with the strongest relationships within a 
variable and theme relationship. Applying this process, and overseeing the implementation of the 
recommendations is the critical last step in protecting a police agency against patterns or 
practices of unconstitutional policing.  
 The SIRR model makes the knowledge gained from this study useable, and pragmatic, 
and although individual organizations may have discrete needs, this model provides police 
leaders with the knowledge of where to look, what to look for, and how to address threats to 
constitutional policing practices before they take hold. The success of which falls to two critical 
elements – dedicated and directed resources (i.e. research and planning), and effective and 
committed forward-thinking leadership.  
Future Enforcement Options 
 The fourth component of this research question requires an understanding of 
organizational decision-making, and how that may change over-time. The acquisition of 
knowledge here then is part art, and part science. Indeed, it is known what the DOJ did, and the 
orientation that guided those decisions. It is unknown, and quite possibly unknowable, what the 
DOJ will do, however, based on the analysis presented in this dissertation, and what is known 
regarding the application of this provision by the DOJ through disjointed incrementalism, three 
possibilities for what law enforcement organizations need to know about § 14141 are offered. 
 Section 14141 implementation towards municipal police has been characterized by 




prioritization of behaviors that constitute unconstitutional policing. This conclusion adds to the 
literature regarding DOJ’s global enforcement of § 14141 and their decision-making, suggesting 
that decisions regarding which police agencies to enforce the provision against are in fact a 
complex “mixture of politics, policy, and legal discretion” (Harmon, 2017, p. 622). As well, the 
DOJ appears to identify police departments for reform when those departments are particularly 
large, or their problems salient (Harmon, 2017). With the future status of § 14141 as a means of 
reforming municipal police tenuous, restricted, and uncertain (Sessions, 2018), three policy 
options are offered to better explore and explicate implications on municipal police.   
 Enforcement option one – continuation of past practices.  
 Since DOJ’s enforcement policies have been influenced by administrative turnover and 
the accompanying agenda, a plausible policy option is to continue to pursue § 14141 actions in 
the manner that has been done so in the past. Although such a policy does not comport with a 
long-term strategy, it is a strategy nonetheless, and does present a realistic and rational option 
that is flexible to administrative turnover, vicissitudes in the political stream, and changes in the 
national mood. In a rational decision-making sense, this policy option is quite rational, but not 
comprehensive, comporting with Lindblom’s (1979) disjointed incrementalism approach – small 
adjustments to the present course, while recognizing the influence of Kingdon’s (1995) position 
that elements in the political stream exert the greatest influence on the agenda. However, there 
are two core problems associated with this option: First, scholars of police and organizational 
behavior, police practitioners, and the DOJ have yet to agree on what constitutes a successful 
intervention of municipal police under § 14141 through its current life-course (Chanin, 2014a; 
Harmon, 2017; Walker, 2017). Second, this policy does not rectify any of the current criticisms 




from the investigation process, and the apparent random nature of DOJ’s enforcement policies. 
Moreover, this policy option is aligned with a punishment-first orientation that stigmatizes a 
municipal police agency – still a criticism of § 14141 by police leadership in general.   
 By adopting this policy option, all that municipal police know about DOJ’s enforcement 
orientation is this: Under § 14141 authority, the DOJ is most likely to target large police 
departments, influenced by the political environment, deterrence, and proximity to other 
municipal police departments under investigation; everything else is guesswork. This leads to a 
glaring problem for municipal police: Who or what agency can a municipal police department go 
to for guidance to determine if their practices and policies put them at risk of unconstitutional 
policing? Certainly, a municipal police agency cannot go to the DOJ under this policy option for 
two reasons. First, for fear that a request for assistance may initiate a costly and onerous § 14141 
action – a similar outcome that occurred to the New Orleans Police Department. Second, as 
DOJ’s position on § 14141 enforcement is uncertain, municipal police may not find a receptive 
audience from the DOJ in matters related to patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing. As 
such, municipal police leaders hoping to reform and guide their agencies towards avoiding 
unconstitutional policing have to play a guessing game – never knowing if they will be the next 
police agency subject to a § 14141 action, unsure of where to go for appropriate assistance, and 
what can be done about it.  
 Enforcement option two – revised deterrence strategy.  
 The application of deterrence through an economic framework was first put forth by 
Harmon (2009), wherein it was suggested that the DOJ seek to substantially raise the probability 
of § 14141 action against specific police departments as a means of deterring current and future 




to both compel and induce change in organizational police behavior. In sum and substance, 
Harmon (2009) recognizes that the scope of law enforcement in the United States, combined 
with the limited resources of the DOJ, makes it so that § 14141, as previously enforced, is 
unlikely to address problematic police behavior through compelling change. The costs associated 
with § 14141 action, the time dedicated to conducting a § 14141 investigation, and the scale of 
law enforcement in the U.S. compared to the capabilities and resources necessary to identify and 
address troubled police agencies makes the application of §14141 untenable.  
 As an alternative to the past model of enforcement, it is suggested that the DOJ identify 
and categorize police departments according to the degree of harm, and depth of misconduct 
within their agency. Being assigned to a category of misconduct would then be the equivalent of 
being put on notice by the DOJ. Police agencies that are unable, or unwilling to reform within a 
specific period of time, are then recategorized as high-risk, and placed at much greater 
probability of federal intervention. This strategy would then have the effect of raising the 
probability of compelled change under § 14141 enforcement for the most troubled agencies, and 
similarly, incentivizes less-offending police agencies to self-correct through induced change.  
 The basis for this model of enforcement is the application of economic theory to the 
public enforcement of law, whereby an increase in the probability of enforcement, or costs 
associated with that enforcement, alters the behavior of the rational actor, in this case the rational 
actor is the police agency. Aligning this policy option with investigative findings, and 
interpretations from this study produces two notable benefits, and two notable drawbacks.  
 The first benefit of this proposal relates to the police practitioner. As mentioned earlier in 
this dissertation, many municipal police leaders have called for greater transparency, 




prioritizing those police agencies into two discrete groups ameliorates much of these criticisms 
by notifying police agencies at risk, and allowing them to engage in induced internal change, as 
opposed to being stigmatized through association as a failed police agency, and having changed 
compelled upon them by the federal government.   
 Second, DOJ’s limited resources dedicated to § 14141 enforcement can be more 
efficiently managed and utilized through this two-tiered process. Under past enforcement of § 
14141, the DOJ opens a preliminary investigation, which may lead to a full investigation, which 
may lead to a finding of unconstitutional policing, which then leads to a type of agreement. All 
of this is time-consuming, costly, and heavily resource dependent. Under the deterrence model, 
the entirety of the § 14141 process would be streamlined, and more efficient.  
 Before moving on to the drawbacks of this policy, it is important to consider that DOJ’s 
use of technical assistance during Bush Administration as a means of supporting police reform 
may have been an attempt to practice such a policy. By having a bifurcated outcome, the DOJ 
had two types of affirmative enforcement options under § 14141, not dissimilar to this policy 
option. A qualitative analysis of investigative timelines and outcomes for many § 14141 actions 
of municipal police support this interpretation. For example, two municipal police agencies 
under negotiated settlement were first the subject of a discrete § 14141 investigation that led to 
technical assistance (Miami & New Orleans). Moreover, there were municipal police agencies in 
this study whose final outcome was a negotiated settlement, however, during the course of a DOJ 
investigation, interim technical assistance was offered (Easton & Cleveland). Both of these 
examples suggest that at times over the life-course of § 14141, DOJ’s decision-making sought to 
induce change in police agencies first, and then to compel change when that option was reasoned 




 The two most compelling negatives to the adoption of this policy option are the vagaries 
of political support, and burdensome costs associated with § 14141 action on the police agency 
that have the potential to lead to organizational demise.  
 Any and all policy options that the DOJ chooses among its alternatives will have to take 
into consideration the agenda and political preferences of the chief executive, since past § 14141 
enforcement has been directly influenced by this unknowable. This presents a significant 
problem in the enforcement of this provision, and most acutely for this policy option. As 
contrasted with the first policy option wherein the DOJ takes this unknowable into consideration, 
and reacts to the agenda, priorities, and wishes of the chief executive accordingly, policy option 
two requires that the DOJ be proactive by leading the agenda rather than following.  
 Making a deterrence strategy workable requires that the rational actor believes in the 
certainty, swiftness, and severity of the punishment. This presupposes that the DOJ is taking an 
active policy stance towards enforcement of § 14141, has the capital, and political support to 
implement the policy as described. Knowing what is known about the interaction of the political 
stream influence on agenda setting and the policy output in the context of § 14141, this option is 
tenuous at best. Alternatively, the DOJ could take a wait-and-see approach by incorporating 
policy option one and two; recognizing the influences of the political stream, while allowing 
policy option two to lay dormant until a conducive political environment emerges in support this 
option.  
 A second negative to a policy of deterrence through economic sanctions is that it poses 
major threats to the viability of many municipal police agencies, in particular smaller ones. 
According to BJS (2015), 88.3% of local police agencies in the United States have fewer than 50 




existence), police agencies most likely to disband are small (King, 2014), with the causes of 
disbanding related to lack of bureaucratization, changeover in political leadership, age, failure to 
adapt to their environment, and most importantly, financial decline (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018; 
Brunet, 2015; King, 2014). A deterrence policy that emphasizes the potential for federal 
intervention cannot treat all municipal police agencies as equally culpable regardless of the depth 
of misconduct because not all municipal police agencies can withstand the economic sanction 
implicit in a § 14141 action. Yet, the overwhelming majority of municipal police agencies in the 
U.S. are small; by extension, a DOJ deterrence policy would be required to eliminate the threat 
of § 14141 for small police agencies, therefore, the deterrent aspect of this policy is meaningless 
and unworkable for the majority of police agencies in the U.S.  
 An alternative implementation could make this policy more workable, and is probably 
more realistic. By targeting police agencies through the two-pronged deterrence approach, the 
DOJ implicitly acknowledges the risks to smaller police departments. As part of this policy then, 
the DOJ should address misconduct in municipal police through compelling those police 
departments that can withstand § 14141 intervention to reform, while hoping that smaller, more 
vulnerable municipal police agencies follow the lead of the larger agencies. This policy option 
has support in the literature on isomorphism, wherein “organizations change because of 
pressures from larger, more powerful organizations” (Giblin & Nowacki, 2018, p. 189), and may 
represent the best approach if this policy option were to be adopted. 
 Enforcement option three – suspension of enforcement, enhancement of 
 collaboration. 
 The third policy option involves the suspension of § 14141 actions in favor of a 




and accountability. Collaborative reform has been implemented by the DOJ as an independent 
program apart from §14141 enforcement since 2011 (Cole, Collins, Finn, & Lawrence, 2017). 
From public statements of support made by former Attorney General Sessions (2017), and 
financial assistance being offered to local police departments through DOJ’s collaborative 
policing program (DOJ, 2017d), it is apparent that the collaborative reform model is the current, 
and foreseeable policy option that the DOJ has adopted as an alternative to § 14141. This model 
seeks to provide proactive, non-adversarial, and cost-effective technical assistance for law 
enforcement agencies to make necessary internal and organizational reforms (National 
Association of Police Organizations, n.d.). Moreover, collaborative reform offers an opportunity 
for induced change, and professional development apart from the coercive § 14141. 
 A second and unexplored aspect of this policy option, that also placates core criticisms of 
§ 14141, is that in suspending their enforcement against municipal police, the DOJ is allowing 
state-level governments to take independent action regarding bringing a § 14141-like lawsuit in 
federal court against an in-state municipal police department. Such is the case in Chicago, where 
as recently as September 2018, the Illinois State Attorney General, along with the Mayor of the 
City of Chicago, and the Chief of Chicago Police Department announced that they have entered 
into a consent decree to be overseen by a federal judge, the findings and agreement of which 
were supported by DOJ’s Investigation of the Chicago Police Department (Hinkel & Byrne, 
2018). Could this policy option be the future of § 14141 enforcement against municipal police? 
Only time will tell since as of this writing, the details of the agreement between Chicago and the 
State of Illinois are emerging. What is known though, is that the combination of a collaborative 
approach, with deferral to state-level authority placates many of the criticisms of § 14141, 




in the philosophy of American governance, and that the scale of law enforcement in the U.S. is 
too big and unwieldy to be effectively overseen by the limited-resourced DOJ.   
 Put succinctly then, § 14141 has supported municipal police to practice constitutional 
policing through the identification of policies, practices, procedures, and system deficiencies 
identified by the DOJ, and contained herein that contribute to unconstitutional policing and 
systemic misconduct. As well, for municipal police to know is that the DOJ’s most realistic 
policy option for the future of § 14141 is collaboration concomitant with a deferral to state-level 
enforcement authorities. This is the most agreeable and pragmatic option for municipal police, 
the federal government, and the future of federal intervention of municipal police under § 14141. 
The adoption of this policy option by the DOJ, along with the compendium of policy 
recommendations offered here, and the use of a self-initiated SIRR model would raise an 
















 Throughout this dissertation, § 14141 and the time period under study, 1994 through 
2017, have been referred to as the law’s life-course. Analyzing findings from the first completed 
§ 14141 investigation of municipal police in Pittsburgh, to the most recent in Chicago, the 
knowledge created in this study fills many of the gaps that previous scholars of § 14141 have 
called for. To a large extent, everything that municipal police leaders need to know about the 
contours of unconstitutional policing – what policies, practices, procedures, and systems 
contribute to its proliferation, what the DOJ looks for when conducting a § 14141 investigation, 
what influenced the DOJ in their decision-making regarding enforcement of § 14141, how that 
influence changed over-time, and what municipal police departments can do to initiate self-
correction to prevent and address patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing, has now been 
researched, analyzed, and reported.  
 This however does not suggest that there is no new knowledge to glean or create from § 
14141’s legacy. The DOJ investigation of the Chicago Police Department represents both an end, 
and new beginning of § 14141. After the agreement to enter into a negotiated settlement that was 
made between the DOJ under the Obama Administration and the City of Chicago was 
discontinued in 2017 by the Trump Administration, the Illinois State Attorney General brought a 
legal action in federal court against the Chicago Police Department to enter into a consent decree 
for oversight and reform. This is the first known case where a state-official initiated a reform 
agreement against a municipal police agency in the spirit of § 14141, ex post a DOJ finding of a 
pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing. This legal action has brought the relationship 
between municipal police, and federal intervention into unprecedented territory. In this sense, the 




test-case for a new paradigm of structural reform litigation involving municipal police. And yet, 
in another sense it’s the same model of reform that has been in place since 1994, as the State of 
Illinois has simply replicated what the DOJ did under § 14141 for over 20 years. Consider it a 
Lindblomian approach in their decision-making – Illinois modeled their own investigation, 
investigative findings, and legal justification for initiating a consent decree off that created by the 
DOJ under § 14141. Perhaps then, 2017 and the action against the Chicago Police Department do 
not represent the end of § 14141, but a new beginning.  
 In 2017, Stephen Rushin expertly identified and described three eras of federal 
intervention of police in the United States. As expanded upon earlier in this dissertation, the third 
and most recent era was categorized as the intervention era, commencing with the passage of the 
1994 crime bill and § 14141. I believe that the findings presented in this dissertation offer the 
following addendum to Rushin’s (2017) claim: The intervention era as described Rushin (2017) 
is over, and a new era of federal intervention has begun – the era of collaborative reform, and 
deferral to state-level control. The final case of § 14141 initiated against municipal police is also 
the first case of § 14141-inspired oversight at the state-level. Hence, the case against Chicago 
represents this new era in police oversight and reform.   
 The Law Enforcement Misconduct Statute 42 U.S.C. 14141 rose to agenda status in a 
classic Kingdonian way – a problem was identified through a focusing event, accompaniment 
preexisted that event, solutions existed in the policy soup and were pushed by entrepreneurs, and 
the orientation of the political stream allowed for the law’s inclusion in the passage of one of the 
most consequential criminal justice bills in U.S. history. Section 14141 was applied by the DOJ 
through 24 years of American history by forces of disjointed incrementalism, a deterrence 




is too early to say definitively what led to § 14141’s demise, or rather its metamorphosis, but it 
does appear at this point, as Kingdon would suggest, that administrative turnover in the political 
stream exerted the greatest influence on the agenda, and in the case of § 14141 against municipal 
police, by all appearances it was the significant variable that caused it to change. 
Study Limitations 
 There were five significant limitations in this study that require recognition. First, 
although established protocols were adhered to for the qualitative thematic analysis, the reliance 
on a single coder presents challenges for the reliability of interpretation. As well, human error 
presents certain validity and reliability constraints, however, to protect against both I took great 
care to adhere to established protocols, and sought to maintain the highest levels of 
trustworthiness. Yet, interpretive thematic analysis research, as conceived by Braun and Clarke, 
(2006) is best suited to the interpretation of the researcher (Braun & Clarke, 2016), whereas 
others argue that interpretive thematic analysis is best conducted with more than one researcher 
(Boyatzis, 1998). Which argument has greater validity is up for debate, however, the limitations 
of solo interpretive research must still be recognized and acknowledged.   
 The second limitation involved both the research design and findings letters. I am 
referring to both of these as the second limitation since they are interdependent and should be 
critiqued accordingly. In this design, the main dependent variable was the investigative outcome 
– one that differentiated a finding of unconstitutional policing, and constitutional but problematic 
policing. This differentiation is important for the purposes of understanding the specifics, 
nuances, and contours of unconstitutional policing. What this design did not allow for was a 
comparison between police departments under §14141 action, and other police departments that 




between §14141 police agencies, and others, could be a study conceptualized as that between 
proper and improper policing. The limitation here came down to DOJ issued findings letters. 
Municipal police agencies that have never been the subject of a §14141 action, have never had 
an investigation conducted by the DOJ, nor a publicly issued findings letter detailing 
organizational dysfunctions. Herein is the limitation, without the §14141 investigation, there is 
no assessment of a police agency’s policies, procedures, practices, and systems to analyze in the 
binary outcome.  
 A third limitation involves classifying the variety of DOJ investigative outcomes of a 
finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing into one category. That is, the 
investigative outcome “negotiated settlement” subsumes a variety of § 14141 investigative 
conclusions involving; MOA’s, consent decrees, legal agreements, etc. Although the DOJ 
broadly classifies these § 14141 actions as reform agreements (DOJ, 2017a), and other scholars 
subsume these outcomes as consent decrees (Walker, 2017), the DOJ chose to engage different 
municipal police departments into different types of agreements and that each agreement, while 
consistent with a finding of a pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, may provide unique 
insight into organizational practices and the preferred remedies for those practices. For example; 
might a MOA have produced greater cooperation between the municipal police agency and the 
DOJ compared to a consent decree? Similarly; do different types of negotiated settlements 
produce different long-term outcomes? Since the multitude in types of negotiated settlements 
was not analyzed in this study, it does, however, provide a possible area for future research.  
 An additional limitation related to the design and findings letters, but intertwined with the 
theoretical framework, relates to conclusions regarding the influence of the variable Presidential 




throughout the life-course of the law, attributing unconstitutional policing decisions to a political 
party offers an incomplete analysis. When only considering municipal police, specific § 14141 
actions had to be excluded from analysis as justified by methodological decisions and established 
criteria. As such, the political influence on a determination of unconstitutional policing made 
against municipal police has been accurately analyzed and properly attributed, however, this is 
only after a decision has been made to enter into a type of reform agreement. Consider, many 
municipal police agencies were the subject of a § 14141 investigation that did not result in any 
findings by the DOJ, (i.e. no affirmative outcome-negotiated settlement nor technical assistance), 
this may have influenced the results and interpretation of the influence of the variable 
Presidential party. To more accurately identify the influences of the variable Presidential party 
on a § 14141 outcome, all § 14141 investigations could be tested against three types of 
investigative outcomes, including those investigations that were discontinued by the DOJ 
without issuing any findings instead of just the two affirmative outcomes in this study design.  
 Finally, the fifth limitation involved the study population proper, that is, only municipal 
police. Although municipal police make up the overwhelming majority of local police agencies 
in the U.S. (BJS, 2015), there is still quite a diversity of law enforcement agencies, structures and 
jurisdictions that were not included in this research; examples include: State police, county 
police, Sherriff’s, federal police, and any number of other law enforcement agencies to which the 
DOJ has jurisdiction. Because of the diversity in both size and structure of law enforcement 
agencies in the United States, focusing on municipal police limited the number of cases for 
analysis, thereby constraining the quantitative modeling and analysis. This however, does 






 If we are entering into a new era in federal intervention as posited in the conclusion, there 
are great opportunities for future research in how § 14141 is applied at the state level, in the 
national shift towards collaborative policing, and how implementation of this new paradigm of 
intervention functions to forestall unconstitutional policing practices. What becomes of this new 
era, and how it will play out is an area ripe for academic, and practitioner study. As this era 
continues to emerge, scholars can move into studying the next phase of § 14141, namely that of 
outcomes, and how they compare across different levels of governmental intervention with 
municipal police. A future researcher might seek to answer the following question: Which level 
of government intervention, federal or state, is responsible for the most successful long-term 
outcomes for municipal police?  
 As well, there are other questions that remain unanswered from this dissertation. Related 
to the concept of disjointed incrementalism; through my research I have posited that the length of 
an investigation, and number and type of findings, may reflect a previously unaccounted for 
variable – cooperation between organizations. A line of inquiry can explore this phenomenon as 
cooperation between municipal police, and state-level enforcement authorities may have 
implications just as it did between federal and municipal jurisdictions.  
 From the MS framework, two lines of inquiry are foreseeable. First, the influence of 
“spillovers” and the “clustering” effect can be explored on two levels in the fourth era of federal 
intervention. That is, since Illinois has adopted a policy of state-level intervention under the § 
14141 model: Will other states follow? Also, what will be the implications of a state intervention 
for other within-state police agencies? Second, further analysis of the relationship between 




unresolved here, as well in the broader literature. This is another line of inquiry worth pursuing, 
particularly, how the combination of elements in the political stream apply, or do not apply, for 
state-level investigation, intervention, and enforcement.  
 Methodologically, the embedded design that was used for this dissertation – thematic 
analysis, followed by theoretically supported quantitative analysis, can be used as a template to 
analyze municipal police agencies that are engaged in voluntary collaborative policing reforms 
with the DOJ, and compare those to municipal police departments that have been subject of § 
14141-like intervention at the state-level. This is not dissimilar to comparing municipal police 
departments by investigative outcome, but for the voluntariness of the police agency in the 
collaborative reform model.  
 Finally, the model proposed in this study to forestall patterns or practices of 
unconstitutional policing, the SIRR model, can be expanded upon to include a wider-variety of 
police agencies, not just municipal police. Additionally, this model can be tested to determine the 
effectiveness of forestalling unconstitutional policing across different types of police agencies, 
and the applicability of the variables in the model. A future researcher might ask the question: 
How does the SIRR model forestall unconstitutional policing across different structures of police 
organizations?   
 If it is accepted that the relationship between the police and federal intervention has 
entered into a fourth era, the previously described lines of inquiry will expand our knowledge of 
policing, oversight, research methods, and the integration of criminological and public policy 
theory, while serving to assist municipal police agencies to be better functioning organizations 
that meet their missions within the guidelines set forth by applicable law, and most importantly, 






     
Appendix A: Municipal police agencies in the study population 
     
Table A     
N = 33 Municipal Police Agencies Ordered by Investigation Date. 
 









Pittsburgh Bureau of Police PA April-96 January-97 Neg Set 
Los Angeles Police Department CA July-96 May-00 Neg Set 
Steubenville Police Department OH September-96 June-97 Neg Set 
Columbus Division of Police OH March-98 October-99 Neg Set 
Washington Metro D.C. Police DCb February-99 June-01 Neg Set 
Cleveland Division of Police OH August-00 June-03 Neg Set 
Detroit Police Department MI December-00 June-02 Neg Set 
Cincinnati Division of Police OH May-01 October-01 Neg Set 
Schenectady Police Department NY April-02 March-03 TAL 
Miami Police Department FL May-02 March-03 TAL 
Portland Police Department ME May-02 March-03 TAL 
Alabaster Police Department AL March-03 November-04 TAL 
Bakersfield Police Department CA June-03 April-04 TAL 
Beacon Police Department NY August-04 June-05 Neg Set 
Warren Police Department OH December-04 March-06 Neg Set 
Easton Police Department PA October-05 January-10 Neg Set 
Austin Police Department TX May-07 December-08 TAL 
Yonkers Police Department NY August-07 June-09 Neg Set 
Lorain Police Department OH November-08 January-12 TAL 
Harvey Police Department IL November-08 May-12 TAL 
Inglewood Police Department CA March-09 December-09 TAL 
New Orleans Police Department LA May-10 March-11 Neg Set 
Seattle Police Department WA March-11 December-11 Neg Set 
Newark Police Department NJ May-11 July-14 Neg Set 
Portland Police Bureau OR June-11 September-12 Neg Set 
Miami Police Department FL November-11 July-13 Neg Set 
Meridian Police Department MS December-11 August-12 Neg Set 
Missoula Police Department MT May-12 May-13 Neg Set 
Albuquerque Police Department NM November-12 April-14 Neg Set 
Cleveland Division of Police OH March-13 December-14 Neg Set 
Ferguson Police Department MO September-14 March-15 Neg Set 
Baltimore City Police Department MD May-15 August-16 Neg Set 
Chicago Police Department IL December-15 January-17 Neg Set 
Note. Ordered by investigation date. a “Neg Set” refers to negotiated settlement, and “TAL” refers to technical 




Appendix B: Preliminary coding framework with triangulation 
    
Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 






…result in significant part from a 
lack of accountability and review 
systems within the NPD. The NPD 
has neither a functioning early 
warning system nor an effective 
internal affairs structure. 
 
 
Refers to police 
agency’s system of 
accountability and 
review; not specific 








…the manual has not been 




Refers to failures to 
update policies and 







We also have concerns that 
officers’ interactions with 
women victims of sexual assault 
and with transgender individuals 




enforcement by intent, 
design, or outcome 







…insufficient communication and 
cooperation with its law 
enforcement and community 
partners regarding their 





with transmission of 
critical information 






Community policing must be a 
core philosophy that is infused 
throughout the Department’s 














CDP’s civilian complaint system, 
as a whole, is disorganized and 
ineffective.  CDP was only able to 
produce a fraction of the case 
 
Describes deficiencies in 
policies, procedures, 
practices, and systems 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 
Code Exemplar Extract Description of Code 
Code 
Triangulation 
files we requested, and the files 
produced were often incomplete 
and lacked basic information 
about dispositions and 
outcomes.  CDP does not have 
systems in place to track its 
performance or decision-making 
regarding civilian complaints. 
 
complaint making 
process; not the 




…we observed that there was no 
consistent understanding of the 
department’s community 
policing program within the 
ranks.  Even commanders had 
inconsistent understandings of 




policies and procedures 
where there is a lack of 
clarity or understanding 
regarding a given topic, 








…the Division must undergo a 
cultural shift at all levels to 
change an “us-against-them” 
mentality we too often observed 
and to truly integrate and 
inculcate community oriented 
policing principles into the daily 




Refers to broadly 









…downsized ICS has insufficient 
authority and stature to perform 
its function effectively. 
 
Refers to the real or 
imagined perception 
that a unit/division 
within a police 
department lacks the 
formal authority to take 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 
Code Exemplar Extract Description of Code 
Code 
Triangulation 
The NPD has no set presumptive 
penalties for particular 
violations.  As a result, the Trial 
Board can impose the same 
punishment for an officer’s 
failure to report to work on time 
as for the officer’s use of 
excessive force against a civilian. 
 
Formal authority of a 
police department to 
manage, correct or 
discipline its members. 
Can be individualized or 







Not all of CDP’s zone cars have 
computers and, of those that do, 
the computers do not all reliably 
work.  Even the MDCs that do 
work properly do not give 
officers access to CAD or CDP’s 
Records Management System. 
 
 
References to deficient 
equipment, or lack of 
sufficient and necessary 
equipment to perform 




Fail to adhere to 
best practices 
This practice is out of the norm 
for police departments across 
the country, and the NPD’s 
leadership acknowledged that it 
is inappropriate and may 
discourage complainants from 
coming forward. 
 
References to a police 
department’s practices 
not in keeping with 
established standards of 
well-run police 
organizations and/or 






…lack of name plates poses a 
potential impediment to the 
accurate identification of YPD 
employees involved in alleged 
misconduct. 
 
Practices that prevent 
individual officers from 
being held accountable 









BPD also fails to collect data on a 
range of law enforcement 
actions, and even when it 
collects data, fails to store it in 
 
Failure to enable a 
system to collect and 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 
Code Exemplar Extract Description of Code 
Code 
Triangulation 
systems that are capable of 






Our review also revealed some 
disturbing lapses and omissions 
by MPD investigators. 
 
 
Deficiencies related to 
the investigation of 
complaints of 
misconduct made 
against officers; not 









CDP does not use an adequate 
early intervention system to help 
identify risky and problematic 
trends in officer behavior before 
a pattern or practice of 
misconduct arises, such as the 
pattern or practice of excessive 
force that we found here. 
 
 
References to an 
adequate system that 
allows for police 
management to 
monitor, track, and 
assess police officer 








…misunderstanding of critical 
principles of consent and 
incapacitation that are often at 
the center of these sensitive 
sexual assault investigations. 
 
 
Police officers, or entire 
police departments that 
are ignorant of general 









Officers report that they receive 
little supervision, guidance, and 
support from the Division, 
essentially leaving them to 
determine for themselves how to 





with higher-than front 
line supervision that 
have a detrimental 








…tamper with evidence and/or 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 
Code Exemplar Extract Description of Code 
Code 
Triangulation 









…officers are still expected to 
negotiate their compensation 
with the Detail employer and 
officers who coordinate Details 
still wield inordinate influence 
including, in some instances, 
over their superiors 
 
 
When systems and/or 
processes allow for 






BPD’s legacy of zero tolerance 
enforcement continues to drive 
its policing in certain Baltimore 
neighborhoods and leads to 
unconstitutional stops, searches, 
and arrests.  Many BPD 
supervisors instruct officers to 
make frequent stops and 
arrests—even for minor offenses 
and with minimal or no 
suspicion—without sufficient 
consideration of whether this 
enforcement strategy promotes 
public safety and community 




When a police 
organization has geared 
itself towards 
performing activities in 
a specific way in 
furtherance of a goal, 










BPD has conducted virtually no 
analysis of its own data to ensure 
that its enforcement activities 
are non-discriminatory, and the 
Department misclassifies or 
otherwise fails to investigate 
specific complaints of racial bias. 
 
 
The practice of 
reviewing internal 
mechanisms and 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 






The Department also lacks 
adequate civilian oversight—its 
Civilian Review Board is 
hampered by inadequate 
resources, and the agency’s 
internal affairs and disciplinary 
process lacks transparency. 
 
Refers to faulty 
processes with external 






Policy and legal 
inconsistencies 
 
NPD has misunderstood or 
misapplied the distinction 
between criminal and 
administrative investigations and 
abdicated its independent 
responsibility to conduct an 
administrative investigation to 
determine whether officer-
involved shootings violate NPD 




Refers to situations in 
which findings indicate 
that the police agency 
does not follow its own 
policies in practice, or is 








EPD does not have a written 
policy or procedure that 
prescribes what the 
Commanders or Chief should 
review in making their 
determination regarding the 
appropriateness of the force. 
 















The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees a pretrial detainee 
the right to receive adequate 
medical care, and that right is 
violated if officials are 
deliberately indifferent to the 




Refers to deficient 
practices involving 
prisoners concerning 
medical care, transport, 
incapacitation, shelter, 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 




…failure to prioritize the 
recruitment of high-quality 
candidates contributes to the 
chronic, Department-wide 
problems we observed. 
 
Refers to deficient 
practices related to 
hiring candidates to be 
police officers; does not 










We recommend that the 
department conduct a staffing 
study to determine how many 
officers would need to be added 
to the Team, as well as how 
many patrol officers would need 
to be trained and certified, to 
ensure that someone with the 
appropriate skills is always 
available in all parts of the city. 
 
Describes conditions 
that warrant a police 
department to conduct 
self-study and/or learn 







We concluded that OPS was 
understaffed; investigators were 
not provided with the guidance 
and resources necessary to do 
their jobs effectively; 
investigations were untimely; 
civilians’ access to the complaint 
process was limited; and some 
complaints that should have 
been investigated were not.  
More than ten years later, these 
problems remain and, in some 
cases, have worsened.  Current 
deficiencies in the complaint 
process include impossibly high 









that have deficiencies in 
manpower or funding; 










…improper seizures of persons, 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 
Code Exemplar Extract Description of Code 
Code 
Triangulation 
made based on reasonable 
suspicion and making arrests 
without probable cause; seizures 
of property not based on 
probable cause; and improper 
searches of persons and property 
with insufficient cause. 
 
Lack of constitutional 
authority to perform a 
stop and frisk or arrest. 
Lack of sufficient 
reasonable suspicion 
and/or probable cause. 
Differentiated from 
unjustified arrests 







APD’s policies, training, and 
supervision are insufficient to 
ensure that officers encountering 
people with mental illness or in 
distress do so in a manner that 
respects their rights and is safe 
for all involved. 
 
Describes deficient 
practices to vulnerable 
populations, particularly 







Accusations of theft and 
corruption are most often 
leveled against officers in 
specialized units—particularly 
the various narcotics, gang, and 





Refers to deficiencies 














Inadequate screening procedures 
allow officers with multiple theft 
complaints to be assigned to a 
specialized unit or transferred to 
another specialized unit while 




related to transfer or 
promotion to a unit or 
assignment for which 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 







Policing is a high-stress 
profession. Law enforcement 
officers often are called upon to 
deal with violence or crises as 
problem solvers, and they often 
are witnesses to human tragedy.  
In Chicago, this stress is 
particularly acute, for several 
reasons.  Increasing levels of gun 
violence and neighborhood 
conditions take their toll on 
officers as well as residents. 
 
 
Refers to officer health 
both physical and 
emotional; systems 
within police 
departments that allow 
for officer assistance; 
police officer working 
conditions that 







…supervisors often fail to meet 
their responsibility to provide 




Describes the failure of 











We found that officers engage in 
tactically unsound and 
unnecessary foot pursuits, and 
that these foot pursuits too often 





Refers to the use of 
physical restraints, use 
of weapons, and means 
of control by officers 







CDP does not have effective 
mechanisms in place to ensure 
that its officers have received 
training that is adequate in its 
content, quality, and quantity. 
 
 
Describes conditions of 
training both at the 
academy and in-service 
level, that fail to 
appropriately address 
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Table B 
Preliminary coding framework with code description and triangulation. 
    
Preliminary 
Code Exemplar Extract Description of Code 
Code 
Triangulation 






…conversations with FPD 
officers, one officer admitted 
that when he conducts a traffic 
stop, he asks for identification 
from all passengers as a matter 
of course.  If any refuses, he 
considers that to be “furtive and 
aggressive” conduct and cites—
and typically arrests. 
 
Arrests that are made 
without probable cause; 
differentiate from 
search and seizure in 






CPD policy requires officers to 
report force but, in practice, 
officers are not required to 
provide detail about the force 
they used that is sufficient for an 
adequate review, and most 




Refers to policies, 
practices and systems 
that contribute to 
unreasonable, 
unnecessary, or 
excessive use of force 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 
Theme Subtheme Description Example from data (DOJ Investigation) 
Conditions of 
ambiguity - 
Lack of clarity, appropriate 
direction or guidance in 
matters related to policy, 
procedure, protocol or 
reporting. Individual and 
group confusion, and 
contradiction in responsibility 
or action leading to a lack of 
understand of required police 
duties or functionality. 
 
The use of force policy has 
changed, but the policy in place 
at the time of our investigation 
was confusing, at times 
conflicted with the law, and did 
not provide sufficient guidance 
to officers. Indeed, many 
officers reported to us that they 
did not understand the policy 
and, more generally, did not 
understand what level of force 
they were permitted to use 





When an organization 
increasingly bases its 
approach to customers or 
clients on what best serves 
the comfort or preference of 
employees (O’Hara, 2012). 
 
- 
- Internal partiality 
Decisions and investigations 
specifically favoring 
employees in police actions 




who are charged with 
conducting unbiased reviews of 
officers’ use of deadly force 
admitted to us that they 
conduct their investigations 
with the goal of casting the 
accused officer in the most 














A municipal police 
organization that has the 
necessary and appropriate 
policies, but does not follow 
 
While Chief Jackson 
implemented new department 
policies when he joined FPD in 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 
Theme Subtheme Description Example from data (DOJ Investigation) 
them, or routinely ignores 
policies as a matter of widely-
accepted practice. 
 
reporting and review, these 








Failing to have established or 
maintain and adhere to 
acceptable standards in 








Selection and appointment of 
personnel to agency positions 
in which they were not 
qualified, trained, prepared, 
or disqualified but assigned. 
 
…the NPD has failed to 
appropriately train its 
investigators.  NPD command 
staff and officers, IA 
investigators, and Integrity 
Compliance Officers (“ICO”) 
consistently reported that 
investigative experience has not 
been required to become an 











Deficiencies with internal 
control systems, common 
police practices, 
communication failures, and 
training. Police agencies that 
are capable of adhering to 
professional standards but do 
not do so. 
 
 
…so much of the department’s 
training program is not 
documented, it was difficult for 
us—as it is for the department 
itself—to fully evaluate most of 













Practices and policies that are 




This practice is out of the norm 
for police departments across 
the country, and the NPD’s 
leadership acknowledged that it 
is inappropriate and may 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 








Failure of accountability 
within the chain-of-
command; leadership 
indifference to institutional 
problems, not providing the 
organization the support and 
guidance as necessary and 
appropriate. Generalized lack 
of investment of proper and 
appropriate police services by 
leadership. 
 
Commanders seem to take no 
notice of, much less hold 
accountable, supervisors who 
approve egregious uses of force 
without question, conduct 
obviously flawed investigations, 
sign off on clearly deficient 
arrest reports, or who simply do 
not supervise 






Organizational outlook and 
enduring legacy. Widespread 
and endorsed strategies; 
outlook and practices geared 
towards a specific end. Can 









Law enforcement priority is 
to fight crime, but in doing so, 
adhere to illegitimate means. 
 
Ferguson’s law enforcement 
practices are shaped by the 
City’s focus on revenue rather 
than by public safety needs.  
This emphasis on revenue has 
compromised the institutional 
character of Ferguson’s police 
department, contributing to a 




- Prevailing cultural view 
Dominant way of thinking 
within the organization. 
…longstanding deficiencies that 
have allowed a culture of 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 
Theme Subtheme Description Example from data (DOJ Investigation) 
policing and insularity to 






Short term thinking, 
insularity. Not recognizing 
risk (Catino, 2013). 
 
- 
- Adaptation failure 
Failing to adapt to changing 
external conditions in an 
appropriate manner to the 
point of detriment to the 
police organization and 
community. 
 
In light of the diversity of the 
Yonkers community, we also 
recommend that any warnings 
issued to individuals prior to the 
deployment of the K-9 Unit be 
issued in Spanish, as well as in 
English (Yonkers, 2009). 
 
- Conflicts of interest 
Practices that are in 
opposition to the interest and 
autonomy of a police agency 
or a police officer’s duties. 
 
MPD policy requires officers to 
automatically arrest a student 
whenever school officials or 
staff indicate that they would 









Failure to effectively 
communicate with 
organizations outside the 
agency, community groups, 
oversight bodies, and partner 
agencies, leading to 




WPD should hold community 
outreach meetings. The 
meetings should be an open 
forum for all citizens to discuss 







Failing to use, collect or 
analyze information for the 
betterment of the police 
department. Fail to research 
 
We recommend that the 
department conduct a staffing 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 
Theme Subtheme Description Example from data (DOJ Investigation) 
and learn, review or allocate 
resources in an efficient and 
effective manner. 
officers would need to be 
added to the Team, as well as 
how many patrol officers would 
need to be trained and 
certified, to ensure that 
someone with the appropriate 
skills is always available in all 










and otherwise criminal 
conduct committed by 
officers as a matter of routine 
within a police agency. 
 
- 
- Abuse of authority 
Using police authority in an 
intentionally abusive, 
unnecessary, or excessive 




Officers use force against 
individuals, including persons in 
handcuffs, in circumstances that 
appeared not only unnecessary 
but deliberately retaliatory 







Policing practices that are 
motivated by bias towards 
any particular class of 
persons. Bias can be 
intentional or have a 
differential impact. 
in case reports with video 
recordings of the same 
interviews further suggested to 
us that MPD's sexual assault 
investigations are at times 
compromised by an 
investigator's unwarranted 
gender-based assumptions and 








When elements of the 
organization increasingly 
operate according to their 
own standards, with little 
 
NPD has been aware for several 
years that theft by some of its 
officers is a serious problem. 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 
Theme Subtheme Description Example from data (DOJ Investigation) 
regard for the larger 
organization and its rules. Or 
violation of laws and criminal 
activity by subgroups of 
officers (O’Hara, 2012). 
 
and IA have conducted several 
reviews of officers with high 







Police action; arrests, search 
and seizure, without the 
necessary legal justification. 
 
Many of the victims of excessive 
force, false arrest or charges, 
and/or an improper search are, 
at the time 
when the misconduct occurs, 
carrying out some ordinary, 
routine daily activity (either not 
violating the law or committing 











Inappropriate use of 
discretion in tactical 
situations, improper use of 







Not adhering to a force 
continuum; using tactical 
discretion inappropriately, 
and unnecessarily. Legally 
justified, but reasonable use 
of force for a given situation. 
Officers frequently use 
takedown procedures in ways 
that unnecessarily increase the 
harm to the person.  Finally, 
officers escalate situations in 
which force could have been 




- Equipment inadequacies 
Inadequate, improper usage 
of, or insufficient equipment 
for modern police 
functionality. 
 
…other basic equipment is 
either outdated or nonexistent.  
For instance, officers lack 
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Table C    
Theme and subtheme codebook with descriptions and examples. 
 
Theme Subtheme Description Example from data (DOJ Investigation) 
called Mobile Data Computers. 
(Cleveland, 2014). 
 
- Weapon competency 
Incompetent use of weapons 
or tools. 
 
…recognized deficiencies such 
as poor marksmanship, 
shooting from too great a 
distance, failure to follow 
perimeter protocol, and firing at 






Appendix D: Significant relationships; IV by IV 
 
Table D 
Phi coefficients for significant relationships, IV by IV. 
 % non-white Size Pop. Res. 
Focus.  





















white 1 .389* .389* .344* - - - - - - - - -.385* - - 
Size .389* 1 - .344* - - - - - - .407* .420* -.385* - - 
Population .389* - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Resources .344* .344* - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Focusing 
event - - - - 1 - .449** - - - - - - - - 
Indicators - - - - - 1 - .454** - - .879*** .401* - - - 
Feedback - - - - .449** - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Use of 








- - - - - - - - .440* 1 - - -.481** - -.489** 
Civilian 
complaint - .407* - - - .879*** - .528** - - 1 .489** - - - 
Internal 
discipline - .420* - - - .401* 
- 




Appendix D: Significant relationships; IV by IV 
 
Table D 
Phi coefficients for significant relationships, IV by IV. 
 % non-white Size Pop. Res. 
Focus.  




















Pres. party -.385* -.385* - - - - - - - -.481** - -.340* 1 - - 
National 









- - - - - - - - - -.489** - - - - 1 
Note. (-) Not reported since p > .05. Bolded coefficients, ϕ > .50 




Appendix E: Phi coefficients; IVs by themes 
 
Table E 






















% non-white -.06 .12 -.16 .10 .42* .36* .14 .19 
Resources .18 .05 .16 .14 .26 .12 .11 .23 
Size .20 .12 .19 .10 .42* .04 .39* .05 
Population -.18 .12 -.16 .10 .15 -.27 .14 .05 
Focusing event -.06 -.05 .19 .10 .01 .20 .14 .19 
Indicators .56** -.18 .42* .22 .26 .24 -.17 .55** 
Feedback -.05 .03 .23 .06 .18 -.30 .16 .31 
Use of force .41* -.13 .56** .29 .19 .12 -.26 .56** 
Search, seizure, & 
arrest .08 .21 -.13 .31 .32 .30 .29 .01 
Response to special 
populations -.08 .14 -.23 .45** .67*** .19 .35* -.13 
Civilian complaint .49** -.16 .48** .15 .23 .07 -.11 .44* 
Internal discipline .22 .19 .34* .03 .15 .14 -.12 .26 
Presidential party .35* -.18 .14 .01 -.22 -.10 -.49** .31 
National mood .55** .18 -.14 -.26 -.20 .26 -.39* .27 
More than one in 
state -.14 -.19 .21 -.08 -.30 -.25 -.32 -.06 
Note: Significant coefficients bolded for acuity. 




Appendix F: Variables and themes 
 
Table F 
Relating Variables to Themes. 





Percent non-white ≥ 54% Organizational orientation & culture Organizational myopia 
Tactical discretion, 
etc. 
Percent non-white < 54% Lack of professional currency Conditions of ambiguity 
Leadership & 
management failure 
Resources ≥ 2.8 sworn per 
population 
Organizational 
orientation & culture Tactical discretion, etc.  
Conditions of 
ambiguity 
Resources < 2.8 sworn per 
population Institutionalization Routinized Misconduct Organizational myopia 
Size ≥ 500 sworn employees Organizational orientation & culture Routinized misconduct 
Conditions of 
ambiguity 
Size < 500 sworn employees Organizational myopia Tactical discretion, etc. Leadership & management failure 
Population ≥ 250k Organizational orientation & culture Routinized misconduct Institutionalization  
Population < 250k Organizational myopia Conditions of ambiguity Lack of professional currency 
Focusing event Organizational myopia Tactical discretion, etc.  Lack of professional currency 
Indicators – deficient EIS Conditions of ambiguity Tactical discretion, etc. Lack of professional currency 
Feedback Tactical discretion, etc. Lack of professional currency 
Organizational 
orientation & culture 
Use of force Lack of professional currency Tactical discretion, etc. 
Conditions of 
ambiguity 
Search, seizure, & arrest Organizational orientation & culture 
Leadership & 
management failure Organizational myopia 
Response to special 
populations 
Organizational 
orientation & culture 
Leadership & 
management failure Routinized misconduct 
Civilian complaint system Conditions of ambiguity Lack of professional currency 
Tactical discretion, 
etc. 
Internal discipline Lack of professional currency Tactical discretion, etc.  
Conditions of 
ambiguity 
Presidential party - Democrat Routinized misconduct Organizational orientation & culture Institutionalization  
Presidential party - 
Republican Conditions of ambiguity Tactical discretion, etc. 
Lack of professional 
currency 
National mood – positive Conditions of ambiguity Tactical discretion, etc. Organizational myopia 
National mood - negative Routinized misconduct Leadership & management failure 
Organizational 
orientation & culture 
More than one in state Lack of professional currency Tactical discretion, etc. 
Leadership & 
management failure 
Note. Thematic order was determined by the phi coefficient strength of association. aSignificant phi correlations 




Appendix G: Matrix of Hypotheses 
Table G 
Matrix of Hypotheses 
Hypotheses Hypotheses - As Stated Results 
H1 
Thematic findings will differ between municipal police agencies 




Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have 




Second-generation output will be significantly longer than first-
generation output. Confirmed 
H4 
First-generation § 14141 investigations will have lasted longer than 
second-generation investigations. Rejected 
H5 
The length of an investigation will be negatively associated with the 




H6 DOJ’s investigative findings will differ over time.  Confirmed 
H7 
Environmental and organizational characteristics will differ between 
police agencies found to engage in unconstitutional policing, and 




Municipal police agency resources will be negatively associated with 




Municipal police agencies experiencing a focusing event are more 
likely to have been found to engage in unconstitutional policing than 
those that have not experienced a focusing event. 
Rejected 
H10 
Municipal police agencies found to have deficient intervention 
systems will be more likely to engage in unconstitutional policing 
than municipal police departments without such deficiencies. 
Rejected 
H11 
Municipal police agencies with focusing events are more likely to 
have accompaniment in the form of feedback, than police agencies 
without focusing events. 
Confirmed 
H12 
Municipal police agencies under negotiated settlement will have a 




The number of deficient policies will be positively associated with the 
number of thematic findings. Confirmed 
H14 
The number of observed § 14141 investigations occurring during the 
tenure of each president will differ from expected observations. Rejected 
H15 Investigative outcomes will differ between political parties. Confirmed 
He 
Organizational and environmental characteristics for municipal 
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 I was born Jason William Ostrowe on May 22nd, 1975 in Syosset, New York – the 
immediate shadow of New York City. My upbringing was middle-class and typical of many 
families from the 1970s and 1980s experiencing the tumult of a divorced household. With my 
parents separating when I was just an infant – I grew up like so many others from that 
generation; sometimes a latch-key kid, other times within a stepfamily. My mother, who was my 
primary caretaker throughout both my childhood and young adulthood, was a high-school 
graduate and worked in jobs that did not require a college education or specialized skill. My 
father, like his brother and father before him, were police officers in the NYPD. Although my 
immediate family was small and we lived modestly, we never suffered for a lack of the important 
things. This was due to my mother’s tireless enthusiasm for life, and love for her children. 
 From as early as I can recall, I was always invigorated by learning and new experiences. I 
remember quite well as a young child being fascinated by all the information in encyclopedias, 
spending hours upon hours reading them through, absorbing what I could – the knowledge made 
me feel alive. Learning was my proclivity, and I was fortunate to grow up in an environment 
where it was nurtured.  
 As a young boy and adolescent, when adults would ask what I wanted to be when I grew 
up, much to my mother’s chagrin, I would answer, “a police officer”. In retrospect, this career 
choice had more to do with modeling than my own best course – of which: Can anyone really 
know at such an age? Choosing a career isn’t easy for an adult, much less a child. But what I’ve 
always known is that I was never motivated by the acquisition of wealth or taken by the spirit of 
entrepreneurship; my tendencies and aspirations were towards personal development, fulfillment, 




 As a young adult entering college, I dedicated myself to personal and academic 
excellence; I aspired to the highest levels of achievement attainable. My motivation sprang from 
a lifetime of academic underachievement – embarrassingly so, and a desire to actualize the 
thoughtful, intelligent, and accomplished person residing in me. I realized this goal for the first 
time as an undergraduate, having been recognized for outstanding academic achievement by my 
program. 
 It was during this time that I decided to pursue a career in policing. This did not come 
easily, and although I have a family history in the field, it was not ordained. For years I was 
between pursuing a police or teaching career, having always had a passion for history, public 
policy, politics, law, and science. My decision at age 20 to major in public justice and 
psychology sent me on the path which I am just now completing. In retrospect, this decision had 
more to do with the aspiration to be part of something meaningful and important, my family 
connection to the career, and the extrinsic stability that comes with a career as a civil service 
employee. All safe choices.  
 So, in 1999 at the age of 24 and a year out of college, I was hired by the NYPD; it was a 
proud moment, and made me feel connected to my father and his father, who I never really 
knew, and the fulfillment of entering into a career with meaning. My experience in policing as a 
new officer was similar to that of the many thousands who came before me, then the events of 
9/11 happened. I was on-duty in Manhattan during that day, and lived and worked through the 
chaos that ensued for months on end. This event dramatically changed many people’s lives, as 
well, it set me on both a career and academic trajectory that I did not envision. 
 After a few short years as an officer, I began to crave the intellectual stimulation and 




new era not just in policing, but in higher education, and it was in 2003 that John Jay College 
began offering a graduate program in police studies for law enforcement officers – this program 
was in part a response to 9/11.  
 I took the program on with great enthusiasm, yet still a police officer, attending classes 
on weekends, completing it in 2006, and subsequently enrolling in John Jay’s Master of Public 
Administration program. At that same time, I was accepted to become an academic instructor in 
the NYPD Police Academy. I knew I wanted to teach – that feeling never left – and had long-
term plans to do so as second career. So, I thought what better opportunity to gain some 
experience in the classroom.  
 I excelled in teaching, and enjoyed it immensely. The skills necessary to be a quality 
teacher all came very easily – planning, structure, organization, reading, understanding, 
communicating, etc., but most needed are passion and interest, in which I possessed in 
abundance. It was during this time I realized that I wanted to become a college professor, and 
thus began that journey.  
 Taking graduate level classes on Saturdays, after a week working at the police academy 
required a certain level of sacrifice and dedication, but I did it without complaint, and found 
great satisfaction in the process. The motivation that I brought to my undergraduate career still 
abided, and with it, I finished the degree in 2011, earning the program award for highest overall 
GPA – a perfect 4.0. 
 During that same time, I began making plans to work toward a PhD, and used my 
connections in the police department for assignment as a policy analyst in the Office of 
Management Analysis and Planning. There, I gained valuable policy analysis experience, and 




PhD program at the CUNY Graduate Center, specializing in policy, oversight, and 
administration. I began the program in 2012, and attended part-time while still employed as a 
New York City Police Officer.  
 The PhD program from the outset was a grind; graduate studies at the master’s and 
doctoral level differentiate the consumer from the producer, this took me some time to realize, 
the difference is a leap, and profoundly more challenging. I often felt adrift and floundering in 
the PhD program, I frequently considered discontinuing. But for many reasons, whether to prove 
to myself, accomplish something meaningful, feed my need for knowledge and learning, or 
simply to see it through, I continued-on while still a police officer.  
 I left the NYPD in 2015 to pursue other opportunities and continue my doctoral studies, 
which at that point became untenable to maintain. Through fits and starts, I was able to 
successfully transition to career in higher education, realizing a long-held dream of becoming a 
college professor.  
 I was hired as full-time faculty at BMCC in 2016, a hairs-breath away from the WTC 
site, and the only institution of higher education that sustained damage on 9/11. With this change 
in career came opportunity. I approached my doctoral studies with renewed vigor and 
determination. And in late 2016, began development of my proposal. I knew it had to have 
certain core elements: originality, access to data, an analytical plan, and a topic that could add 
value to the literature. In the course of my studies I was introduced to John Kingdon’s multiple 
streams framework, and became fascinated with how it could be applied to explain various types 
of public policy and organizational decision-making. With my background in policing, teaching, 
and policy analysis; a study of how a law is applied to police departments by the Department of 




 My proposal went to committee and was approved in May 2018; thus, I went all-in 
completing my dissertation. From June through December I navigated the demands of family 
life, full-time employment, and researching and writing a dissertation. This required balance, 
planning, and time-management, but also, support, none more than from my wife. I finished my 
manuscript on December 15th, 2018, and felt that I had done something quite special. I received 
news in early March 2019 that my dissertation was accepted with minor revisions, my defense 
was then scheduled for May. 
 Completing a dissertation is not easy, nor should it be. I know of no one who suggests 
otherwise. It is a rarefied achievement, and with it should come great satisfaction. When people 
remark about how they could never do it, I offer the following analogy: Completing a 
dissertation is similar to running a marathon – you don’t have to be the best athlete, but athletic 
enough, and with years of dedication, commitment, persistence, and timing, you’ll successfully 
complete those 26.2 miles. Likewise, completing a dissertation requires a certain level of 
competence, but more important, the student must possess the extraordinary dedication, 
commitment, persistence, and timing to successfully navigate the many bumps, diversions, and 
challenges in the road to completion – its own 26.2-mile path of discovery. 
 My struggles throughout this journey were numerous but not unique, yet, they were all 
mine to own and overcome. I managed to navigate the PhD process and see it successfully 
through while so many others give up along the way for any number of reasons – job, family, 
other priorities, lack of commitment, and all of life’s vicissitudes.  
 This dissertation was 20-plus years in the making, beginning as that college kid 
introspectively weighing career choices. I have many people to thank for their love, support, 




accomplishment possible, ultimately, my 20-plus year journey is one of self-actualization. The 
person I always knew I was; thoughtful, intelligent, and accomplished, I never gave up on, and 
for that, I am most proud. 
 May the next 20-year journey be as fulfilling as the last.   
 
        Jason W. Ostrowe 
        May 3rd, 2019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
